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THE RIGHTS OF MAN

A Study

IN TWENTIETH CENTURY PROBLEMS

BY

LYMAN ABBOTT

Democracy is one step in the march of destiny toward an end unknown, and neither merits the praises it has evoked nor the fears it has inspired.

EDMUND SCHERER.



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TO AUGUSTUS LOWELL.

At once a conservative and a liberal, loyal alike to the best traditions of the past and the best hopes for the future, he was peculiarly fitted to be a leader in an original educational enterprise. His wise financial administration conserved and increased the Lowell fund ; his broad culture and liberal spirit conserved and strengthened its intellectual power and promoted its international reputation ; the disinterestedness of his integrity, the catholicity of his sympathies, and the warmth of his undemonstrative nature endeared him to those whom he admitted to his friendship. All who know his work admire him ; all who knew him loved him.

PREFACE

THESE lectures were given in the months of January and February, 1901, before the Lowell Institute of Boston, some of them in November and December preceding before the Brooklyn Institute of Brooklyn, New York. Unlike my previous courses before the Lowell Institute — “The Evolution of Christianity,” and “The Life and Literature of the Ancient Hebrews” — which were rewritten for publication in book form, these lectures, taken down in short-hand, are here published substantially as they were extemporaneously delivered, although I have not hesitated to condense, to eliminate, to elaborate, or to rewrite whenever it seemed important to do so. Their object is sufficiently stated in the opening paragraph of the first lecture. While they deal with the problems which the country has been compelled to confront anew during the past three years, they refer to the specific aspects of these problems only incidentally and by way of illustration. The first six lectures are devoted wholly to a consideration of fundamental principles ; the other six to a consideration of their applications to American problems.

LYMAN ABBOTT.

CORNWALL-ON-HUDSON,
September, 1901.

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I. THE CONFLICT OF THE CENTURIES.

- Hegel : "The Philosophy of History."
Borgeraud : "Rise of Modern Democracy."
Pietro Orri : "Modern Italy."
W. H. Fitchett : "How England saved Europe."
Guizot : "History of Civilization."
Gibbon : "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," chapters 1, 2, and 3.
James Bryce : "The Holy Roman Empire."
John Morley : "Rousseau."
Thomas Carlyle : "Essays, Vol. II. Voltaire."
MacKenzie : "The Nineteenth Century."
Thomas Erskine May : "Democracy in Europe."

II. THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY.

- Benjamin Kidd : "Social Evolution."
Richard T. Ely : "The Labor Movement in America."
Lecky : "History of European Morals."
Lecky : "England in the Eighteenth Century," especially chapters V., VII., and XIII.
Frederic Harrison : "The Meaning of History."
Geo. O. Trevelyan : "The American Revolution," Part I.

III. POLITICAL RIGHTS.

- Plato : "The Republic."
Hobbes : "The Leviathan."
Aristotle : "Politics."

Machiavelli : "The Prince."

W. W. Willoughby : "Social Justice."

Franklin H. Giddings : "Democracy and Empire."

A. Lawrence Lowell : "Essays on Government."

IV. INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS.

Herbert Spencer and others : "A Plea for Liberty."

Charles B. Spahr : "The Distribution of Wealth."

Sidney and Beatrice Webb : "History of Trade Unionism."

Émile De Lavelye : "Socialism of To-Day."

Thomas Kirkup : "An Inquiry into Socialism."

William Graham : "Socialism New and Old."

Thomas G. Shearman : "Natural Taxation."

Henry George : "Progress and Poverty."

V. EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS.

C. W. Eliot : "Educational Reform."

T. H. Huxley : "Essays, Science and Education."

Herbert Spencer : "Education."

J. L. Tadd : "New Methods in Education," Book I., "First Principles."

VI. RELIGIOUS RIGHTS.

Macaulay : Essays, Vol. II., "Gladstone on Church and State."

Gladstone : "Essays," Vols. V. and VI.

H. C. Lea : "A History of the Inquisition."

Köstlin : "The Theology of Luther."

Köstlin : "Martin Luther."

John Henry Newman : "Private Judgment," Essays, Vol. II.

C. A. Briggs : "The Bible, the Church, and the Reason."

VII. AMERICA AS REPRESENTATIVE OF DEMOCRACY.

De Tocqueville : "Democracy in America."

Bryce : "The American Commonwealth."

Nordhoff : "Politics for Young Americans."

VIII. AMERICA'S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

Josiah Strong : "Our Country."

Booker T. Washington : "The Future of the American Negro."

Helen Hunt Jackson : "A Century of Dishonor."

Jordan : "Imperial Democracy."

IX. AMERICA'S FOREIGN PROBLEMS.

Paul L. Reinsch : "World Politics."

Josiah Strong : "Expansion under New World Conditions."

Brooks Adams : "America's Economic Supremacy."

X. PERILS.

Anonymous : "Certain Dangerous Tendencies in American Life."

Robert A. Woods : "The City Wilderness."

W. A. Wyckoff : "The Workers."

H. D. Lloyd : "Wealth against Commonwealth."

C. L. Brace : "The Dangerous Classes of New York."

Jacob A. Riis : "How the Other Half Lives."

S. L. Loomis : "Modern Cities."

XI. SAFEGUARDS.

Theodore Roosevelt : "American Ideals."

C. W. Eliot : "American Contribution to Civilization, and other Essays."

XII. THE GOAL OF DEMOCRACY.

Count Tolstoi : "My Religion."

Lecky : "Democracy and Liberty."

Henry Morley : "Ideal Commonwealths."

Peabody : "Jesus Christ and the Social Question."

Lyman Abbott : "Christianity and Social Problems."

THE RIGHTS OF MAN

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LECTURE I

THE CONFLICT OF THE CENTURIES

IN this course of lectures on the rights of man it will be my attempt to define with some accuracy what those rights are, in State, Church, and Society. The time is opportune for a consideration of this topic. The fundamental questions concerning the rights of man involved in the recent political campaign are not yet answered, and cannot be by a single election. But I hope that it may be found possible for me to write and for others to read with minds freed, not indeed from all prejudice, but from those partisan heats which usually accompany a political contest and render difficult a judicial consideration of the principles involved in it. The people have decided to whom they will intrust the administration of the National Government for the next four years, and have indicated the methods which they expect the Administration to pursue. But the fundamental principles according to which the nation must frame all its policies, both in domestic and in foreign

dealing, remain, and must remain, subjects for public discussion and popular instruction. In these lectures I assume that there are such principles, that they are absolute, eternal, unalterable because they are divine, that they inhere in the nature of man and of human society because they inhere in the nature of God which man inherits from his Father, that God is in his world directing its course toward the ultimate victory of righteous principles, and that by a study of history no less than by consulting our own intuitions and giving heed to the counsels of the great spiritual interpreters of life, Hebrew and Christian, we can learn what those principles are.

In the beginning of the Christian era two ideals of social organization confronted each other, — the Roman and the Hebraic. In the Roman Empire the entire organization, political, social, educational, and religious, was framed and administered for the benefit of the few. The political power was centred in an Emperor, who administered it throughout the vast empire by means of a bureaucracy composed wholly of his appointees; through their administration his jurisdiction, civil and military, extended throughout all its various provinces. There are three great powers which in a free community are intrusted to different bodies, and so tend to counterbalance each other, — the powers respectively of the sword, the purse, and the public conscience. All three were vested in the Emperor. As commander-in-chief of the ar-

mies of Rome, the power of life and death was in his hands in time of war; and all times were times of war. The control of the finances, the adjustment of taxation, and the appointment of the tax-gatherers were vested in him through his appointees, nor did it tend to lessen his real authority that he secured the approval of the Senate by giving to members of that body the chief places of power and emolument. As supreme pontiff he controlled the administration of religion and was able to regulate its functions. This supreme power extended to the remotest provinces of the great empire, and even those cities which retained the name of free cities were without the means of preserving the liberties of their citizens. The provinces were, indeed, regarded valuable only or chiefly as a source of public revenue; the right to collect what revenue could be extorted was sold to wealthy individuals or still wealthier corporations, and by them in turn farmed out to subordinates who paid for the privilege of using the power of the empire to extort what they could from the people.

Industrially and morally, society was no less organized for the benefit of the few. Agriculture was wholly servile; and even in the great cities the full benefit of citizenship belonged only to a small minority, — “a portion,” says Frederic Harrison, “which might not exceed one tenth, whilst ninety per cent. of the actual dwellers within the walls might be slaves, freedmen, aliens, strangers, clients, and camp-followers.”¹ The many toiled

¹ Frederic Harrison: *Meaning of History*, p. 231.

without receiving recompense in the product of their toil; the few lived without industry. Schools for the people were wholly unknown; the only education was in athletics and rhetoric, and this was furnished only to the children of the most favored. The offices of religion were not conducted for the purpose of adding to either the intellectual or the moral culture of the people; there was nothing analogous to either our pulpit or our Sunday-school; the pagan temples were not conducted for an ethical purpose; their function was to minister, not to men, but to the gods, either by propitiating their wrath and so escaping their displeasure, or by winning their favor and so securing, not for the people, but for the Imperial Government, what may be called their alliance. Thus neither religion, education, industry, nor government sought or pretended to seek the well-being of the many. The many were regarded as created for the few; to be fed, amused, governed, compelled to labor, but not to share in the benefits of either religion, education, industry, or government. Such share as they obtained was incidental and indirect, not purposed and planned.

In one province of this great empire were a people who possessed a very different social and political ideal. It is true that partly by their apostasy they had lost, partly by reason of their feebleness they had been robbed of their liberties, and that in this brief sketch I portray less their actual life than the ideals contained in their liter-

ature. In their ideal commonwealth all authority for law was regarded as derived from God, not from military power, and the king was as truly subject to it as was the meanest peasant. His power was strictly limited by the constitution of the commonwealth; he was commander-in-chief of the army, but the army was composed of volunteers; the power of the purse was not given, as in later English history, to a representative assembly, but the amount of tax which might be levied was definitely limited to one tenth of the agricultural product. The existence of a landed aristocracy was prohibited; private ownership of land was not admitted; the land belonged to Jehovah — the landholder was only a tenant and his lease expired every fifty years; no caste or class was allowed; the judges were forbidden to show any superior respect to the rich or the great; bribe-taking was condemned under severe penalties; and the people were required to provide the same law for foreigners dwelling among them as for themselves. Slavery was so hedged about with restrictions that in the beginning of the Christian era it had almost if not entirely disappeared. Industry was honored and commended, and every father was expected to teach his boy some trade, and generally did so. There were schools for the children of the common people in every village, and though, measured by modern standards, the education was but scant, it was perhaps as good as could be expected from a people so poor and so isolated as the Hebrews.

It may indeed be claimed that the priesthood served substantially the same purpose as the priesthood of other peoples, the appeasement of God rather than the inspiration of the people; but they occupied a secondary place in the public estimate. The principal function of the church was to minister to the life of the people, who every week gathered in the synagogues to receive instruction in the principles of their faith; the chief feature of the religious service was a public reading and a public interpretation of their religious books, the message of which may be summed up, in the words of one of their prophets, that "to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God," is all that true religion requires of man.

Thus the religious, the educational, the industrial, and the political institutions of the Roman Empire were all framed on the assumption that the world is made for the few, and the many are to be their servants; those of the Hebrew Commonwealth, on the assumption that the world is made for all, and the few are to be the servants of the many, — a doctrine which has never found a clearer definition than in the statement of the Great Prophet of the New Judaism, "He that is greatest among you shall be your servant." The history of Europe from the first to the nineteenth century may be regarded as the history of the conflict between these two conceptions of life and of the social order, in which, in successive epochs and by successive campaigns, the Hebrew concep-

tion, entertained originally by an insignificant and despised people, has triumphed over the Roman conception once entertained unquestioned throughout the then civilized world.

I have called Jesus Christ the Prophet of the New Judaism, for so he may be called when regarded simply as a social reformer. He took up the message of the earlier Hebrew prophets and repeated, emphasized, amplified, and extended it. His followers built upon their faith in his death and resurrection, a faith that he had come to emancipate the many from the thrall of the few and found a new social order on the earth in which ambition should seek, not the highest things for self, but opportunity for the highest service for others; witnesses to his person and heralds of the new life, they went forth as missionaries to proclaim the advent of a kingdom of God or of heaven on the earth, in which the poor should be recipients of glad tidings, the broken-hearted should be healed, the captives delivered, the blind made to see, and the bruised should receive their liberty. Roman imperialism understood the social significance of this message better than some of those who delivered it, and, seeing very truly that these apostles had come to turn the world upside down, undertook to destroy the new spirit by wholesale persecutions. The attempt failed. The new faith and hope in humanity could not be extinguished; by the end of the fourth century it had captured the empire, though by no means all the people,

and by the seventh century had overturned the old Rome and planted a new Rome in its place. The palace of the Cæsars became the Vatican of the Pope, the temples of the gods were turned into temples to Jehovah and to his Son Jesus Christ, and to Mary the mother of Jesus, and to saints who had given themselves to his service. Lanciani has shown that it was not the Goths and Vandals who destroyed ancient Rome; it was destroyed by the new Rome which built the churches of the new empire not merely on but out of the ruins of the old empire. The physical fact is symbolic of the spiritual. In vain did Charlemagne in the ninth century and Charles V. in the sixteenth century attempt to repeat a world-wide empire with a new capital as its centre. Neither outlived its founder; the real successor of pagan Rome was ecclesiastical Rome.

In this transformation of imperialism from a military to an ecclesiastical organization the New Judaism had won its first victory. It is true that ecclesiastical Rome was as imperial as its predecessor; but the imperialism was ecclesiastical, not military. The history of Rome may be said to have been the reverse of that of the individual man. In the individual the spirit is immortal, the body dies; in the history of Rome the body remained and the new spirit took possession of it. The power of the Pope extended throughout the whole of Europe, and it was as absolute as the power of Augustus had been; it was administered

by a bureaucracy as highly organized; the diocese corresponded to the province, the archbishop and bishop to the proconsul and the procurator. But the secret of power was entirely different. "The Empire," says John Morley, "was a political organization resting on military power; the Church was a social organization made vital by a conviction."¹ The one rested on fear of physical power here, the other on fear of divine penalty hereafter. It may be said that the one fear is no better than the other; but it is different. An empire resting on an idea can be conquered by an idea. By the transformation of pagan Rome into ecclesiastical Rome the battle between Imperialism and Hebraism was transferred from the physical to the spiritual realm.

The fundamental postulate of ecclesiastical Rome was that Jesus Christ had appointed Peter and his successors to be the vicar of God on the earth, to administer his kingdom, and direct and control his Church in his absence; that, therefore, what this vicar of God officially declared was infallibly true, and what he officially commanded must be implicitly obeyed. And inasmuch as a vicar of God could not, in the nature of the case, be everywhere at once to teach the divine truth and exercise the divine authority, inasmuch as he had not the divine quality of omnipresence, his authority must be executed through an ecclesiastical bureaucracy, and the voice of the priest must be accepted

¹ John Morley : *Diderot*, i. 100.

in the remotest parish as the voice of the Pope, — that is, as representing the vicar of God. To refuse to hear and heed this voice was therefore counted, not merely an act of disrespect to an ecclesiastical superior, not merely a peril to the order and unity of the Church, but an act of disloyalty to Almighty God, whose vicar is the Pope, whose pro-vicar is the priest. On this postulate was built the whole superstructure of that ecclesiastical imperialism which constituted the Roman Catholic Church.

Starting with an attack upon what he believed to be an unauthorized abuse in the Church, Martin Luther was driven by the logic of events to deny this postulate. He did not merely put the Bible above the Church as the final authority; he did not merely claim for man what is called the right of private judgment under the authority of either Bible or Church; he affirmed that Christ was with his Church always, even to the end of the world; that he was not merely with the hierarchy, but was with every one who honestly sought to know and do his will; that there could be no vicegerent when the King was present, and that the King is present with and in every soul. The Roman Catholic Church was right to refuse all compromise with Luther; Luther was right to refuse all compromise with the Roman Catholic Church. There are some issues which cannot be compromised. This was such an issue. The final authority must be either outside the soul in a

church or a book, or within the soul in the voice of the reason and the conscience. There cannot be concurrent supreme authorities which sometimes conflict. Luther gradually came to the conviction that the authority was within, not outside, the soul; but when he reached this conviction it was unalterable, and inspired him with a military ardor. "The investigations of the Reformer," says Dr. Julius Köstlin, who is perhaps his best modern interpreter, "lead to a clear conclusion that there is, according to the divine order, no external, tangible, final decision in matters of faith."¹ And that this was Luther's conclusion Dr. Köstlin makes equally clear. In his reply to the Legate of Rome Luther contended, his biographer tells us, that "every faithful believer in Christ was superior to the Pope, if he could show better proofs and grounds of his belief."² Later reformers might draw back from so radical a conclusion; they might seek to find in a new Church, or a new epitome of the doctrine of the ancient Church, or in the Bible as the outgrowth of the primitive Church, a final authority which they could set up against Papal authority. But Luther, who had both a clear vision and an indomitable moral as well as physical courage, struck at the heart of ecclesiastical imperialism in his doctrine that the final authority in the spiritual realm is within, not without; in the conscience, not in a church or a book.

¹ Julius Köstlin: *The Theology of Luther*, i. 509.

² Julius Köstlin: *Life of Martin Luther*, p. 116.

His doctrine was not the right of private judgment, though that right may be deduced from his doctrine; it was the possibility for every soul of direct communion with God, and, therefore, for every soul to take its directions from him and not substitute therefor any vicar or pro-vicar, living or dead, in church or in literature.

It is not necessary for my purpose in this article to trace the history of this conviction and its revolutionary effect on the thought of Europe. Wherever it went it destroyed the superstructure of ecclesiastical imperialism because it destroyed the foundation on which that superstructure was built. The second victory for the new Judaism had been won. Primitive Christianity, by influences working within the Roman Empire, had transformed it from a military to an ecclesiastical autocracy; Lutheranism, working from within, destroyed the foundation of the ecclesiastical autocracy. Speaking broadly, Lutheranism found acceptance only among the Germanic races; among the Latin races the ecclesiastical autocracy remained dominant, and there remained also, based on that autocracy, remnants of the old military imperialism, though not in any one world-wide power.

The religious revolution wrought by Lutheranism was followed by another less dramatic but equally important in its effect on humanity, — an intellectual revolution wrought by science and philosophy. So long as man imagined that this

world was a flat plain, that it was the centre of the universe, that all problems of life belonged to it, that the sun and the moon and the stars were mere subsidiary bodies created to illuminate it, he naturally conceived that the problems of life were all within his comprehension, that it was possible to frame a comprehensive, complete, and adequate theory of the universe, — that is, of the divine life and the divine law. The new astronomy gave to this belief a shock from which it has never recovered. As soon as men understood that this world was not the only nor even the chief stage of divine action, not the only nor even the chief realm in which God's laws are operating; when they realized that it was but a smaller one of many planets in what is probably but a smaller one of many planetary systems; when they began to get a glimpse of the infinitely great, and to discover that the best telescopes which art can create only show the universe, as we know it, to be boundless; when, further, the infinitely little began also to be conceived, and it was discovered that the finest microscopes which man can invent leave the smallest globule of matter still to be analyzed; when, still further, geology and anthropology began to carry history back into boundless realms in the past, and thus an infinity of time as well as an infinity of space became the subject of study, the old notion that man could form a complete system of truth and reveal it infallibly to other men, or receive it, if it were so revealed, became untenable.

Gnosticism yielded to agnosticism; the assumption of an infallible revelation was supplanted by the more modest endeavor to know in part and prophesy in part.

Contemporaneously with this development in observation came a development in thought. Men began to perceive that knowledge comes only by research, and to found their convictions, not on their imagination, but on their investigation. If some, in the reaction against the old scholasticism, denied the value of the intuitions altogether, others, more rational and more catholic, simply insisted that though the prophesyings of the poet and the seer were not to be despised, neither were they to be accepted with unquestioning credulity; that all testimony, whether of observation or consciousness, was to be tested and proved, and only such as could bear the test of a rational examination could be accepted as ascertained and established. Thus, partly through a new science, partly through a new philosophy, was born in Europe the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, which found among its most eminent exponents Kant in Germany, Diderot in France, and Locke in England. While the imperial authority of the Church was rudely shaken and for the Protestant world wholly overthrown by Lutheranism, *i. e.*, by the doctrine that God is in his world and speaks in each soul and needs no vicar, the infallibility of the Church was rudely shaken, and for all who accepted the new philosophy wholly overthrown,

by the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, *i. e.*, by the doctrine that knowledge is not and cannot be instantaneously and infallibly revealed, but, founded on experience and tested by experience, must grow gradually as the soul grows, and must be limited by the limitations which time, space, and the laws and conditions of the human mind impose upon the soul. In the science of Copernicus and Galileo, and in the inductive philosophy of Bacon and what grew out of it, imperialism received a third and fatal blow, this time in the intellectual realm.

Lutheranism affirmed man's right, because his duty, to judge in the moral realm; the new philosophy affirmed his right, because his duty, to think in the intellectual realm; his right to act was still obstructed by remnants of Roman imperialism existing in the political and the industrial realm.

In England, where the progress of liberty was most advanced and best assured, and where the victory over ecclesiastical imperialism was complete by the beginning of the sixteenth century, the battle was first joined between pagan imperialism and Hebraic democracy in the political realm.

Roman imperialism had never truly subjugated the British Isles. Cæsarism withdrew from Great Britain with Cæsar's legions, leaving, as the chief if not the only relics of its occupancy, remains of Roman architecture and Roman roads. It had never taken possession of the life of the people. In the Anglo-Saxon Witenagemot, under Alfred

the Great, the people were represented as they never had been in imperial Rome, and never were in the imperial government of western Europe. The subjugation of the Anglo-Saxons by the Normans gave unity to the kingdom without destroying the spirit of the people. The barons wrested from King John in the Magna Charta concessions which were fatal to absolutism. The common people, under the lead of Simon de Montfort, in the reign of Henry III. entered the Parliament and began the process which was to make the House of the Commons supreme. If the willfulness of Henry VIII. was the occasion, the spirit of independence in the people was the cause of the reformation which separated England from ecclesiastical Rome forever. Bacon, the father of inductive philosophy, was the progenitor of that method of thought which, founding knowledge on experience, is fatal to all ecclesiastical claims of infallibility, and so prepared the way for the more radical if the more practical philosophy of Hume and Locke. Through all these years in England imperialism sat like an uncertain rider on an unbroken horse, and her people were prepared for the final struggle more than a century before the people of the continent of Europe.

Ideas move in the realm of spirit; force in the realm of matter. There are only two ways, therefore, in which a great moral power can overcome a great physical power, — by converting it or by inspiring a new physical power to conquer it.

The new physical power which the spirit of Lutheranism inspired, and which gave successful battle to imperialism in England, was Puritanism. Puritanism and imperialism are necessary and mortal foes. Their conceptions of government, industry, education, and religion are absolutely, irreconcilably, hostile. Imperialism derives all its ideas historically from pagan Rome; Puritanism, all its ideas from the Hebraic constitution. "England," says J. R. Green, "became the people of a book, and that book the Bible."¹ From this book they derived not only their religious but also their social and political ideals. In it they found a conception of social equality which is still radical even in this democratic age. "Their common call, their common brotherhood in Christ," — I again quote from J. R. Green, — "annihilated in the mind of the Puritans that overpowering sense of social distinctions which characterized the age of Elizabeth. The meanest peasant felt himself ennobled as a child of God. The proudest noble recognized a spiritual equality in the poorest 'saint.'" It is the fashion in our time to speak with open scorn or self-complacent though more gentle irony of the Puritans; yet we imitate the very characteristics in them which we satirize. They were Roundheads; all men now cut the hair short. They discarded the gorgeous colors of the Cavaliers; we all dress in sober grays and blacks. They condemned bull-baiting and dog-fighting, and

¹ *A Short History of the English People*, ch. viii., § 1.

even pugilistic encounters; our laws are in these respects Puritanical. They forbade the drama; the plays which occupied the stage of Charles II. would not be allowed by public sentiment on the boards of a New York theatre for a single night. They did not, indeed, believe in religious liberty, in the separation of Church and State, in the rights of the individual conscience as we believe in them; that is, from the doctrine that God is in his world and needs no vicar they had not deduced all the conclusions which their descendants have deduced; but they held this truth firmly and were prepared to follow whithersoever it led them.

In Oliver Cromwell the virtues and the vices of Puritanism were embodied, — its broadness of view and its narrowness of sympathy, its tenacity of will and its lack of tenderness, its love of liberty and its spiritual despotism, its moral earnestness and its lack of culture, its strength of conscience and its intolerance, its curious combination of humility and pious self-conceit. In the ideals of Charles I. were combined the principles of imperial Rome and of ecclesiastical Rome. Stafford represented the first, Laud the second. But Charles I. had neither the power of a Cæsar nor the diplomatic skill of a Pope; in the campaigns between his Cavaliers and the Ironsides of Cromwell the battle between the imperialism of ancient Rome and the fraternalism of the New Judaism was fought out; and in the overthrow of Charles I. Roman imperialism was forever overthrown for

England. Neither the brief absolutism of Cromwell, the feeble attempts to reëstablish imperialism by Charles II. and James II., nor the yet more feeble attempt to practice it by the Georges, could do anything to stay the progress of that popular revolution which in our century William Ewart Gladstone has conducted to its consummation for England, and which other statesmen after him are to carry on throughout the wider domain of the British Colonial Empire.

On the continent of Europe imperialism had met with no such stubborn resistance as in Great Britain. It was not dissolved, undermined, or seriously limited; it was simply broken into fragments. In lieu of one great military power were four rival military powers, — France, Prussia, Spain, and Austria, — and a congeries of smaller powers, not less absolute, in Germany and Italy. Lutheranism had never won a considerable constituency in either Spain or Italy, and though in France the doctrine had been accepted by large numbers of her best citizens, fire, sword, and exile had so effectually driven the Huguenots from the kingdom that as the eighteenth century drew toward its close there was left in that once great empire neither the conscience to resist absolutism in the Church nor the courage to resist absolutism in the State. By far other warriors and by very different weapons both phases of imperialism, the military and the ecclesiastical, received their death-blow in the three Latin countries.

Voltaire neither deserves the encomiums of his friends nor the execrations of his enemies. The best portrait of him in the English language is that furnished by Thomas Carlyle in his famous essay. Voltaire was not a great man, for great men always build, and Voltaire only tore down; he was not a great philosopher, for he left nothing that can be called a philosophy as a legacy to the future; he was not a great poet, for he possessed no true insight. He was an iconoclast in an age and a country whose greatest need was iconoclasm; a destroyer, but a new order could not be built until the old order was destroyed; a cynic and a mocker, but the age needed such to unmask the false pretense which mimicked piety; an unbeliever, but in an epoch when creeds had ceased to be the expression of religion and had become only the instruments of oppression. He had more wit than wisdom, more audacity than courage. He had the cynicism of Mephistopheles, but without his malice; the curiosity of Faust, but without his earnestness. No one who had faith in God could have said, "If there were no God, it would be necessary to invent one;" yet he was not an atheist. No one who had faith in men could have said, "We have never pretended to enlighten shoemakers and servants; the true public is always a minority; the rest is vulgar;"¹ yet he was not an aristocrat. He hated falsehood, yet had no love

¹ Quoted in Lecky's *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, v. 314. See the whole passage, pp. 309-314.

for truth; cowardice, yet was no hero; false pretense, yet ever wore a mask. He did not so much love his fellow men as scorn their oppressors; he despised the pretentious civilization of his age, yet saw no way to make a better one. Nevertheless, his ridicule did for France what neither the piety of Luther nor the conscience of Cromwell could have done in a country denuded of its devout and independent souls, — it destroyed that respect for royalty and that reverence for the priesthood which were the basis of imperialism, military and ecclesiastical. John Morley declares that it was Voltaire's task "to shake the foundation of that religious system which professed to be founded on the revelation of Christ."¹ That task he successfully achieved; nor is it easy even now to see how it could have been so successfully achieved in that time and among that people by a man of a different even though a better temperament.

While Voltaire attacked the bases of absolutism by ridicule, Rousseau, by more subtle yet not less effective methods, attacked it through the sentiments. Absolutism is based on contempt for humanity, — by the nobility for the commoner, by the hierarchy for the laity. Voltaire turned the laugh upon the noble and the priest, — he leveled down; Rousseau claimed admiration for the commoner and the layman — he leveled up. The one was the cynic, the other the sentimentalist, of the Revolution. It is not possible to take seriously

¹ John Morley: *Voltaire*, p. 241.

the man who writes beautifully of humanity and left his friend in an epileptic fit upon the sidewalk for strangers to take care of; who exalts marriage and lived out of wedlock; who glorifies the natural instincts of humanity and violated the most sacred of them by leaving his five children in a foundling hospital without even making a note by which they could be subsequently identified.¹ Some corollaries deduced from his philosophy remain objects of a not very intelligent admiration in certain circles, but his philosophy concerning man's state of nature and the basis of government as founded upon a social contract is no longer regarded seriously by scholars; nor is his faith in God and in immortality, both of which were founded neither on revelation, reason, nor intuition, but merely on sentiment, worthy of a much more serious regard. Nevertheless, his apotheosis of man signaled if it did not produce a new respect for humanity, and initiated if it did not induce a new study of man, and led philosophy to discern in common people qualities which the old philosophy thought were wholly confined to the few. This spirit of Rousseau reappears in more rational forms in the fiction of Dickens and Bret Harte, in the political philosophy of Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, and in the theological teaching of Channing and Beecher.

These two forces, respectively represented by Voltaire and Rousseau, prepared the way for the

¹ John Morley: *Rousseau*, pp. 58, 115-126.

French Revolution. The one destroyed respect for the king and the priest, and simultaneously respect for law and for religion; the other developed self-respect in the commonalty, and, at the same time and by the same process, egregiously fostered self-conceit. The French Revolution was the consequent overturn of society; it put what had been the bottom of society at the top, and what had been the top of society at the bottom. It is not necessary for my purpose in this article to describe either the social and political wrongs which absolutism had inflicted upon France nor the inadequacy of the remedy which the Revolution proffered. I am here but sketching the process which throughout Europe has led to the overthrow of imperialism; and for France it was overthrown by the Revolution of 1789. Out of that Revolution, at once its product and its typical representative, came the last factor in that history of the destruction of imperialism which was a necessary preparation for the recognition and establishment of the rights of men.

Professor W. M. Sloane has described Napoleon Bonaparte as "the embodiment of the Revolution," and no so brief sentence could more accurately characterize him. It is true that he was an Italian, not a Frenchman; and that his earliest training was Corsican, not French; but it is none the less true that he was a child of the Revolution, that in his person he embodied alike its virtues and its defects, that by his genius he carried its

influence throughout all western Europe, and that he was not defeated until, on the one hand, he had completed the necessary work of destruction, and, on the other, had proved himself incompetent to lay the foundations of a new order on the ruins of the old.

The French Revolution was the coronation of self-will by a great nation. The law which should restrain, and the Church which should guide, had both failed utterly, hopelessly, irremediably; the pilot was ousted, and the passengers took possession of the vessel and undertook to pilot it without any knowledge of the laws of navigation. There was no one to restrain, no one even to guide the passions of the hour; to-day a triumphant multitude conducted the king into Paris, to-morrow to the guillotine; now it screamed itself hoarse in the glorification of the Goddess of Reason, now in brutal triumph at the execution of her chief priest Robespierre. Napoleon Bonaparte was an embodiment of this spirit of self-will. His sentiments were sometimes of the noblest, sometimes of the basest; he is alternately a hero and a brigand, a Marcus Aurelius uttering the sentiments of a saint and a Nero doing the deeds of a demon, a lover of liberty and the most imperial Cæsar of European history: but he is always uncontrolled. Various are the forces which operate to restrain men from following too absolutely the impulse of the hour, — law, public opinion, conscience, religion. None of these influences did Napoleon .

know. From the initiation of his Egyptian campaign he knew no law but his own will; he was throughout his life fighting the public opinion of Europe, and was the creator of the public opinion of France; conscience he had none; and religion he regarded not as a power to which he must be subject, but as an instrument which he could use to subjugate others to his will.

Thus, for the fifteen years in which he ruled France, Europe saw an empire in arms dominated by its own self-will, unruled by law, uninfluenced by public opinion, ungoverned by conscience, unrestrained by religion. Yet we can now see, what even such a prophetic spirit as Edmund Burke could not see at the time, that the great destroyer was completing the work of Luther and Copernicus and Bacon and Cromwell and Voltaire and Rousseau. Luther had destroyed the spiritual authority of ecclesiastical imperialism; Copernicus and Bacon had overthrown its intellectual supremacy; Cromwell had set an example for the rest of Europe to follow in teaching the lesson that kings are the servants, not the masters, of the people; Voltaire and Rousseau had prepared the way for a similar lesson to be taught, not only in France, but, through the power of France, in Italy, Spain, Austria, and Germany. The Napoleonic campaigns completed their work: destroyed imperialism in Spain and with it the Inquisition; in Italy and with it the military support of the temporal power of the Pope; in Austria and so prepared

the way for the quasi-emancipation of Hungary; in the German principalities and so made possible the unity of Germany. Constitutional government in Europe dates from the beginning of the present century, — that is, from the French Revolution. The State House in Boston and the Capitol in Washington are the oldest buildings in the world occupied by a popular assembly. The English Parliament is older than the American Congress, but the Houses of Parliament are more modern; while the Spanish Cortes, the Italian Parliament, the German Reichstag, the Austro-Hungarian Reichsrath, and the French Parliament are all children of the nineteenth century. When the sword of Napoleon had thus made possible the organization of a new social order, his sword was taken from him; the new imperialism which he had attempted to found on the ruins of the old fell in his fall at Waterloo, and the way was left open for those constructive processes which were carried on under Castelar in Spain, under Cavour in Italy, under Bismarck in Germany, under Gambetta in France.

It is not necessary for my present purpose to do more than recall in the briefest fashion these constructive efforts of the present century. Bourbonism was reinstated wherever the Napoleonic era had overthrown it. The Holy Alliance, most unfitly called, aimed not only to reëstablish absolutism throughout all Europe, but to reinstate it on this side of the ocean. The miscalled Monroe

Doctrine, English, not American, in its origin (for it was suggested by Canning and accepted by Monroe), gave a halt to this effort by foreign powers to export imperialism to the American continent. At first success attended the effort in Europe, but the reaction was short-lived.

In France the people, thoroughly awakened out of the sleep of centuries by Napoleon's cannon, could not be put to sleep again. Revolution followed revolution. Napoleon III. did, indeed, construct a new Cæsarism out of the ruins of that which his uncle had constructed; but the Bastille could not be rebuilt, nor the spirit of liberty be entirely repressed. The awful and splendid genie of the lamp, released from his imprisonment, refused to return to it again. The self-constituted defender of the Church became, despite himself, the instrument for the overthrow of the temporal power of the Pope in Italy; and when his empire crumbled at Sedan, there were ready a Thiers and a Gambetta to organize a republic which, in spite of émeutes by Anarchists and Socialists, and in spite of the advocates of the different forms of absolutism, happily fighting among themselves, has grown in wisdom and in strength. If the Church has not been wholly separated from the State, the State is emancipated from the Church, and Protestantism has gained the right to contest the claim of Rome for supremacy in the religious realm. If the schools are not all that a republic needs, they are no longer the means of maintain-

ing unquestioning obedience to the authority of an infallible Church. If the ambition of glory which fifteen years of military ambition kindled throughout France is not wholly laid, the spirit of militarism is not the supreme power it once was; the "man on horseback" is no longer the terror of industrial France, and, if the trial of Dreyfus came short of justice, it successfully asserted the supremacy of the civil over the military authorities.

In Spain as in France, though revolution followed revolution, and every form of government was tried in succession, there was no basis in either a common national spirit nor a popular education for a free commonwealth. The people, still cowed by the domination of an Inquisition, although the Inquisition was destroyed, are a prey to office-holders, political and ecclesiastical. The descendants of a nation which equipped the Armada proved at Santiago and Manila how utterly Spain had failed to keep up with the progress of the age; the brief and unequal conflict involved in the recent Spanish-American war is chiefly valuable as an object-lesson of the relative strength and weakness of a nation founded on the schoolhouse and one founded on the Inquisition, the one on the right of every man to think for himself, the other on the duty of common men to accept without question the thoughts of their superiors.

The emancipation and unification of Italy has been achieved by spiritual rather than by military

forces. The conscience of Europe had been awakened, and when Gladstone in his famous letter protested against the cruelty of imperialism in Italy, it responded as it did not to the no less trenchant appeals of Voltaire a century before. It was thus possible, as before it would not have been possible, for Cavour to make the freedom and unity of Italy a European question and compel the coöperation of the Powers against imperialism in the very source and fountain of its power. When, in 1870, the abolition of the temporal power of the Pope was finally effected, it was effected for all time, and with it the danger of the permanent reëstablishment of the old imperialism in either Church or State west of the Russian boundary was forever destroyed.

It is still true that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty; but it is also true, as it once was not, that all the liberty which they are competent to exercise can be had by any people in western Europe, if they are willing to pay the price. In Germany perhaps more than in any other state there remains something of the spirit and more of the power of the old imperialism. But the unity of Germany has created an organization which is capable of freedom, and the spirit of Luther, though without his religious faith, is slowly but surely possessing the nation. A recent writer in "The Outlook" has thus briefly characterized the earlier steps in a process not yet completed:—

In 1815 Germany emerged from the Congress of Vienna divided into thirty-nine little states, but in 1815

was born the man who was to weld them into one. Society was then organized on the old patriarchal basis: at the bottom was the peasant; above him was the gnädige Herr; above him Unser Allergnädigster Herr, the King, who lived in Berlin or Munich or Dresden; and above him, the Herr Gott in heaven. The statesman who was born in 1815 brought about the third great event of the nineteenth century in Europe, the unification of Germany. Though an aristocrat, he changed a multitude of little states, as Italy had been changed, by the spirit of nationalism, through centralization, towards democracy.¹

This is not the only case in the history of the world in which one who was essentially an absolutist has pushed forward the cause of human rights and laid foundations for a free state. Hildebrand transforming a political into an ecclesiastical empire; William the Conqueror welding together the fragments of provincial England into one body politic; Napoleon I. overthrowing empires in the name of liberty by a military empire more absolute than they, but destined to fall in pieces because hostile to the interests if not to the suffrages of its citizens; Napoleon III. calling himself Defender of the Church, yet preparing by the victories of Magenta and Solferino for the overthrow of the temporal power of the Pope; Bismarck ruling with the assumed authority of "Herr Gott in Himmel," yet making an empire which the free school, free thought, and a free Parliament are

¹ *The Outlook*, July 14, 1900, p. 648.

sure to make truly free, — all furnish signal examples how a Power higher than the highest overrules the rulers, and achieves through their wills the purpose of a will they did not themselves understand.

In history each epoch develops silently and gradually out of the preceding epoch, as dawn succeeds the night and day the dawn; but, in so far as any date can ever be given to mark a great transition, it may fairly be said that with the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 the age of conflict between Hebraism and Romanism came to its end, and that henceforth the chief problem of the Occident is, not how to escape the perils of imperialism, military or ecclesiastical, but, the supremacy of that imperialism having forever passed away, how to solve the problems of life which are given to humanity to solve in the free air of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. What those problems are, and in what direction we are to look for their solution, will be subject of consideration in the future lectures of this course.

LECTURE II

THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY

IN the previous lecture of this course I have endeavored to show how, in the conflict of eighteen centuries between the principles of the Hebrew Commonwealth and those of the Roman Empire, the latter was, by successive processes, overthrown in western Europe: first, by the transformation of the Roman Empire from a military into an ecclesiastical empire; next, by the denial of the authority of the Church by Lutheranism, and the denial of the infallibility of the Church by the new philosophy; finally, by the forcible destruction of the military remnants of Roman imperialism by the swords of Cromwell and of Napoleon. In this article I propose to trace the historical process by which the fundamental principle of the Hebrew Commonwealth has grown into general acceptance as the foundation of a new and democratic order.

I. Whatever may have been the teaching of the Hebrew prophets, some of whose utterances were certainly more catholic than the spirit of the people, the Hebrew race was possessed by a spirit of brotherhood at once inclusive and exclusive; it

included all of the race of Abraham, and excluded all the rest of mankind. The most that liberalism could claim was a secondary place for the proselyte who by baptism had been adopted into the race of Abraham. This exclusive spirit is illustrated by the Temple at Jerusalem, in which no Gentile was allowed to pass beyond the Court of the Gentiles, under penalty of death; by the egotistical belief of the Hebrews that they were the chosen people of God, — for the choice of a particular race out of the world by God necessarily implies that the rest of the world is left by him in darkness and disfavor; by their anticipation of the Kingdom of God, in which Jerusalem should be a world-capital, the Temple a world-centre, the Hebrew nation the mistress of the world, and all other races either in subjection to it or shining, if at all, only by a reflected light derived from the Hebrews. When, in Christ's first sermon, he intimated, though with the greatest tact and in the gentlest and most indirect manner, that God cared for Gentiles as well as for Jews, he was mobbed; and the proximate and immediate cause of the popular feeling against him in Jerusalem, which made possible his crucifixion, was his explicit and daring declaration that God had rejected the Hebrew people and would build his kingdom anew upon another foundation. When Paul first went out from Palestine to preach to the Gentiles, it was against the opposition of a large party in the nascent Christian Church, who could not believe his radical doctrine that God is the

Father not only of the Jews but also of the Gentiles. In short, the Hebrews believed in what seems to us a very narrow doctrine of election: they believed that religion was only for the Jews, and God was the God of the Jews only.

As the Christian Church grew by accretions from the Greek and Roman world, this doctrine of national election necessarily disappeared. Greeks and Romans would not and could not believe that God was the God only of the Jews, that salvation was salvation only for the Jews, and that they could come into the Church of God and have his favor only by sufferance as adopted Jews. A new and broader doctrine of election therefore took the place of the Hebrew doctrine. The new faith was also at once inclusive and exclusive; it assumed definite barriers; but they were changed. In the Catholic Church, composed as it was in unequal parts of Jews and Gentiles, the doctrine soon became dominant that God is the God of all the baptized. There was still a race; but it was a spiritual, not an ethnic, race; there were still limitations, but they were ecclesiastical, not blood, limitations. Whoever was baptized was brought by baptism into personal relations with God; whoever was not baptized was left forever outside his grace. And this is still the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. "Infants dying unbaptized," says the Catholic Dictionary, "are excluded from the kingdom of heaven, although, according to the opinion now universally held, they do not undergo

suffering of any kind in the next world." The Catholic faith was not always so hopeful, however, for the Catholic Dictionary is also authority for the statement that the merciful suggestion of one theologian "that God might commission angels to confer baptism on infants who might otherwise perish without it," found no general acceptance; while, on the contrary, "the theologians of the Augustinian order held an opinion at the opposite pole, viz., that the infants in question were punished both by exclusion from heaven and by positive pain, though much less pain than is inflicted on those who die in actual mortal sin;" and it adds, "This undoubtedly is the opinion of St. Augustine." What was the orthodox opinion respecting the fate of unbaptized heathen, Dante graphically illustrates:—

So he set forth, and so he made me enter within the first circle that girds the abyss. Here, so far as could be heard, there was no plaint but that of sighs which made the eternal air to tremble: this came of the woe without torments felt by the crowds, which were many and great, of infants and of women and of men. The good Master to me, "Thou dost not ask what spirits are these that thou seest. Now I would have thee know, before thou goest farther, that they sinned not; if they have merits it sufficeth not, because they had not baptism, which is part of the faith that thou believest; and if they were before Christianity, they did not duly worship God: and of such as these am I myself. Through such defects, and not through other guilt, are we lost,

and only so far harmed that without hope we live in desire.”¹

Paul, using Jewish philosophy to broaden the Jewish conception of God, had insisted that God was not confined in his choice to any race; he might, if he pleased, choose a pagan, and he might, if he pleased, pass by a Jew. John Calvin, partly resting on the authority of Paul, partly employing his method, used a similar argument against the baptismal election of the Roman Catholic Church. He insisted that God was not confined within either national or ecclesiastical lines; he might choose whom he liked and he might pass by whom he liked. Whether Calvinism was, in the intention of John Calvin, a broadening faith or not, — a question not necessary here to consider, — it was so in its effect. It opened the way for a supposed choice by God of Jews who had lived before Christ, of pagans who had lived without a knowledge of Christ, and of infants who had died before they were able to exercise faith in Christ. In lieu of the Catholic doctrine of election which sent all infants to a *Limbus Infantium* where they would be forever excluded from heaven, the Calvinistic doctrine of election allowed that “elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated by Christ, through the Spirit, who worketh when and where and how he pleaseth;”² and also mercifully left the hopeful

¹ Dante: *The Inferno*, Canto V., Charles Eliot Norton's Translation.

² *Westminster Confession of Faith*, ch. x., § III.

believer to entertain the pleasing faith that all infants are elect and therefore all infants are saved. At the same time it opened a similar door for "all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word."¹ Calvinism, as interpreted by the Westminster Confession of Faith, does not involve the damnation of infants nor of the heathen; respecting both, its attitude is that of agnosticism. The election of Calvinism is broader than that of Romanism, as the election of Romanism is broader than that of the popular conception in Judaism.

Arminianism still further broadened the doctrine of election, though it still maintained a line of exclusion and inclusion. That line, however, was not racial, nor ecclesiastical, nor theological; it was not drawn by birth, nor by divine decree, but by human choice. The most striking practical manifestation of this new doctrine of election is that afforded by the history of the rise of Methodism in England; and perhaps as unprejudiced a history of that movement as exists is the one furnished by Lecky in his "History of England in the Eighteenth Century."² The leaders of the movement, says Lecky, "were never tired of urging that all men are in a state of damnation who have not experienced a sudden, violent, and supernatural change." This supernatural change was based upon a conscious repentance of sin, a self-surrender

¹ *Westminster Confession of Faith*, ch. x., § III.

² Vol. ii., ch. ix.

to the will of God, an acceptance of Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour, and was accompanied or followed by "an absolute assurance of salvation and by a complete dominion over sin." The rapturous experiences incident to the preaching of a new and larger hope have passed away; the philosophy of the change called conversion has undergone changes; but the Methodist or Arminian doctrine of election remains substantially unchanged. It is, in a word, that God chooses all who choose him. God is regarded as the Father, not merely of a race, a baptized, an elect, but of all who, accepting his gift of life, become conscious sharers of that life with him.

Even this is not broad enough for the broadening life of man. The doctrine of what may, for want of a better name, be called the New Theology is that God is the universal Father; that he chooses the Jews and also the Gentiles, the baptized and also the unbaptized, the elect and also the non-elect, the repentant and also the unrepentant; that he is the Father of the prodigal son as of the elder brother; the Saviour of Zaccheus as of Peter, James, and John; that he loves the whole world; that Christ lived and died to save the whole world; that universal redemption is God's purpose; that, if all men are not brought at last to holiness and life, it will be because his purpose is frustrated and his love disappointed; that, in a sentence, to quote Dr. George A. Gordon, of Boston, "God has a Christian purpose toward our entire human-

ity," and, "if God shall succeed, universal salvation will be the final result."¹ Such is the outcome of that gradually widening process by which the spiritual vision of man has been extended and his spiritual sympathies enlarged, from a faith that God is the Father only of the Hebrew people, to the faith that he is the Father of the whole human race, regardless alike of national, ecclesiastical, theological, or even ethical boundaries.

And the nature and work of religious institutions has changed with the changing philosophy of religion. The Jews made little or no attempt to extend their faith beyond their own nationality; the baptism of the people was the chief objective point of the Roman Catholic missions, nor was there any considerable attempt to instruct the reason or change the conscience or the moral life of men until by baptism they had come within the supposed reach of God's blessing; Calvinism made little endeavor to carry gospel influences beyond the geographical boundaries which Providence had indicated as those set by his sovereign decree as the limits of practical Christian endeavor; missionary work in the modern sense of the term was initiated, at least so far as the Protestant Church is concerned, by the Moravians and the Methodists in the eighteenth century, but by them was confined to securing that supernatural change which they deemed essential to the favor of God; under

¹ *The New Puritanism*, p. 163.

the spur of the larger hope, the missionary movement of to-day includes schools, colleges, hospitals, orphanages, college settlements, boys' clubs, kindergartens, — in brief, a whole host of instrumentalities which absolutely though quietly ignore alike the limitations of race, of baptism, of divine decree, and of supernatural conversion, fixed by the earlier theologies. The gift of divine life is coming to be regarded, if it is not already regarded, as intended for the whole race, regardless of blood, baptism, divine election, or even human choice; and this extension of faith and hope is to be found, though not in equal degree, in the Jewish rabbi, the Roman Catholic priest, the Presbyterian preacher, the Methodist evangelist, and the Liberal philanthropist.

II. The change which has taken place in the conception of government is quite as radical as that in the conception of religion.

Aristotle draws clearly the distinction between two forms of government: "In the government of slaves, though the interest of the natural slave and natural master are really identical, yet the object of the rule is, nevertheless, the interest of the master and is that of the slave only incidentally, because if the slave is destroyed it is impossible that the master's government should be maintained. On the other hand, in the rule of children or wife or a whole household, the end is either the good of subjects or some common good of rulers and sub-

jects alike.”¹ The doctrine that political governments exist and should be administered for the benefit of the governors, not for the benefit of the governed, was clearly a popular doctrine, as it certainly was the common practice, in ancient time. In Plato’s “Republic” Thrasymachus thus, with cynical frankness, defines it: “Might is right; justice is the interest of the stronger.” And he keenly satirizes the opposite view that government exists for the benefit of the governed.

“You fancy,” he says to Socrates, “that a shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, who are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night.”² It is not improbable that Thrasymachus is set up by Socrates only to be knocked down again, for this was quite the Socratic method: but it is evident that the doctrine which he defends was really maintained in his time, else Socrates would not have thought it worth attacking.

We need not, however, go back to ancient times to find either defenders of this doctrine that government exists for the benefit of the few, or for illustrations of governments founded upon it. Two striking illustrations are afforded at a much later period, one by Great Britain, one by France.

¹ Aristotle : *Politics*, Book III., ch. vi.

² *The Republic*, Book I.

In the eighteenth century Great Britain governed her colonies undisguisedly, openly, avowedly, upon the principle cynically avowed by Thrasy-machus that "justice is the interest of the stronger." Her whole colonial policy was founded on the doctrine that government exists for the benefit of the governors. "The general sentiment," says Alleyne Ireland,¹ "in regard to the colonies, during the period of the old colonial system, was that they existed merely for the benefit of the sovereign state ; that they were a national asset which should be made to yield as much profit as possible to the mother country."¹ Green, in his "History of the English People," while offering some explanations of this sentiment, is not less explicit in his recognition of it. "England," he says, "looked on America as her noblest possession. It was the wealth, the growth of this dependency which more than all the victories of her armies was lifting her to a new greatness among the nations. It was the trade with it which had doubled English commerce in half a century. Of the right of the mother country to monopolize this trade, to deal with this great people as its own possession, no Englishman had a doubt."² Lecky, in his "History of England in the Eighteenth Century," is more explicit than either Green or Ireland. "England," he says, "made it a fixed maxim of her commercial policy to repress the prosperity of her colonies by

¹ Alleyne Ireland: *Tropical Colonization*, p. 7.

² *History of England*, iv. 199.

crushing every industry that could possibly compete with the home market.”¹

Nor was it America alone that suffered from this doctrine that government is for the benefit of the governors and that “justice is the interest of the stronger.” A plausible argument might be framed for the application of this doctrine to the American colonies. The continent had been taken possession of by Great Britain; she owned the land by right of conquest; she had bestowed it by charters upon the colonists who were her lessees; she had expended money in defending them from the Indians; she had furnished arms and men to them in the wars against the French; they were bound to her by ties of gratitude; they ought to be willing to repay the debt by making their policies subservient to her interests. Such was the Tory argument then; its echoes are still to be found in literature. But no such arguments could be produced to defend the spoliation of the East Indies, and the spoliation of the East Indies was more open, more flagrant, more high-handed by far than the inequitable government of the American colonies. India was handed over as a private possession to a private corporation. The nominal sovereignty remained in Indian Princes, the real sovereignty was delegated to the East India Company. It used the name and authority of native rulers to earn dividends for English stockholders. The system, corrupt at its fountain head, corrupted

¹ *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, ii. 11.

all who administered it. The government of India became a system of organized and unorganized pillage, the latter founded on the former. When Lord Clive went out the second time to India, he declared that "every spring of the Government was smeared with corruption; that principles of rapacity and oppression universally prevailed, and that every spark of sentiment and public spirit was lost and extinguished in the unbounded lust of unmerited wealth."¹ And Lord Clive was not a purist in political morals; he had gone out to India as a youth, a penniless clerk; he had returned at the age of thirty-four with a fortune of more than two hundred thousand dollars a year, besides bestowing in gifts to his relatives two hundred and fifty thousand dollars more. The protests against this corruption fell on deaf ears. In vain Lord Chatham maintained that it was both the right and the duty of Great Britain to assume the sovereignty which she ought never to have relinquished. The argument that a charter is inviolable and that vested rights are an invincible bulwark against all assailants of gigantic wrongs was too strong for him. In vain was it pointed out that if the powers of sovereignty are delegated to a commercial company they will be employed for commercial purposes. In vain were public exposures of the enormities to which such a travesty of government inevitably led, — exposures unhappily in that age not as public as they would be in

¹ Lecky: *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, iii. 518.

ours with its free press and its universal reading. Officers of the company refused to pay the customs which constituted the chief source of government revenue; sold to natives for large sums a similar exemption; forbade natives to deal in goods in which they themselves dealt; compelled them by imprisonment or even flogging to buy of the English official at his own price; in one recorded instance compelled a native peasant to plough up his poppy field that his poppies might not interfere with their monopoly. In spite of all, it may well be doubted whether the East India Company's rule would have ended to this day, had not their agents and sub-agents robbed the corporation as well as the natives, and brought the iniquitous system to an end by bringing both corporation and colony to the edge of irretrievable bankruptcy.

The doctrine that government exists for the benefit of the governors and that "justice is the interest of the stronger" was even more forcibly illustrated, and its tragic results even more terribly manifested, in the case of Ireland. Doubtless the doctrine which prevailed in England in the eighteenth century that Roman Catholics have no rights which Protestants are bound to respect aided commercial enterprise in destroying Ireland for the supposed benefit of England. It is not the first time in history that religious prejudice has come to the support of commercial greed. It is not necessary for a description of this application of the principle of Thrasymachus to go beyond the pages

of Lecky; it is not possible within the limits of this lecture to do more than hint at some of the illustrations which those pages afford. England disregarded the religious faith of Ireland, denied her aspirations for education, confirmed the feudalism which was being abolished elsewhere in the kingdom, and aggravated it by substituting absentee and foreign landlords for the ancient lords, and put restrictions on industrial and commercial enterprises which ended by destroying it. With the latter process only, we have to do here, for that alone was based exclusively and avowedly on the principle that England's government of Ireland should be for England's benefit. The "fixed maxim of her commercial policy to repress the prosperity of her colonies by crushing every rising industry that could possibly compete with the home market" was rigorously applied in the government. Irish cattle had always been famous; their importation into England was prohibited. Ireland has admirable harbors; no goods could be imported into English colonies except in English ships manned by English sailors. Denied the privilege of raising cattle, the Irish turned their attention to sheep, and soon were producing what was accounted the best wool in Europe. An English Parliament forbade the exportation of their wool to any other country; let them make linen. They attempted linen, only to find themselves forbidden to export to British colonies any but the plain brown and white linens; and to make the

prohibition more effectual, they were not allowed to bring back any colonial goods in return.¹

It was not possible to apply the same methods to the same extent in the American colonies; partly because they were too remote, partly because the Americans were Americans and would not submit. But the same spirit underlay and the same spirit guided English legislation concerning those colonies. Navigation Acts forbade all trading to or from the plantations except in English-built ships. Woolens manufactured in the colonies began to compete with woolens manufactured in England; a law, therefore, was passed which forbade all exportation of colonial wool from the colonies or even from one colony to another. America abounded in iron ore. But England was dependent on iron industry; her law, therefore, forbade all iron manufacture in the colonies: "No smith might make so much as a bolt, a spike, or a nail." America abounded in furs, which began to be used in the manufacture of hats. The hatters of England protested, and a complaisant Parliament forbade the exportation of colonial hats even from colony to colony. The colonists were accustomed to send provisions and lumber to the West Indies and bring back rum, sugar, and molasses. A law imposed prohibitive duties on all such articles unless exported from the British colonies.

The object of all this spoliation of India, of Ireland, of the American colonies, was the enrichment

¹ Lecky: *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, ch. vii.

not even of the English nation, but of an idle aristocracy in the English nation. The elder son held the feudal estate, took the product of labor he did not perform, and sent his own nominee to Parliament to represent a constituency which did not elect him. The second son went into the army, and if there were war fought bravely, for the Englishman has always been brave; but in peace he lived in idleness on the State. The next son went into the Church, not to preach the gospel, but to enjoy a living; the fourth into the navy; the others, if there were others, lived off the gaming-table. Mr. Smollett has described the motley crowd at the greatest of English watering-places, Bath, which this system produced:—

Clerks and factors from the East Indies loaded with the spoils of plundered princes; planters, negro drivers, and hucksters from our American plantations, enriched they knew not how; agents, commissaries, and contractors, who have fattened in two successive wars on the blood of the nation; usurers, brokers, and jobbers of every kind; men of low birth and no breeding, have found themselves suddenly translated to a state of affluence unknown to former ages.¹

The war of the American Revolution was begun not for any theoretical doctrine that government rests on the consent of the governed; not from any complaint that the consent of the colonists had not

¹ Humphrey Clinker; quoted in *The American Revolution*, by Sir George O. Trevelyan, i. 46.

been asked for Acts of Parliament or appointments of governors; not because of any insignificant tax on tea or paper, except as these symbolized the principle that the Americans were governed not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of the English governors; not to gratify an aspiration for independence, which at first no one desired, all deprecated, and which finally was resolved upon by the people with reluctance, because they could get justice in no other way. Lecky truly says that "the deliberate and malignant selfishness of English commercial legislation was digging a chasm between the mother country and the colonies, which must inevitably, when the latter had become strong enough, lead to separation." One has but to reread the now unread Declaration of Independence to assure himself that Lecky and Trevelyan are right in their interpretations of the meaning of the American Revolution. "Deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed" is but a parenthetical clause in the Declaration, which might be omitted without mutilating that noble document. Its fundamental doctrine is "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men; and that whenever a form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute a new government, laying its foundations

on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.”¹ On this as on a self-evident truth is based an indictment of the King of Great Britain for having in his government disregarded these rights and endeavored to establish and maintain an absolute tyranny over the States. In this indictment there is nowhere a count against him that he has denied, refused, or violated any real or fancied right of self-government. The indictment is, count after count, this and this alone, that he has used the powers of government not for the benefit of the governed, but for the benefit of the governors. Self-government is but a means to an end; but the end of all just governments, whether paternal, aristocratic, or democratic, is always the same, — the well-being of those that are governed.

It is not necessary for my purpose, nor is there space in this lecture, to show how this doctrine that governments exist for the benefit of the governed crossed the ocean, how it found a fertile soil in France, how, mingling with previous teachings to the same effect, it coöperated in producing the Revolution of 1789. Nor is it necessary to describe at length the Bourbon rule of France which has preceded that revolution, a rule which denied every right claimed as self-evident by the Declaration of Independence, — the right to life, the right to liberty, and the right to the pursuit of happi-

¹ See further, on this topic, the next lecture.

ness. The wholesale starvation of communes while the court was feasting symbolized the first denial; the Bastille with its prisoners who never knew the complaints against them symbolized the second; the indescribable misery of a people sunk in the despair of a degradation which language cannot picture emphasized the third. No one can read Taine's "Ancient Régime," or Morse Stephen's "French Revolution," or even such a novel as Dickens's "Tale of Two Cities," and question that the government of France under the Bourbons was and had been without disguise administered for the benefit of the few and in disregard of the self-evident right of the many; was and had been consistently based on Thrasy-machus's definition of justice as "the interest of the stronger;" was and had been framed on the pattern of a slavocracy, not on that of a household. Nor is it less clear that the revolt of 1789 was a revolt against this fundamental assumption of all feudal governments that the many exist for the benefit of the few, not necessarily that government rests on the consent of the governed. Frederic Harrison thus interprets the effect of that revolution: —

For the old patriarchal proprietary *de jure* theory of rule, there was everywhere substituted on the continent of Europe the popular fiduciary, *pro bono publico* notion of rule. Government ceased to be the privilege of the ruler; it became a trust imposed on the ruler for the common weal of the ruled. . . . Over the continent of Europe, down to 1789, the proprietary or *jure divino*

theory of privilege existed in full form, except in some petty republics which were of slight practical importance. The long war, the reactionary Empire of Napoleon, and the royal reaction which followed its overthrow made a faint semblance of revival for privilege. But after the final extinction of the Bourbons in 1830, the idea of privilege disappeared from the conception of the state. In England the Reform Act of 1832, and finally the European movement of 1838, completed the change. So that throughout Europe, west of Turkey, all governments alike — imperial, royal, aristocratic, or republican, as they may be in form — exist more or less in fact, and in profession exist exclusively, for the general welfare of the nation. This is the first and general idea of '89.¹

Such is the outcome of the second great movement, — the political. The religious movement has conducted us from a narrow faith in a God of a race, a baptized, an elect, or a repentant people, to faith in a God of humanity; the second has conducted us from a conception of government as organized and maintained for the benefit of the few who govern, to a conception of government as organized and to be maintained for the benefit of the many who are governed.

III. Analogous to and contemporaneous with this enlargement of the theological conception of God and his relation to humanity, and the political conception of government and its relation to the governed, is an enlargement of the conception of the social and industrial organization. The

¹ Frederic Harrison: *The Meaning of History*, pp. 189, 190.

latter movement has not reached, either in its theory or its practice, the democratic realization; but the candid and careful student of history can hardly doubt that its tendency is democratic, — that is, a tendency toward the doctrine that wealth, as well as religion and government, should be organized and administered, not for the few, but for the many.

In the Middle Ages the accumulations of property were almost necessarily invested in land. There were some ships and warehouses; there was some wealth in clothing and in gems; some money was hoarded, to be loaned out at usurious rates of interest; but in the main, wealth was put into lands or houses. And under the feudal system land was the property of the few lords of the soil; indeed, in strictness of speech, it was all the property of one lord, the king, from whom others held it only as tenants. This theory of landownership still lingers in English law, though only as fossils from which the life has forever gone. That theory is thus stated in the article on Feudalism in the "Encyclopædia Britannica:" "There is no such thing as absolute property in land; a man can only have an estate of interest in land. Every landowner is, in the eye of the law, a tenant only. The owner in fee is the tenant of some one else, who in his turn is the tenant of another, and so on until the last and absolute owner is reached, viz., the king, from whom, directly or indirectly, all lands are held."

This, which is now only a theory, was in the Middle Ages a sombre and sometimes a tragic fact. "The state: I am the state," was no egotistical fiction; it was the sober utterance of an undoubted fact. France belonged to the Bourbon king. It was his personal property, and to call him to account for wasting it was regarded as an impertinence. To attempt to reduce his income from it was treated as a violation of private rights, even more than in our time would be socialistic legislation aimed at limiting the amount of property a citizen may own or the amount of income he may be permitted to derive from it. The lords of the soil were tenants of this king, and held it by the same divine right. To them as his representatives, the ownership of substantially all invested wealth belonged by divine right. The public revenues of the state were the personal revenue of the king; the revenues of the estates into which the kingdom was divided were the personal revenues of the lords political and ecclesiastical. Under this system in France the public lands belonged to the king directly; of the remainder fully one half belonged to the privileged classes. "This large fortune, moreover," says Taine, "is at the same time the richest, for it comprises almost all the large and imposing buildings, the palaces, castles, convents, and cathedrals, and almost all the valuable movable property, such as furniture, plate, objects of art, the accumulated masterpieces of centuries." The land, so far as

it was productive at all, depended for its cultivation on serfs who belonged to the soil, and so to the lords of the soil. Sometimes they were permitted to preserve enough of the fruits of their labor to keep them alive; sometimes they were not; then wholesale famines ensued. But both in England and in France much of this land was purposely kept out of cultivation, — part of it in private parks, part of it in great forests for the royal sport of hunting. The King of France in the closing part of the eighteenth century averaged one hunting-party every three days, — stag hunts, boar hunts, wolf hunts. Such hunts were made possible only by reserving great tracts of forest from cultivation in order to serve the purposes of hunting-grounds.

The abolition of feudalism, the invention of machinery, the introduction of manufacturing, the cessation of private war, the development of commerce, and the rise of the commercial spirit have combined to change all this. Whatever moral injury commercialism may have inflicted on the community, it has certainly accomplished a decentralization of wealth such as could not have been accomplished by any merely moral reform, however supported. The wealth of the world is no longer represented in unimproved lands; it is represented in mines, factories, ships, railroads, cultivated farms. Wealth is no longer idle; it is busy. Jesus Christ counseled his followers not to lay up for themselves treasures on earth, where

moth and rust corrupt and thieves break through and steal. At that time wealth was largely represented by coins or gems hoarded in earthen vessels and buried in the ground, or in rich dresses hung in cupboards and worn with caution, that they might not tempt the omnivorous and unscrupulous tax-gatherer. Moths destroyed the garments, rust consumed the coin; thieves could carry either off. Jesus counseled against hoarding; his counsel is now followed almost universally; hoards are very few in America. He who ties up his gold and hides it in a trunk, or invests it in an extraordinary assortment of clothing, is rightly regarded as a fool. Neither moth nor rust corrupts active wealth; and thieves cannot steal it. And this busy wealth necessarily renders service to others than its possessor. The railroad serves the farmer and the railroad employee; the factory, the operative and the purchaser in the market; the cultivated land, the farmer who cultivates the soil, and the men and women and children whom he feeds by his industry. Commercialism compels the man of wealth so to use his wealth that the world shares it whether he will or no. Even idle wealth becomes a minister to the people. The parks are no longer private property; they are the breathing-places of the city; and the analogue of England's Great Forest, the Yellowstone Park, is held in trust for seventy-five millions of people.

At the same time and by the same process property is broken up into fragments and has many

owners while it is serving many people. We hear much about the concentration of wealth in America. In fact, the process of the centuries has been toward decentralization, not toward centralization, of wealth. Never in the history of the world has wealth been so widely distributed in ownership, and never approximately so widely distributed in the benefits it confers, as in democratic America to-day.¹ The complaint against centralization of wealth is really due to the fact that the community are beginning to appreciate the advantages of wealth distribution, to see the evils of its concentration, and to recognize that they have the power, though they do not yet know how to exercise it, to prevent such concentration. While thus commercialism and modern invention have brought about the distribution of wealth in one way, the enlargement of human sympathy has brought it about in another. There never was a time when man had not fellow-feeling for his brother man. But his brother man was the member of his own household or the member of his own tribe. Those that lay beyond the horizon of his household or his tribe did not come within the circle of his sympathy. Later, the sympathies were enlarged to include all of his class, of whatever nation. *Noblesse oblige* was the law of the Middle Ages. The nobility owed something to the nobility, but nothing to the peasant class.

¹ Some statistics on this subject will be given in a future lecture.

Thanks to the influence of Christianity, to the preaching especially of the lower clergy, to the influence of a wider intelligence, to political revolutions, to industrial uprisings, in a word, to the development of humanity, *noblesse oblige* has grown into a spirit of humanity. When Mr. Carnegie considers what he shall do with his wealth, he resolves to confer benefits, not on the men of his own class, but on the men who have no class relation to him. As I am writing these lines, it is announced that he has given five millions of dollars in trust for the benefit, not of the circle in which he moves, or the class to which, so far as in America there can be said to be classes, he is supposed to belong, but for the benefit of the workingmen on whom his industrial prosperity has depended, and for their families. Thus a catholic philanthropy has coöperated with the spirit of commercialism to secure a distribution of the benefits of wealth, while industrial forces have done something, as we shall see more clearly hereafter, to secure the distribution of its ownership and control.

IV. These three processes, religious, political, and industrial, have been accompanied by a fourth process, — educational. There are two contrasted philosophies respecting the significance and end of life. The one is expressed by the phrase “struggle for existence, survival of the fittest.” It assumes that the end of life is the development of a type of individual character, what Nietzsche¹

¹ Frederick Nietzsche: *Thus spake Zarathustra*.

calls the "beyond man." It assumes that the weak and the poor are to be destroyed by the process, and that whatever intervenes to prevent their destruction delays the desired consummation. The other assumes that the end of life is the development of a race in which the strong will be the servants of the weak, and by their service will make the weak fit to survive. The end of life, according to this conception, which is Christ's, is a race, a divinely organized society, a kingdom of God or a kingdom of heaven, on the earth.

Which of these is the sounder philosophy, which most scientifically interprets life, which will achieve the noblest results in character, it is not necessary for my purpose here to discuss. It is enough to say that the latter of these is the dominant philosophy to-day, and all educational systems in western Europe, England, and America are based upon it. How these educational systems have grown, how the principle of education has been changed, the curriculum widened, and the circle of pupils to be provided for increased, will be subject for consideration hereafter. It must now suffice to point out the fact that with democratic institutions has gone a democratic ideal of education. Popular suffrage and representative assemblies have been accompanied with public schools provided by the State for the education of all the children of school age.

And this widening of education by an enlarged school system has been accompanied by similar

educational processes outside the school. The discovery of the printing-press has created cheap literature and the cheap newspaper, and, by making reading possible to all, has made education possible for all. Photogravure, color-printing, and photographs have made art universal, while the press has made literature so, and education has given to the common people the ability to enjoy the one and utilize the other. If the highest ideals for the few have been lowered by this process, — though this is by no means here asserted, — it is certain that the enjoyments and abilities of the many have been greatly increased. Education, no less than religion, government, and industry, has been transformed from the servant of an elect few into a ministry to the many.

We need not go to the Church nor to the Book as an authority in order to learn what God is doing in his world. We may deduce his purpose from his achievements. Thus, history reveals his will, because it shows what ends he has accomplished through the wills, often unintelligent and sometimes recalcitrant, of his children. When history is interrogated, it replies that he who is mightier than the mightiest has, on the one hand, undermined and destroyed the imperial organization typified in ancient Rome, and, on the other, has built up a democratic organization typified in the religious, political, industrial, and educational life of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. In the future lectures in this series I shall assume the conclusion

to which I have thus far sought to conduct the hearer. I shall assume that the object of religion, of government, of industry, and of education is the benefit of all the people, and I shall ask the hearer to consider with me what, assuming this to be the case, the organization of society should be; assuming that the end of government is the benefit of the governed, what should be the organization of government; assuming that the end of industry is the welfare of humanity, what should be the organization of industry; assuming that educational and religious institutions are for the benefit of all, what should be the institutions of religion and education. If there are any of my hearers who are still inclined to the opinion that life is for the few, not for the many, that its end is the development of a few fine types, not the development of a divine race, they and I will from this point part company.

LECTURE III

POLITICAL RIGHTS

WALKING in the streets of one of our great cities not long since, my interest was aroused by a group on the opposite corner. A butcher-boy, with a basket of meat upon his arm, was surrounded by a group of street arabs, who apparently intended a petty highway robbery; and as it was in a district where I happened to know that such highway robberies had been perpetrated by boys on boys, I stopped a moment to observe. Half a dozen of these hoodlums so surrounded the butcher-boy that he could not escape in either direction, and were unmistakably endeavoring to provoke him into a fight. He was quite helpless. He could not fight them with a basket on his arm, and if he set it down, some one of his enemies was sure to pick it up and make off with it. His irresolute look first in one direction and then in another appealed to me, and I started to his assistance. The moment I approached, the hoodlums ran hooting down the street, and the butcher-boy, without even looking to see what were the reinforcements which had come to his aid, started on his delivery again. This simple incident set me

thinking. What right had I to interfere? Probably the Anarchist, and possibly the Friend, would say I had none; but I had no scruples; and if the hoodlums had resisted, I should, without hesitation, have laid my cane on the shoulders of any one of them, my chief regret being that my arm was not stronger. Neither the State nor the city had reposed any authority in me; if a policeman had come along at that moment, he would have been quite justified in arresting us all and taking us to the nearest magistrate, that the matter might be investigated. Certainly my authority did not depend on the consent of the governed. If a vote had been taken, I should have been voted down six to one; the butcher-boy would have been my only supporter. The right to interfere in such a case is the right which every man possesses to interfere, to prevent by force an injustice which is being perpetrated or threatened by force.

Every man has certain natural rights. He may forfeit them by his crimes; he may prove himself unable to use them with safety to himself or to others by reason of his incompetency. There may be other limitations. I shall not undertake to offer a complete catalogue of these rights. But, speaking broadly, every man has a right to his person, to his property, to his reputation, to his family, and to his liberty, — this last being the right to use his person and his property in any way he chooses, provided he does not infringe the

rights or impair the welfare of others by such use.¹ If any one attempts by violence to deprive him of these rights, he is justified in using whatever force may be necessary to repel the assailant and protect himself. This right of self-defense is absolute, inherent, fundamental. There are a few people who think it better to suffer any injustice rather than to employ force in self-defense. There are a few who think that such was the teaching of Jesus Christ. The great majority of men, however, do not so interpret either the ethical instincts of humanity or the ethical teachings of Jesus Christ. I shall not discuss this question here. I shall assume the right of self-defense.

This right of self-defense involves, if necessary, the right to defend others who are dependent upon us for protection, when they are attacked. The same instinct which justifies a man in defending his person or his property justifies him in defending the person and the property of his wife and children. Most persons would regard this as an obligation rather than as a right. They might concede that a man may, if he choose, suffer in his person or his property rather than resort to violence in his defense; but they would not concede that he may, if he choose, permit his wife and children to be robbed or assaulted with impunity

¹ The reader will observe, of course, that this classification is borrowed from the Ten Commandments, which remain after nearly thirty centuries the most comprehensive, as they are the most concise, statement in literature of social rights and duties.

if he has the power to defend them. Actor of the however, no adequate reason for confining dominion of self-defense to the man and to his sons and family. He is a member of a larger family. Every man is his brother; all the weak are his children; whoever is in peril may look to him for help if it is within his power to give help. Whatever a man may do to protect himself he may do to protect another who is in peril. Certainly men may organize for the purpose of mutual protection in their rights of person, property, reputation, and family. Such an organization is government. It is founded, not on the consent of the governed, but on the inherent right of every man to protect himself and to protect his neighbor whenever either is assailed, and his person, his property, his reputation, or his family is endangered.

What is government? It is nothing less than the control of one man's will by another man's will. In all government there are two elements: authority and power. Authority is the right, real or assumed, to control the will of another; power is the ability to enforce that right despite the resistance, if it should be offered, of the person controlled. Where either of these elements is lacking, rightful government does not exist. Where no right to control is claimed, there is no government; Marc Antony's control of the mob in Rome was not government, for Marc Antony neither had, nor pretended to have, any authority to require the people to act contrary to their own

rights or here there is no power to control, there is no government; while Charles I. was in prison, though he was still the nominal king of England, he did not govern England, for, whatever his authority, he had no power. Power enforcing authority is essential to government.

This power enforcing authority may be one of several kinds: it may be in the governor's ability to inflict penalty for disobedience or give reward for obedience, — in this case it is political; it may be in the conscience of the governed, who yield to the will of the governor either because they think it is right to do so, or because they fear supernatural penalties in another world in case they do not, — in this case the power is religious; it may be in the mere sense of loyalty to a person, or in the semi-hypnotic influence exercised by one over the many, as by Napoleon over his soldiers, — in this case it is personal. But to constitute a government, the two elements of authority and power must combine. There must be in the governor both a recognized right and a real power to control the will of the governed. If there is no rightful authority, there is no rightful government; might, therefore, does not make right. If there is no power to enforce that authority, there is no government; directions which cannot be enforced are advice, not law.

The real question as to the basis of government, then, is this: When has one man a right by his will to control the wills of other men; to overrule

them; to substitute himself as the director of the action of other men; to make his personality dominate another's personality? This question brings us to the same result we have already reached. He has a right to do this whenever that other is, in the exercise of his own will, violating the rights of his fellow men. How far one may claim the right, as against his fellows, to injure himself is a doubtful question; but he has no right to injure his neighbor. If he attempts to do so, not only the injured man but any one else may interfere to prevent. This right of self-protection confers authority, and makes the government just; power to exercise this right effectually makes it strong. A good government is one which is strong enough to protect the rights of the members of the community from all assailants, and which uses its strength chiefly, if not exclusively, for that purpose and never inconsistently with that purpose. There are other functions which the political organism may exercise, but they are not, properly speaking, governmental functions. Of these I shall speak in a future article.

The history of the development of government confirms this view of its basis and its primary functions. The family is the earliest of all social organizations. It grows by a natural process, — by children, grandchildren, uncles, nephews, cousins, and, connected with it, servants or retainers. The father is the governor of this little community; the authority is vested in him; that authority

is sustained partly by the interest and partly by the conscience of the family. He is the commander-in-chief of the organization, and arms and equips it when it is attacked by another family. The common perils which threaten families of the same stock create a common interest; intermarriage creates a closer bond; the family grows into a tribe. The head of the tribe is the head of the larger household; its authority is vested in him; he is the commander-in-chief of the tribe and leads it to battle, defensive and offensive. The same instinct which has knitted the family together unites the families in a single tribe, — the instinct of self-preservation for the individual, and the unselfish instinct which leads every man to desire to protect his wife, his children, his brothers. Other elements enter into and modify the simple organization. The tribe engages in predatory expeditions; in robbery and revenge as well as in self-defense. But the ethical foundation is the desire of each man to secure the protection to his rights which confederacy with his neighbor affords, and to give similar protection in turn. Thus government has in fact grown up out of the instinct of self-preservation and mutual protection. This instinct, not the power of the governor nor the consent of the governed, is the basis of government.

The theory that power of itself confers authority I need not consider; for, although it has been affirmed in the past by eminent thinkers, it is be-

lieved in America by so very few that it may be dismissed without comment. The second theory, that the consent of the governed confers authority, is more popular in America and needs fuller consideration. This phrase "consent of the governed" is the expression of a theory of government which may be epitomized thus: In a state of nature every man was free; by a covenant with one another men agreed to surrender this freedom for the greater advantages of government; and this covenant and surrender constitute the foundation of government. Concerning this theory four things are to be said.

First: Man did not enjoy freedom in a state of nature. The alternative of freedom is a control of one will by another will. In a state of nature every man was always liable to run against the will of another, and which will should control depended upon the question which will was the stronger. If he fished in a stream, hunted in a wood, cleared off a little patch and cultivated some corn, loved and married a woman and built him a home, a stronger man might at any time drive him from the stream, expel him from the wood, seize upon his growing corn, carry off his wife and children. The state of nature is not a state of liberty. Governments grew up, not by a surrender of freedom, but to secure freedom; they grew up by a gradual, unconscious, spontaneous process, in order to protect the governed in his rights and thus to make his freedom larger and

surer. The will of the stronger was in the growing government formulated in laws, written or unwritten; thus the individual was enabled to know when he was liable to collide with another's will, and thus he could, if he wished, escape the collision. The stream and the wood were protected by the tribe and belonged in common to the tribe; a portion of the individual's corn patch went in a simple tax, but of the rest he was secure; his wife and home were sacred unless the government to which he belonged was overpowered in war by a government stronger than his own. The change from a state of nature to a state of government was a change from a control constantly shifting and always irresponsible to a control established, formulated, and comprehended; it was an advance into a greater and a more assured freedom.

Second: There never was a contract, covenant, or compact on which, or out of which, government grew. Historically, no government rests upon any such compact. The "social contract" is a philosophical fiction. Government has grown historically, not out of a compact, expressed or implied, to surrender liberty for the sake of order; it has grown out of the organization of the instinct of self-protection and mutual protection, and begins in the patriarchal organization of the family.

Third: The doctrine of the consent of the governed has never afforded even a philosophical bulwark of freedom. It has been made the defense

of absolutism, as well as of freedom, and has served the one advocate as well as the other. Says Thomas Hobbes in "The Leviathan:" —

They that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude ; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another man or other assembly of men, for they are bound, every man to every man, to own and be reputed author of all that he that already is their sovereign shall do and judge fit to be done : so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant to that man, which is injustice : and they have also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person ; and therefore, if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.¹

Fourth: Historically, the consent of the governed has never had even the least effect to make the government founded thereon a just government. In Spain, under Philip II., there is little question that the great mass of the people would have voted to continue the Inquisition; their acquiescence did not make the Inquisition just. In the Red Terror, Robespierre and the guillotine had the enthusiastic support of the people; that sup-

¹ Hobbes: *The Leviathan*, ch. xviii. The meaning appears to be that, a covenant having been entered into between the king and the people, it cannot be broken by the people without injustice, so long as the king dissents. The employment of this theory of compact to justify handing over a State to the autocrat, aristocrat, or plutocrat is very common ; it has probably been employed by despotism far oftener than by freedom.

port did not make the Red Terror a just government. The Empire of Napoleon I. was founded on a plebiscite which gave overwhelming indorsement to both it and him, and was an undoubted expression of the will of the great body of the people of France; that plebiscite did not make the Napoleonic Empire a just government. The burning of negroes in the South and the West is no more an act of justice because it is done by a mass-meeting than if it were done by a Star Chamber. Majorities do not make wrong right. "For myself," says De Tocqueville, "when I feel the hand of power lie heavy on my brow, I care but little who oppresses me; and I am not more disposed to pass beneath the yoke because it is held out to me by the arms of a million of men."

It is clear, then, that the consent of the governed does not make government a just government; nor does the lack of such consent make it unjust. A government is just, whatever its form, which protects the members of the community, the poorest and the richest, the lowliest and the highest, in their rights of person, property, reputation, and family, and in their liberty to use their persons and property as they choose so long as they do not injure their neighbors. It is equally clear that the consent of the governed does not make a government a free government. A government is free when the members of the community are free. If democracy denies to an accused the right to a fair trial, as democracy has done again and again

in the United States, the community is, in so far, not a free community. If democracy should attempt to spoil the rich for the benefit of the poor, to deny the men of property the right to be protected in their property and to use their property as they choose so long as they do not use it to the injury of others, the community would, in so far, cease to be a free community. The freedom of a people is not to be identified with the form of their government. England is a monarchy, and Englishmen are free; the Spanish-American governments are republics, and the Spanish-Americans are not free.

Thus, whether we consider the true basis of government, — namely, the instinct of self-preservation and mutual protection; the history of the rise and development of government, — namely, its evolution from the family by the unconscious operation of that instinct; the true function of government, — namely, the safeguarding of natural rights; the history of the phrase “consent of the governed” and the uses to which it has been put, or the history of governments just and unjust, — this famous phrase is seen to have as little foundation as the philosophy of which it is the popular expression. He who desires to consider this subject further can do so advantageously by reading the essay on “The Theory of the Social Compact,” by A. Lawrence Lowell, in his “Essays on Government.” He thus sums up his history of the social compact theory of government: —

We have traced the history of this extraordinary theory from the time of its first appearance at the end of the sixteenth century, and we have seen it used to support the most divergent doctrines and the most conflicting opinions; for, like certain ingenious Yankee inventions, it was capable of being applied to almost any service, although really adapted to none. No better example can be found of the fact so strongly urged by Lecky, that men are chiefly persuaded, not by the logical force of arguments, but by the disposition with which they view them. We have seen the theory started by a zealous churchman to uphold his church. We have seen it wielded by Hobbes in favor of absolute monarchy in England. We have then seen it taken up by Locke as a shield to individual right, and in defense of a limitation of the power of government; and later still by Rousseau, as an argument for an unbridled democracy. We have seen its working here on the Constitution of Massachusetts; and, after lighting the world for two centuries, we have seen it give a last despairing flicker in the courts of the United States, and fade away in the dim light of German metaphysics.¹

With this quotation we may dismiss from further consideration both the phrase “consent of the governed” and the philosophy from which it springs, save for one remark pointing out the probable cause of the extraordinary currency which has been given to both. While the consent of the governed has nothing to do directly with either the justice of a government or the freedom of the people who are subject to it, it has much to do

¹ A. Lawrence Lowell: *Essays on Government*, p. 182.

with its stability. A government, however just, which depends, for its maintenance, on force to compel obedience to its commands, and issues those commands to an uneasy, restless, and discontented people, may be just, but will not be stable. Its people may be free, but they will not be peaceful. Whether the fault is in the governed or in the governor, the government will lack stability if governed and governor are not in accord. The authority of the governor may be never so just, the power of the governor may be never so great, the stability of the government and the peace of the people under the government will not be secured unless the government has the consent of the governed, express or implied, positive or negative. To other elements we must look to make the United States Republic just, but the consent of the governed makes it stable. At the end of an exciting election in which a President is elected and a policy indorsed by only seven hundred thousand plurality in a total of nearly fourteen million votes cast, the whole country acquiesces; and if any advocate of the defeated party should attempt to raise a revolt, Democrats would vie with Republicans in putting the revolt down. This fact secures a peaceful four years to the country. But it does not secure four years of justice to the country. If the foreign and domestic policies of the Republican party were unjust before the election, they are unjust still; if they were just before the election, a Democratic victory would not have

made them unjust. Neither the decision of the majority governing, nor the consent of the minority governed, can have the least effect on the fundamental question, what are human rights at home and abroad, and what measures may be justly taken to protect them.

The basis of government is the universal instinct for self-protection and mutual protection; and that is a just government, whatever its form, which adequately protects the natural rights of its subjects.

If government fulfills this function of protection justly and adequately, it is a good government, whatever its form; and, whatever its form, it is a bad government if it fails to perform this function justly and adequately; it is preëminently a bad government if, instead of protecting rights, it violates them.

It is not always easy to determine what are the rights of person, property, reputation, family, and liberty which government ought by force to protect. A great deal of the business of the courts consists in the determination of these questions. They recognize, for example, that man has rights of property in some kinds of animals and not in other kinds; that a verbal charge of crime is a violation of the rights of reputation which government will punish, but a verbal charge of impropriety or indecorum is not; that to seduce a daughter by promise of marriage is an offense against the family which the law will punish, but

to win her consent without promise of marriage is not. Who is to determine what are the rights which government will protect and how they shall be protected? The answer is that the existing government, whatever it may be, is to determine these questions. And this for a very simple reason. Whoever possesses power is, by the mere possession of that power, made responsible for its right employment. To recur to the illustration with which I commenced the last article; assuming that I had power to protect the butcher-boy from the hoodlums, I was responsible for the right exercise of that power. The possession of the power imposed a concurrent responsibility. If, on arriving on the scene, the boys whom I took to be hoodlums had assured me that the boy whom I took to be a butcher-boy was a thief and they were simply attempting to recover their property, it would clearly have been my duty to have investigated the question or secured an investigation of it. If, as the result of my interference, the thief had made off with the property which he had stolen, I should have been morally responsible. In any given community the actually existing government must in the first instance determine what is justice in any given case. Its power to enforce its judgments makes it responsible to form just judgments. Might does not make right; but might does impose responsibility on the one who possesses it, to determine what is right.

Suppose, what not infrequently occurs, the gov-

ernment forms a judgment which to the individual or to a group of individuals, seems to be unjust, what is the remedy? Is there any? or is the decision of the government final, so that while in theory might does not make right, practically and in effect it does? In case the decision of the government appears to be unjust to the individual or individuals directly affected, there are four courses, and only four, open to the injured party. He may submit; he may endeavor by peaceable methods to change the decision of the government or the personnel of the government; he may leave the community for another which is under a government that seems to him more just; or he may resist the government and endeavor to overthrow it.

In the great majority of cases, the first is the course which both prudence and morality dictate. There is probably not a reader of these articles of the age of manhood who has not at some time suffered what he regards as an injustice, either through the commission or the omission of his government, and has submitted to it with such grace as he could command. All human organizations are imperfect. And for those individual acts of injustice due to the imperfection of human government, quiet and uncomplaining submission is the best remedy.

When, however, it is not a single act but a series of acts, and when this series of acts becomes a governmental habit, we may resort to the next

remedy. We appeal to public opinion, and by public opinion endeavor to bring about a change, either in the habit of the government, or in its personnel, or in its structure, or in all three. As I am writing this article, such an agitation is going on in the city of New York, the object of which is to change both the form of the municipal government, — that is, its charter, — and the personnel of the government, — that is, the men who administer it. As we have seen, the force which enables the government to serve its purpose of protection of rights may be a force of arms exerted over the governed, or a force of conscience exerted within the governed. In nearly all modern governments these two forces are combined. The more democratic the government, the more its force is in the conscience of the governed and the less is it in the physical power or force of arms of the governor. The appeal to the conscience of men, therefore, which would have been in vain under the Cæsars in the first century, is not in vain in modern Christendom in the nineteenth century. The appeal to the conscience of Europe made by Mr. Gladstone in his published letters concerning the cruelty and rapacity of the Bourbon rule in Naples led to the overthrow of Bourbonism in Italy and the establishment of Italian unity. The appeal of the anti-slavery reformers in England and America against slavery resulted in the overthrow of slavery by peaceful measures in the British Empire, by revolution in the United States. The

appeal to the conscience of England by the Chartists ended in the initiation of nearly all of the political and social reforms which they demanded and the end of much of the injustice against which they complained.

A variety of circumstances may make this method impracticable or ineffective. The government may refuse to permit free speech or a free press; or those who suffer the injustice may only know that they are suffering, but not be sufficiently intelligent to understand why they suffer and so be unable to point out the injustice and demand a remedy; or they may be so poor and so uninfluential that their protests are unheard and unheeded. In this case the third remedy remains: they may, if they can accumulate the means and possess themselves of the courage, leave the community in which they were born and reared and go to another community, where, as they believe, their just rights will be better safeguarded and their interests better promoted. This is the remedy which millions of immigrants to America have sought for injustice suffered in their original homes. It is true that the government may forbid, and in some cases has forbidden, such migration. In so doing it clearly violates the fundamental principle of its own existence. For government, as we have seen, is formed to protect the rights of man. One of the most elemental of those rights is the right to go where one pleases, provided one does not violate the rights of others.

Leaving one's native country to go to another country does not violate the rights of any other one. Such prohibition of migration assumes that the governed exist for the benefit of government, whereas governments exist for the benefit of the governed.

When neither of these remedies is practicable, there remains, as a last and terrible resort, revolution. To justify revolution against an existing government, whatever it may be, these conditions must exist: the government must be an unjust government; the injustice must be of such a character that submission to it involves evils to the community greater than resistance will involve; the remedy by public opinion must be denied, or be unavailing; the evils must be so widespread that escape from them by emigration is impracticable except to the favored few; and, finally, the discontent produced by the injustice must be so widespread as to give promise of success to a movement organized to overturn the government and substitute a new one in its place.

This right of revolution, however, requires further elucidation.

"Man," says Aristotle, "is naturally a political animal."¹ He is born into a government as he is born into a family. He has no more to do with the choice of the one than with the choice of the other. He is a subject of parents whom he did not choose; he is similarly a subject of a govern-

¹ Aristotle: *Politics*, book i., chap. ii.

ment which he did not choose. As his hand or his foot is a part of his body, so he in turn is a part of the political organism, and he cannot dissociate himself therefrom. He is born, not isolated, but to be sharer in obligations and responsibilities from which he is powerless to escape. They belong to him by reason of his manhood. He does not form them, though he may participate in changing their form. Government is a growth, not a manufacture. Even if it seems to be newly created, as in the case of the American and French Republics, it is not really the government, it is only the *form* of the government, which is newly created. The American Republic grew out of previous English and colonial governments; the French Republic grew out of previous imperial and revolutionary governments. But, as we have seen, government is founded on, and grows out of, the instinct of self-preservation. Its primary function is to protect the rights of men; its authority is derived from the right of the strong to protect the weak. If the government into which any man is born violates this fundamental principle upon which all government is based, if it uses its strength, not to protect the weak, but to oppress the weak, it no longer has authority. It may still have power, but it has by its own act destroyed its authority. It may still be able to rule, but it has no right to rule. The same principle of self-preservation, which is the foundation of government, then becomes the justification of revolu-

tion. Man has an inherent right to protect himself; if the government founded on this right of mutual protection does not protect, especially, if instead of protecting, it oppresses its subjects, the same right of self-protection justifies them in overturning the government, if they have power to do so. In other words, when injustice in any government becomes so great, so radical, so habitual, that the government ceases to be a mutually protective organization, then the people have a right to overturn it and substitute a new government in its place, because they have an absolute, inherent, and indefeasible right to be protected in their persons, property, reputation, family, and liberty.

The mere fact that the form of government does not suit the protestants is no just ground for revolution. The justice of a government does not depend upon its form, — although some forms are more apt to do equal justice than other forms; it depends upon the fidelity with which it fulfills the function of government, — that is, with which it safeguards the rights of man and promotes his prosperity. The resort to force is justified only by the extremest exigency. A mere distaste for one form of government or desire for another form of government is not such an exigency as justifies resort to force to overthrow the government.

The mere fact that the government declines to permit the protestants to share in the administration of government is not an adequate reason for revolution. No man has a natural right to share

in the administration of the government under which he lives. He has a right to be protected in his person, property, reputation, family, and liberties; but if the government of which he is a subject affords him such protection, adequately and effectively, he has no ground on which to demand of the government, as his right, permission to participate in it. That he has no such natural right is evident from a consideration of the nature of government. Government is, as we have seen, the control of one man's will by another man's will. No man has any ground for claiming that it is his natural right to control the will, or dominate the personality, or direct the life-action of another man. This right, wherever it exists, is not natural and inherent; it is acquired, and rests upon some other fundamental and essential right. We have seen what that fundamental right is; it is the right of self-protection. The only reason why one man may claim the right to control another man against his will, if he be of full age and mentally and morally of sane character,¹ is in order to secure the protection of himself and others from injury and wrong-doing. If that protection is sufficiently afforded by government, he has no ground for insisting on his right to participate in the government, — that is, to share in that control

¹ The right of a parent, or one standing *in loco parentis*, to control the child, and the right of the sane to control the insane, need not here be considered. We are considering the control of sane men of adult age by other sane men of adult age.

over the wills and lives of other men. The only ground on which such a claim can be based is that such participation of all in the government is necessary, in order to make the government an adequate protection of all. Suffrage, or participation in the government, is not an end, it is only a means to an end; it is not a right, it is only one means to the preservation of rights.

That we do not believe in this country that suffrage is a natural right is evident from our practice. The people who live in the District of Columbia cannot vote, but they are not denied their natural rights. The newly arrived immigrants not yet naturalized cannot vote, but they are not denied their natural rights. The young man of nineteen or twenty, whose education makes him much more competent to vote than many men who do vote, is not denied his natural rights. The man whose business interests are in New York City, but whose residence is in Westchester County, and who pays large taxes in New York City but is not allowed to vote there, is not denied his natural rights. So in those states in which women are not allowed to vote they are not denied any natural right. Those whose persons, property, reputation, family, and liberties are adequately secured under the government as it is now organized, have no right to claim anything more. A claim by any persons, whether men or women, to the suffrage as a right, must be founded on the assumption that their natural rights cannot be

protected in any other way; a claim to the suffrage as politic must be founded on the assumption that the rights of the individual and the welfare of the community will be best promoted by the extension of the suffrage. A man has no more a natural right to vote in a general election than he has to vote in the legislature. In both cases the conditions of the vote are determined by the existing government, whatever it may be. Properly speaking, suffrage is not a right at all; it is a prerogative and a responsibility; and who shall exercise that prerogative and who shall share that responsibility are to be determined by the existing government, whatever that government may be. This is, in point of fact, the practice of all governments, including our own; and it is a practice abundantly justified both by philosophy and history. How extensive the suffrage ought to be in any given community is dependent wholly upon the question, what conditions of suffrage, first, will secure the best protection of person, property, reputation, family, and liberty, and, second, will best promote the general life of the community, material and spiritual.

The fact that a particular government is dependent upon another government does not of itself justify a revolution. Independence is not synonymous with liberty. The two are often confounded, but they are quite distinct. A government is independent when it has no organic relation of subjection to another government; it is free when the

members of the community subject to the government are protected in their persons, property, reputation, family, and liberties. It is clear that a government may be independent and not furnish such protection, and, on the other hand, that it may be dependent and furnish such protection all the better because of its dependence. Spain in the sixteenth century was independent; but her people were not free. Canada in the nineteenth century is not independent, but her people are free. No State in the Union is independent, but the freedom of the subjects of the various states is better secured because they are dependent on each other and on the Federal Government. This fact that dependence may be a means of securing liberty is distinctly affirmed in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States: "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." These, not independence, are the ends of government. When they are secured, the mere fact that the government under which they are secured is dependent for them in part on another government, is no reason for a revolution. Our own history affords a striking illustration of the fact that independence and liberty are not only not synonymous, but may be

antagonistic. The Civil War was a war between independence and liberty. The South fought that the Confederate States might be independent, and if they had won their independence they would unquestionably have established slavery for a large proportion of their people. The North fought to prevent their independence, and, winning the battle, gave freedom to the slaves. Liberty was won by the overthrow of independence. There are two questions in the Philippines to-day. Ought they to be independent? ought they to be free? These are not different forms of the same question. Those who believe that the Philippines ought not to be independent believe that if they become independent they will not be free, and if they become dependent on the United States their freedom will be assured. They justify maintaining the dependency of the Philippines in order to maintain the freedom of the Filipinos.

The principle here laid down, that only injustice in the existing government justifies a revolution for the purpose of overthrowing it, finds expression in our own Declaration of Independence. The war of 1776 is called not inaptly the War of Independence. It was; our fathers fought for independence; but they fought for independence only because they became convinced by long experience that they could not secure justice in any other way. Independence was not an end, but a means to an end. This is very explicitly declared by them in the document by which they justify to the

world their action. Let the reader reflect upon both the preamble and the conclusion of this Declaration:

When a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them [the people] under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

Nor have we been wanting in attention to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They, too, have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends. We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, Free and Independent States.

Why ought they to be independent States?

Not because they are denied participation in the government and representation in the Parliament; nor because they prefer a republic to a monarchy, or independence to dependency. These are not the reasons assigned. The signers of the Declaration affirm that the people ought to be free and independent because the government to which they are subject “evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism” — that is, to set at naught that protection of human rights which is the fundamental function of government, and all appeals to the conscience of the governor for justice, have been made in vain.

But, although man does not make government, but is born a subject of government, and although he is justified in resorting to violence to overthrow the government of which he is a subject only in case it abdicates its rightful authority by failing to fulfill its fundamental function, — that is, the protection of human rights, — yet he may and does modify the form of government, and, in fact, there are many forms existing in the world. Which is the best form?

Aristotle’s division of governments into four forms may be accepted as adequate, subject to a modification to be hereafter suggested. These forms are government by one, *i. e.*, monarchy; government by a few, *i. e.*, oligarchy; government by the best, *i. e.*, aristocracy; and government by the many, *i. e.*, democracy. The Napoleonic empire may be taken as a type of the first; Venice

as a type of the second; England, in the eighteenth century, as a type of the third; America as a type of the fourth. There is, however, a fifth form of government which Aristotle does not mention, perhaps because it did not exist in his time, perhaps because it is a bastard which does not deserve classification with legitimate governments. This bastard is bureaucracy, — a government by the office-holder. The most complete form of bureaucracy on a large scale is that furnished by Russia; but all modern governments, not excluding America, are more or less corrupted by it. It is the only form of government for which a philosopher can find no defense.

In considering these four forms of government it must be remembered that the distinction between them is marked more sharply in philosophy than in fact. Thus monarchy in its modern forms is rarely government by one. The power of the one is generally limited, as in Turkey, by a hierarchy, or, as in Russia, by a bureaucracy, or, as in France, in the eighteenth century, by the nobles, or, as in England, in the nineteenth century, by the common people. So, again, the power of the oligarchy, which, as Aristotle has also shown, is necessarily a plutocracy or rule of the rich, is limited by the necessity of promoting the commercial interests of the community in order to promote the interests of the rich. So, again, the aristocrats are, by no possible method of selection yet devised, wholly composed of the best; from them are ex-

cluded some of the best; into them creep some of the worst. Finally, democracy is not a government of all the people, but only of a large minority of the people. In the recent Presidential election, out of a population of over seventy millions, only about fourteen million votes were cast, — that is, one in five of the population determined the questions at issue. And of this fourteen millions Mr. McKinley's majority was only seven hundred thousand, so that in fact those questions were determined by only about one one-hundredth of the population. The value of this fact as a protection against the perils of democracy I shall consider in a future paper.

Recognizing these qualifications in the actually existing governments, the question presents itself as a practical and important one, which of these four forms of government, — government by the one, by the few, by the best, or by the many, — constitutes the best form of government; that is, which of these forms of government gives the best promise of, first, securing protection to the rights of man, and, second, of promoting the general welfare of man? Whatever government does these two things in the best manner is the best government. For, as we have seen, no man has a right to participate in the government, or has any ground of complaint because he is not allowed to participate in it, provided it fulfills these two functions of government adequately, — the first a definite and fundamental function, the second an in-

definite and subsidiary, though perhaps not less important, function.

We have already seen that there is no one form of government which is absolutely right, making all others absolutely wrong. There is no divine right of either kings, oligarchs, aristocrats, or majorities; the only divine right which government must recognize is the right to be protected in person, property, reputation, family, and liberty. It is also true that there is no one form of government which is absolutely best, making all other forms inferior. That is the best government which, at the time, under the circumstances, and in consideration of the intellectual and moral development of the people, is best adapted to protect their rights and promote their welfare; and the same form of government does not best accomplish these ends under all circumstances, in all epochs, and with all peoples. This is not, perhaps, a very popular opinion in America, but it may be true nevertheless.

It is interesting to note that of the forms of government mentioned by Aristotle, we have at least three in successful operation in the United States at the present time, and it is doubtful whether any considerable number of persons would wish to change radically either one of the three. The family is autocratic. The father is not, indeed, an absolute despot, but a constitutional monarch; and in case of extreme violation of the rights or disregard of the interests of his children,

an appeal lies to the government of which he is a subject. But in all the ordinary matters of the household his power is little less than absolute. So also the organization of the secondary school is largely autocratic. In some instances the principal is very strictly limited in his powers by a school board, in which case the government approximates the oligarchy, but whether with any real benefit to the pupils, is very doubtful. But in the best private schools the government is very nearly absolutely autocratic, the remedy for any real or fancied injustice being the remedy of emigration already referred to; that is, the pupil may go to another school. But as long as he remains in the school he has no participation in its government; or, if he does, it is only by sufferance of the principal. Political rights as such, he has none. In the college the government is oligarchic. It is administered almost exclusively by the faculty, who are under no political responsibility whatever to the pupils, and under none directly to the parents of the pupils. This oligarchy might be described as a limited or constitutional oligarchy; that is, its powers are limited generally by a written constitution, and in many cases an appeal lies to the board of trustees, and in all cases to that public opinion on which the college depends for its prosperous life. But the students rarely have any political power in the administration of the college, or, if they do, it is a power conferred by the favor of the faculty, and liable to be taken

away from them again. As a political organism the college is oligarchic, and probably few would wish to see it made more democratic than it is. The government of the country, the state, and the nation is that of a representative republic, — that is, of a government administered, not by the people directly, but by representatives elected by the people, and really by a minority, though a large minority, of the entire population. Finally, we have in the town meeting in some states, and in the district school meeting in others, an illustration of a pure democracy, in which the people assemble to debate questions and determine policies as well as to elect officials to carry those policies out. The same divergences in form of government are to be seen in other organizations: thus, the chorus choir and the orchestra are necessarily autocratic; the great corporation is generally in reality oligarchic, though it may be and generally, is in form representative; and the trades union is a curious combination of the oligarchic and the democratic. Similar differences are to be seen in our ecclesiastical organizations: the Roman Catholic Church being at least in form autocratic; the Episcopal, semi-aristocratic; the Presbyterian, representative; and the Congregational, democratic. These facts make it evident that the form of government necessarily depends in large measure upon the nature of the organism, the function it has to perform, the capacity of the people who constitute it, and the circumstances of its existence.

It is true that in most of the organizations mentioned above, the government is not an end, but only a means to an end. That is, the organism does not exist merely to govern, but also to perform other functions, — as to teach, to perform music, to conduct trade, and the like. But it is clear that it would be possible in some of these organizations to differentiate these functions. Thus, it would be conceivable that the boys in a school or college should make all the rules, elect all governing officers, and administer all discipline, leaving the faculty simply to teach. But it is not conceivable that any considerable number of either teachers, parents, or pupils would desire such a change.

My hearers may now, perhaps, be prepared to consider, if not to accept, the next proposition, — namely, that one controlling element in determining the question, what is the best form of government, is the mental and moral development of the people who constitute the governed community. In other words, government, as one of the products of social evolution, necessarily depends on the degree of social evolution attained by the governed community. The political history of the world indicates the true order of political development.

The family is the first and oldest government. It is and ought to be autocratic. The tribe comes next. The head of the tribe is, like the father of the family, an autocrat, though his autocratic powers are somewhat limited by the power of re-

sistance possessed by members of the tribe, if the autocracy becomes oppressive, and by customs which have grown up in the tribe and have all the binding force of constitutional law. In other words, he is a constitutional monarch. It is exceedingly doubtful whether any form of government could be devised better adapted to the Indian tribe, so long as it remains a nomadic tribe, than that which it possesses. We have given our indorsement to this autocratic method of government for the Indian by appointing over the tribe on the Reservation a white autocrat, whom we call Agent. In many cases the Agency system has worked very badly, because, first, the government of the Agent has not been for the benefit of the governed but for the benefit of the governor, and, second, it has been aimed, not to prepare the Indian for self-government, but to keep him in tutelage. But where the Agent has been honest, capable, and progressive, the results have been wholly admirable.

The next step in the evolution of government is the development of an aristocracy. This aristocracy is often far from absolutely excellent; but it possesses certain elements of courage, self-control, and intelligence which make it superior to the average. It puts limits on the power of the autocrat; it demands better protection for its own rights, if not for the rights of the people; it wrests from a King John a Magna Charta. Under its influence political power is somewhat more diffused,

and government is somewhat more equable than under the autocracy. The class below the nobles are awakened and stimulated by their example; they in turn limit the power of the nobles, and appeal to the still lower classes to aid them in securing a more equal distribution of justice, — that is, a more general and equable protection of person, property, reputation, the family, and liberty. The people under Simon de Montfort demand and secure a representation in the House of Commons. What are the rights of man, what are the privileges of class, what are the distinctions between the two, and what the functions and therefore what the powers of government, become matters of debate, each side enforcing its own interests with reasons, and sometimes with courageous battle. The privileges of the few give way gradually to the interests of the many, and at length the simple principle that governments exist for the benefit of the governed, and that their function is primarily the protection of the fundamental rights of man and of all men, is wrought into the consciousness of the people. Then, and not till then, is the community ready for a government founded on the will of the majority.

Autocracy is the best government for a people in its early childhood; oligarchy or aristocracy for a people in its teens: democracy for a people in its manhood. What happens when a people is suddenly transplanted from autocratic government to democratic government, without any interven-

ing preparation, is illustrated tragically by the French Revolution, and less tragically by the carpetbag government in the South. That person, property, reputation, the family, and liberty are better protected in Egypt under an autocracy than they would be by a government formed and administered by the fellaheen will hardly be doubted by any. Whether these fundamental rights will be better protected in Cuba under an independent democracy, or in Porto Rico under a mixed government, partly democratic partly autocratic, we shall soon know.

But while there is no one form of government which is absolutely right and no one form of government which is absolutely best for all peoples and under all circumstances, there is one principle of government which is the ultimate principle, and to which all history is slowly but surely conducting the peoples. That principle, — for it is a principle rather than a form, — is self-government.

Government is the control of a part of the community by another part of the community; it may be by a king, by an oligarchy, by an aristocracy, by a vote of seven million voters to which the opposing six million three hundred thousand voters submit, but in any case it is the control of a part by a part. It is clear that the government is best when the best exercise control and the less competent and virtuous are controlled. But it is not less evident that the supreme and ultimate government

is that in which the best in each man controls the inferior in each man. This is self-government; and the more nearly any community approaches self-government, the more nearly it approaches the ultimate goal of all political organization. The end of government is mutual protection against injustice. But when the people have become so educated that no one wishes to do his neighbor an injustice, the supreme end of government has been reached, because there is no longer any need of mutual protection; and when public sentiment has been so educated and developed that even men who would do an injustice to a fellow-man dare not do it, not because they fear a punishment forcibly administered, but because they fear the judgment and condemnation of their fellow-men, the end of government is approximated. For the object of all government is to destroy the necessity of any government, by developing such a public conscience that no other force than that of conscience will be needed to protect the rights of man.

But it is also evident that a government which proposes to depend on the united conscience and united judgment of a great body of men for its means of enforcing justice, or, rather, to trust thereto in lieu of relying upon an external enforcement of justice, must have in the community a great number of individual men whose judgment and conscience have been educated. A great body of men who are unable to govern themselves, either because they lack the judgment or the conscience,

cannot constitute a community which can govern itself. Self-government is not an assumption on which we are to start in framing a government; it is the goal which we are to reach by means of government. It is the *terminus ad quem*, not the *terminus a quo*.

An educative preparation is necessary for self-government in the race, as in the individual. To thrust a childlike people out into the world and expect them to provide for and protect themselves without any previous training is as unwise, not to say as cruel, as it would be to thrust the little children out from a home and expect them to take care of themselves. It is sometimes asked whether a despotic government has ever prepared a people for freedom. The answer is that no people have ever been prepared for freedom except by a despotic government. The Napoleonic empire was a necessary preparation for the French Republic. The suddenly liberated people had to learn to obey before they could learn to command. A long line of kings, beginning with William the Conqueror and ending with Charles I., laid in England the foundation for her constitutional liberties. Our own preparation was made in the same school, and a post-graduate education was added in colonial government under an English autocratic authority. No people in the history of the world have ever passed directly and without intervening education from a primitive or tribal condition of government to a self-governing democracy which ade-

quately protected person, property, reputation, the family, and liberty, and it is safe to assume that no people ever will. The question which confronts self-governing countries in this beginning of the twentieth century is, Shall we leave races just emerging from childhood to acquire capacity for self-government through the long and dismal processes which have been necessary in our case, or shall we serve as their guardians and tutors, protecting their rights and educating their judgments and their consciences until they are able to frame their own mutual protective associations, — that is, to constitute and administer without aid their own governments?

To sum up in a paragraph the conclusions of this and the preceding article: Government is a mutually protective association; it grows out of the instinct of men to protect their own rights and the rights of their neighbors; it is a just and a free government when it adequately protects those rights; it is neither a just nor a free government if it does not adequately protect those rights. The possession of the powers of government gives to those who possess such powers the responsibility of determining when it is right to interfere in order to prevent injustice. Man is born under government, and he is to be subject to that government, unless it fails to fulfill the functions of government; if it does so fail, and he cannot find adequate remedy for himself and his fellows by submission, protest, or migration, the right of re-

volution exists; because the same right to organize for self-protection in government exists to overthrow the government when it becomes an instrument of oppression, not of protection. There is no absolutely best form of government; that is the best form of government which, in any stage of the world, in any age of human development, best secures human rights; but the ultimate form of government, toward which history is gradually conducting the human race, is that form in which every man governs himself, and therefore all men partake in the common functions of government. But such self-government in the community, as in the individual, is a *terminus ad quem*, not a *terminus a quo*; that is, it is a result to be reached by means of government, not a foundation to be assumed on which government can be built.

LECTURE IV

INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS

THE industrial rights of man: what are they, and how are they to be secured in a democracy?

Every man has a right to the product of his own industry, because it is a part of himself; into it he has put a portion of his life. His life is his own, therefore this portion of his life is his own. The artist paints a picture; the musician composes a symphony; the author writes a book; into this picture, this symphony, this book the artist, musician, author, has gone. Because the artist has projected himself into the picture, the musician into the symphony, the author into the book, this product of himself belongs to him. And what is true of the artist, of the musician, of the author, is true of every laborer. The shoemaker projects himself into the shoes; the carpenter into the house; the loom-worker into the cloth. These also are a part of the man. Into them he has put his brain-work or his handiwork; therefore they are his. This right of every man to the product of his own labor is a natural right. Society did not confer it; society cannot take it away. Society may fail to protect it, or may violate it; but the right itself is absolute. Whenever organic

law violates this right it is unjust; whenever it fails to protect this right it is inefficient.

It was for this reason that slavery was unjust. The injustice of slavery did not lie in the fact that the slaves were ill-fed, ill-clothed, or ill-housed. If it had been true that they were better housed and fed and clothed in slavery than in freedom, still slavery would not have been justified. The evil of slavery was not that families were separated. If the law had provided explicitly that slaves' families should not be separated, still slavery would have been unjust. The injustice was not in specific acts of cruelty. If there had never been a Legree, still slavery would have been unjust. It was not that the slave was denied education. In Rome the slaves were educated, and authors, copyists, and literary men were held in slavery, and slavery was not just. The wrong of slavery lay in this: that personality was invaded; the product of the man was taken from him; he had put a part of his life out into the world and he was robbed of it. Whenever and however society does this, it does injustice.

So, again, if society is so organized that men cannot engage in productive industry, it is unjustly organized. The command, "By the sweat of thy brow thou shalt earn thy daily bread," involves a prerogative even more than a command. If society is so organized that there are large masses of men that cannot, by the sweat of their brow, earn their daily bread, it is unjustly organ-

ized. "Enforced idleness," says Carlyle, "is the Englishman's hell." There have been times in the past, in the history of this country, — and if the industrial organization of to-day remains unchanged there will be such times in the future, — when thousands of men have been driven into that enforced idleness which is the Englishman's hell. Any organization of society which prevents masses of the people from earning their daily bread by the sweat of their brow, or which fails to enable them so to earn it if they will to do so, is an unjust organization of society. So, any organization of society which, allowing men to work, still fails adequately to remunerate their work, fails adequately and rightfully to adjust the relations between the workers, and takes so much for the one class that it leaves practically nothing for the other class, or leaves them but a mere pittance and bare subsistence, is an unjust organization of society. The man who has put his life into his labor has a right to the product of that life. If, in the complexity of modern society, he is combined with others in that production, he has a right to a fair, just, and equable share in the product of the combined industry. If society fails to secure it for him, society is inefficient and in so far unjust.

If any section of society endeavors to prevent any man from working and from enjoying the product of his work, that section of society is unjust. If any organization undertakes to prevent any man from working when he will, where he

will, for whom he will, and at what wages he will, that organization violates the essential right of labor. It is not primarily the enemy of capital; it is primarily the enemy of labor; for every man has a right to work, and every man has a right to the product of his industry. Imagine, for a moment, that any man should propose to place a law on our statute-books providing that no man should work in any special industry unless he belonged to some special guild; not for one instant would he have the support of the people. Not for one instant would he have the support of any free people. But such a law is not better, but rather worse, if it be enacted by an irresponsible body and enforced by violence.

The right of every man to work, and the right of every man to the product of his work, are fundamental rights. There is enough to be done, and the world is fruitful enough, to make it possible for every man, in the present stage of civilization, to earn enough to support himself, his wife, and his children in comfort. Any organization, political or industrial, capitalistic or laborers', which impugns this right, prevents this work, or takes from the laborer the product of his industry, whether it be industry of the brain or industry of the muscles, without adequate compensation is unjust. The first industrial duty of society is to protect every man in his right to labor and in his ownership of the fruits of his labor.

But there are large values in the world which

are not the fruits of labor. There are, therefore, large values in the world, the individual right to which is not a natural right.

The ocean is not the product of industry. It belongs to no man, and to no body of men. We may call a nation mistress of the seas, but we do not thereby concede that she owns the seas. By international law it is generally agreed that the water extending from the shore out to a line three miles from the coast shall belong to the nation whose coast that water adjoins; but this right to the three miles of water is not a natural right. It does not belong to the nation by any law of nature. It belongs to the nation because the nations have, for mutual convenience, agreed that it shall possess it. It is a purely artificial right, and that it is an artificial right is evident from the fact that the artificial boundary has been settled by international agreement.

The great navigable rivers are not the subjects of private property, according to any natural law. They belong to the community, not to any individual in the community, nor to any group of individuals in the community. In the early part of this century the State of New York gave to Robert Fulton and his heirs the exclusive right to navigate the harbor of New York and the waters of the Hudson River. Daniel Webster contended before the Supreme Court of the United States that no State had the right to confer an exclusive right to navigate the rivers within its own bound-

ary lines. No one service that Daniel Webster ever rendered to this country, except perhaps his reply to Hayne, was so great and so lasting as this service. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed what he had claimed. They declared that no State could give a right to a navigable river within its boundary line; and to-day all navigable rivers in our country flow unvexed by toll or personal intervention, or monopoly of any kind, because the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that a navigable river cannot be made, even by the state through which it flows, a private property.

Streams that are not navigable are not the subjects of private property, except in so far as they are made so by artificial arrangement. The brook that flows through a man's land is not his to do what he pleases with. He cannot pollute its waters and make it a nuisance to his neighbor below. He cannot dam its waters and make it a nuisance to his neighbor above. He cannot deflect its waters and prevent his neighbor below from having the benefit of them. He has simply the right to use the waters as they flow through his land, — no right beyond. This right is fixed by law. It is an artificial right; it is not a natural right. Ocean, navigable river, unnavigable stream, are not subjects of private property except as they are made so by artificial arrangement, for the simple reason that they are given to man by God, — they are not the products of man's industry.

What is true of ocean and river is equally true of land. No man ever made an acre of land and its contents. Man may transfer the soil from one place to another, in which case we speak of him as "making land;" but he does not really make the land, he simply moves it. The land belonged to the Almighty. To whom has he given it? Not to a few favored individuals, but to the human race. If land is the subject of private ownership at all, that private ownership depends upon the arrangements which society has made, not upon the inherent and natural right of the so-called owner. Society has a right, if it chooses, to say, "The ownership of navigable rivers in common will be injurious; we will let New York State have a monopoly of them." It has a right, if it chooses, to say, "It will cost too much for us to build a waterway between the Atlantic and the Pacific; we will let a corporation build the waterway and levy the tolls." But if the corporation gets the river or the canal, it is because society has given it, not because the corporation has a natural right to it.

That the right to land is an artificial right is plain, in the first place, because it is not the product of human industry. Man did not make these prairies and store them with their vegetable richness; nor these coal mines, filling them with fuel for the future; nor these wells where the oil is stored; nor these forests into which we go for our lumber. These were put there by the Al-

mighty. And for whom? As we have already seen, not for individuals but for the whole human race; not to single men or single classes of men, but to man, God gave the world, saying, "Take it, rule it, use it; it is yours."

That the right to land is an artificial right dependent upon artificial arrangements made by society is further illustrated and confirmed by the history of the evolution of land ownership. In a state of nature men live in the forest as the wild beasts live. The territory over which the tribe roams is the common property of the tribe; the only law recognized is the law of the strongest. Controversies arise between families or between tribes. Partitions are made, and out of these controversies private ownership arises. The early traditions of the Hebrew people furnish an illustration of such a controversy and its peaceful settlement. Abraham divides the land into two sections, gives to Lot his choice, and Lot chooses the fertile plains where are the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah. It is thus that the first division of lands is made. How later the governments divide the lands they have acquired by grant to favorites, and how the grants thus made continue through successive generations by bequest or exchange, is familiar history. William the Conqueror crosses the Channel, conquers the Anglo-Saxon people, takes possession of England, divides the land among his retainers, and to-day the great land titles of England date back to the distribu-

tion of land made by William the Conqueror, because he had conquered England. The English come over to this country; they find five hundred thousand Indians roaming over this unused continent. England conquered the continent, took possession of it, and then divided it. The great land titles in America go back, the oldest of them, to the patents issuing from Holland and from England. The later titles come in the same way. America, taking possession of the vast regions of the West, divided them up and said to every man, "You may have one hundred and sixty acres of land if you will occupy and till them." How does the owner get his right to this one hundred and sixty acres? By the act of the Nation. His title grows out of the homestead law. That law might have said two hundred acres; it might have said one hundred acres; it might have said a thousand acres. The title to the land depends on the act of the government. All land titles in their history are thus derived from the action of society; the right to land is an artificial, not a natural, right.

As the titles are derived from the act of government, so, in the theory of the law, the government still has the supreme ownership. We have already seen that in the Hebraic commonwealth the land belonged to God; the men who occupied it were only tenants of God. We have seen how under the feudal system the land belonged to the king; the men who occupied it were only tenants of the king. Under the doctrine of eminent domain, the

ultimate ownership of the land of the United States is not in the individual owner, but in the state. The owners are *quasi* tenants; their rights are limited and defined by the law which has created them. Those rights are not absolute, as is their right to the product of their own industry.

What is true of the ocean, the rivers, the land and its contents, is equally true of the great forces of nature. Light, heat, gravitation, electricity, are not subjects of personal ownership except as law makes them so. The world is a great electric motor; it generates electricity, — that is, it transforms some other power into electricity. This electric power which the world generates belongs to all the people in the world. If one man discovers a way of tapping this electric reservoir and drawing off the electric current and using it for illumination or for locomotion, the state gives him an exclusive right to use that method for a term of years. When that term expires, his right expires. Nor does this right even for this limited term prevent any other man from discovering some other method of entering nature's reservoir and drawing off the force which she has created for the human race. The right to the forces of nature, like the right to land and its contents, is an artificial right limited and determined by the law of society which has created the right.

Thus we have two kinds of right to property. The first is absolute, — the right of every man to himself, and therefore to the product of his labor,

the right of every man to his life, and therefore to that into which he has put his life. The other is social, legal, artificial, dependent upon the arrangements which society has been pleased to make. All rights to ocean, to navigable rivers, to unnavigable rivers, to land and the contents of the land, and to the great forces of nature, are of this latter kind. They are dependent upon the arrangements which society has been pleased to make. They are founded upon the will of the community.

The chief sources of wealth are in this common wealth. What has made this nation in the aggregate wealthy beyond all compare is primarily, not what our industry has produced, but what we have found already produced for us: the rich prairies, the almost inexhaustible mines, the great forests, the mill streams, the navigable rivers, the great forces of nature, — light, heat, electricity. We are the richest people, not because we have produced more *per capita* than any other people have ever produced, but because we have found a treasure which no other people ever found. It was made for us; it was stored here awaiting our arrival.

How ought this common wealth, this wealth which by nature belongs to no individual because no individual produces it, to be distributed?

In a previous lecture I traced the progress toward the larger distribution of wealth in the abolition of feudalism and the substitution of the wages

system. We have seen that the wages system converts capital from a dead possession to a living instrument of industry; that the wealth once buried in forests used by royalty for hunting, or in parks kept by nobles as pleasure-grounds, is now invested in factories which give employment to hundreds and food or clothing or tools to thousands, or in railroads which serve the entire nation as a public highway. We have seen, too, that under the wages system not only is nearly all property used for the benefit of the all, but it is actually divided among a vastly greater number of owners than ever before. Statistics are rarely interesting, but they are sometimes very significant. The student who wishes to know to what extent the distribution of wealth is already carried in democratic America will find ample material for his inquiry in the admirable monograph of Mr. Charles B. Spahr on "The Distribution of Wealth." He shows that while in England, not yet wholly freed from the relics of feudalism, "more than three fourths of the people of Great Britain and Ireland are without any registered property whatever," "nearly half the families in America own the real estate they occupy," and in the rural communities the proportion of real estate owners is still greater. Again, in Great Britain less than six hundred and fifty thousand persons, that is, about a little over one and a half per cent. of the population, are possessed of property valued at five thousand dollars or more; in America approximately one

eighth of the families of the Nation — city, town, and country — own each more than five thousand dollars.

The statistics of the savings banks confirm these figures. The total deposits in such institutions for 1890–91 aggregated over two thousand five hundred million dollars. The total number of depositors in the savings banks alone for the year 1890 was over four million and a quarter, with an average deposit of \$354.80 for each depositor. As most of these depositors probably represent families, the proportion of wealth owners to the population is seen to be large. But these figures do not adequately represent the extent to which wealth is distributed in the United States. This is further indicated by the extent to which wealth is owned by great corporations. The corporation is a modern contrivance by which, for purposes of administration, the property of a great number of owners is put into the control of a small number of sagacious men. It is essentially a democratic invention. The stock is owned by many stockholders; the administration is conducted by a few directors. In estimating the extent to which property is distributed in the United States, the economic student must take account not only of the landowners and the savings bank depositors, but also of the smaller stockholders in the corporations of the country.

The observer in any fairly prosperous American town may see the evidences of this distribution of

wealth for himself. As he goes by the miner's or manufacturer's cottage he sees a hammock under the trees, — this means leisure; he hears the music of an organ or a piano, — this means culture; he meets the grocery wagon or the butcher's cart driving through the town, — this means good food and plenty of it; he finds the best building in the town a schoolhouse and perhaps the next best a public library, — this means education. To this comparatively equable distribution of wealth the unexampled prosperity of the United States is due. Whatever tends to increase the distribution of wealth will tend to increase that prosperity; whatever tends to diminish that increase and substitute therefor a concentration of wealth tends to diminish that prosperity. For the true wealth of the community depends far more on the equity of the wealth-distribution than upon the aggregate amount of wealth possessed.

This matter requires a little further elucidation.

Money is simply a convenient means of exchanging the products of industry. In any community every member who is busy producing something which the community needs is also producing something which he can give in exchange for the labor of another which supplies his own needs. The shoemaker requires clothes of the tailor, a house of the carpenter, flour of the miller. But if for any reason the shoemaker is unable to produce shoes, and is compelled to lie idle, he no longer has anything to give in exchange for the

work of the tailor, the carpenter, and the miller. Thus every busy man tends to produce another busy man, and every idle man tends to produce another idle man. Both idleness and industry are self-propagating. When wealth is so concentrated in the hands of an individual that the many are without means to purchase what their needs really demand, their inability produces a similar inability in others, and thus poverty breeds poverty. An Italian village, the wealth of which is concentrated in the castle of a single nobleman, while the peasants live on the coarsest foods, in the poorest hovels, wear the plainest clothes, and their children go barefoot, will give employment to a minimum of farmers, carpenters, tailors, and shoemakers. A New England village, in which there are no millionaires and no paupers, in which every family is well housed, well clad, uses the best flour, and eats meat twice a day, gives employment to a maximum of farmers, butchers, millers, carpenters, tailors, and shoemakers. Thus no industrial system can be advantageous to any which leaves any without the possibility of employment, as no industrial system can be ethically right which has the effect of forbidding any from obeying the divine command and earning their bread by the sweat of their brow.

As it is the glory of the United States that wealth has never been so widely distributed as it is in the United States to-day, and employment has never been so much in demand in all the

various vocations of life, so it is the peril of the United States that wealth is still too much concentrated in the hands of the few, and still there are, even in prosperous times, some, and in unprosperous times great numbers, who in vain seek an opportunity to earn their livelihood by their industry. For we must recognize the fact that, while wealth has never before been so widely distributed as it is to-day in the United States, while the concentration of wealth attracts so much attention, largely because it is the exception in a community whose prosperity is more equally shared than ever before in the world's history, this concentration exists, and in forms which are perilous to American institutions. De Tocqueville warned us more than half a century ago that the greatest peril to America would arise from plutocracy, and events are proving his warning true. If it is true that nearly one half of the families of the United States own the real estate they occupy, it is also true that seven eighths of the families own but one eighth of the wealth of the nation; if it is true that the families which own five hundred to five thousand dollars equal in number those who own less than five hundred, — that is, those who have been able to save a little, those who barely live upon their income, saving nothing, and those who are dependent upon the charity of their neighbors, — it is also true that one hundred and twenty-five families own as much wealth as all the other families in the United States put together. A single strik-

ing but not unparalleled fact may serve as a concrete illustration of the extent to which, and the methods by which, the process of wealth-concentration is carried on in the United States in our time. The senior Cornelius Vanderbilt began life as a deck-hand. It is currently reported that at his death he left one hundred and eighty million dollars to be divided among his heirs. If the popular chronology is correct, and Adam was created six thousand years ago, and had lived until our time, and had worked industriously throughout that six thousand years, three hundred working days in each year, and had earned one hundred dollars a day more than his livelihood, which is more than most industrious men are able to earn, he would have acquired exactly the fortune that Cornelius Vanderbilt acquired in a lifetime. Should we, then, put fetters on industry? limit the amount a man may earn? prohibit his making all that he can? No. Let him by his industry produce the utmost which his industry can produce. Let law stimulate, promote, encourage his industry. But a hundred and eighty millions are not made in a lifetime by productive toil. They are largely taken out of the common wealth. No one objects — no one, at least, ought to object — to an industrial system merely because it allows a man, by his skill, by his knowledge, by his industry, to produce all the wealth he can, and to own it when he has produced it; but the industrial reformer does object to an industrial system which

permits a man, by his shrewdness, his skill, his ingenuity, perhaps his political unscrupulousness, to get all of the common wealth he can into his hands.

Four evils grow out of this concentration of that which is by nature common wealth in the hands of a comparatively few.

First are the material evils. Where industry is fairly compensated, every man, by his industry, supports not only himself but his neighbor. Riding through any one of our commercial streets, we wonder who it is that buys all these goods in all these shops. The man in one shop buys from the other shops. Each man purchases of his neighbor; they support one another. The children of the schoolmaster must be shod; they support a shoemaker. The children of the shoemaker must have clothes; they support a tailor. The tailor must have woolens; he supports a factory. The factory hands must have their children taught; they in turn support the teacher. Every one of us is thus engaged in supporting some one else, and every one of us is in turn supported by some one else. We hear much glorification of independence, but there is no such thing as independence. The more complicated society and the more advanced civilization, the less the independence.

Let any one of these interdependent industries stop, and all are injured. If the factory stops, the children no longer go to school, the schoolmaster can no longer buy shoes, the shoemaker can no

longer buy clothes, the tailor can no longer buy woolens. Whatever distributes wealth energizes industry; whatever concentrates wealth paralyzes industry. Sometimes we read in the newspapers that hard times are due to over-supply. Too many houses, therefore men are shelterless; too much coal, therefore they are shivering; too much bread, therefore they are hungry; too many clothes, therefore they go naked! It does not take much thought to see the folly of such political economy. What causes hard times is not over-supply, but under-demand. If every man was able to meet the demands of himself, his wife, and his children, no factory would ever close its doors. If all the women in America were able to buy all the silk dresses they want, no silk-factory would ever stop its work.

In the second place, this concentration of wealth tends to great political perils. As a result of this concentration of the common wealth in a few hands, one small body of men control the coal-oil — that is, the light; another small body of men control the anthracite coal — that is, the fuel; another small body of men control the gold and silver mines — that is, the basis of currency of the country; another small body of men control the transportation, on which the whole country depends for its life; and another small body of men, through the stock exchanges, are continually trying, with more or less success, to control the food supplies. A community in which a small

body of men control the light, the fuel, the transportation, the money, and the food supplies, is perilously near a political oligarchy. And out of this grows that political corruption which is the worst foe and the greatest peril to the United States.

A third evil grows out of this concentration of wealth: under it, and owing to it, society is divided into two classes, the tool-owners and the tool-users. A comparatively small body of men own the raw material and the tools with which it can be transformed into useful products; a large body of men use those tools in making the raw material into useful products. The tool-owners we call capitalists; the tool-users we call laborers. "I can myself remember when, in the remoter parts of New England, there were still the spinning-wheel and the hand-loom in the farmer's house; when the sheep were sheared and the wool was sent to the carding-mill, and then brought back and woven and spun into garments. Now the spinning-wheel is banished from the family, the hand-loom is gone, and the spinning-wheel and the loom are under the roof of the great factories, operated by a thousand men, who own no share whatever in the machinery which they are using. In my boyhood, going home from school, I sat on the box of the stage with the driver, who owned, at least in part, the stage and four-horse team; and it was my ambition as a boy to be some time a stage-driver myself and own four splendid horses.

Now the locomotive engineer stands in the cab, and carries many more passengers, a great deal more comfortably, and at a far greater rate of speed; but he does not own the locomotive. The locomotive and the railroad track are owned by one set of men, and operated by quite another. Practically, all the tools and implements of industry, except in agriculture, are owned by one class, while they are employed in productive labor by another class.”¹

The result of this division of society into two classes — the few that own the tools and the many that use them only as they get the consent of the tool-owners, that is, into capitalists and workingmen, — is to make a rift in what would otherwise be a homogeneous democratic society, and to bring about, as between these two classes, a chronic state of warfare which does not merely injure the classes but imperils the whole community. The tool-owners in Pennsylvania — that is, the men into whose hands we have allowed the coal-mines to fall — and the workingmen in Pennsylvania — that is, those who are laboring in the mines — become involved in a controversy, and the rest of the community wait, wondering how high the price of the coal will go and whether the factories will have to close for lack of power and the poor will suffer cold for lack of fuel because of this labor war in the anthracite coal district. Such labor wars are an almost inevitable incident of this rift of society

¹ Quoted from my *Christianity and Social Problems*, p. 161.

between tool-owners and tool-users; for more and more the tool-users are inclined to combine to protect their rights against aggression, and then to use that combination for purposes of aggression if they think they can do so successfully; and the tool-owners to combine to protect themselves against aggression and then to use that combination for purposes of aggression if they think they can do so successfully. For neither capitalists nor laborers are yet wholly sanctified!

A fourth evil resulting from this concentration of wealth and consequent division of society into two classes, a few very rich and the many dependent upon them, is seen in the vices which such a social organization tends to produce; the vices respectively of what Mr. Gladstone has called the "idle rich" and the "idle poor." It is true that the great millionaires are not idle; they are generally the busiest of men. But their sons are not the busiest of men. Given an idle rich class, with plenty of money and none of that self-control which is learned in the school of industry, and there inevitably result the three great vices of America, — gambling, drinking, and licentiousness. On the other hand, given a great dependent class and a time of hardship when some of them can no longer get the right to use tools and earn their bread, and they become literally dependent upon charity and begin to listen to the man who says, "The world owes you a living;" and when a man has begun to think that the world owes him

a living he has taken the first step toward getting his living by foul means if he cannot get it by fair. So out of the great working class the poor are recruited, and out of the poor the paupers, and out of the paupers the tramps, and out of the tramps the thieves, and out of the thieves the robbers.

Thus the concentration of wealth tends, first to material, second to political, third to industrial, and fourth to moral evil. The real and radical remedy is nothing less than a better distribution of wealth, — not by invalidating the right of every workingman, whether he works with his brain or his hand, to the product of his toil, but by a better division of that great common wealth, the title to which, in so far as it is held by individuals, depends on the artificial arrangements of society. Society, which made originally the arrangements by which this common wealth tends to drift into the hands of a few, has a right to make new arrangements by which this common wealth will tend to be divided among the many. Nor will this process of division reach its consummation until the distinction between tool-owners and tool-users is obliterated, and the tool-users become the tool-owners; in other words, until the laborers become capitalists; until, at least, the present relationship is so far reversed that the tool-user hires or owns the tool in lieu of the tool-owner hiring or, as in the slave system, owning the tool-user, — until labor ceases to be a commodity to be hired, and

becomes itself the hirer of capital; in other words, until, in lieu of money employing men, men employ money.

This is the revolution toward which society is steadily, though for the most part unconsciously, moving. This is the true meaning of socialism and communism, which, by, I believe, mistaken methods, seek to secure the world for the all and put it under the control of the all; which interpret the divine declaration, "Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of the earth, and every tree in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat," as addressed to the whole human race, not to a privileged class who, possessing the earth, are afterward to parcel it out to their less fortunate or less competent fellows. This is the meaning of the so-called socialistic legislation, which is an attempt by the community, though not always wisely directed, to take control, if not possession, for the community of those industries on which the life of the community depends. This is the meaning of the labor unions and the strikes, which often seem, and sometimes are, causeless, but which are generally blind endeavors to get, not merely a larger share of the common product of labor and capital working in coöperation, but also a larger share in the control of the industry by which that common product is created.

By Democracy of Industry, then, I mean that state of society in which the right and duty of

every man to earn an honest livelihood by his industry will be universally recognized, and in which the raw material and the native forces, by which alone in our time such a livelihood can be secured, will be recognized as belonging not to the few, but to the many. Thus, and only thus, will industry be truly democratic. Such a result can be accomplished either by revolution or evolution. Our present industrial system throughout the civilized world is based upon the private ownership of the common wealth. The common ownership of the common wealth, wherever it has been attempted, has failed to furnish any adequate reward to enterprise, and so any adequate incentive to industry. Communism in all its forms assumes in man a virtue which he does not possess, and fails to furnish that stimulus which is essential, not only to the production of the greatest wealth, but to the development of the best character. If the present industrial system were overturned by a revolution, and the people were to become owners in common of the common wealth, the result would be a derangement of the industrial organization which would bring immeasurable suffering, accompanied with gross injustice, upon all classes of the community. It would be a revolution like that of France in 1789, probably accompanied with distress more widespread, though possibly ameliorated by the humanitarian spirit which did not exist in France a century ago. Such a revolution might possibly be endured if great benefits

were to follow, but, so far as it is possible to foresee, great benefits would not follow. For the common ownership of the common land, if effected, would probably produce in civilized communities the same sort of effect which it has produced in India, in Russia, and among the North American Indians. What society needs is not a revolution which will destroy private property in the common wealth, but an evolution which will accomplish changes as great by processes more gradual, and will leave operative on character and society all the incentives which private ownership affords, and yet will preserve for all the people their right to an equable share in the benefits of that wealth which is not produced by personal industry. The method proposed for this purpose, a method which makes very slow progress, and in spite of years of agitation is as yet understood only by the few, is that miscalled the Single Tax.

At present the expenses of governments are chiefly met by three forms of taxation: a tariff tax on imports, a tax on incomes, and a tax on property, real and personal.

The tariff on imports is an unjust tax because it is levied, not upon property nor on income, but upon expenditure. The rich man calls on government for much greater protection than the poor man. If he is a landlord, he has a hundred houses to be protected; the poor man has but one; if he is a stockholder in a great railroad, he has a highway thousands of miles long to be protected,

while the poor man has nothing but the pathway from his front door to his gate. The rich man ought therefore to pay a very much larger tax than the poor man. It ought to be proportioned to the value of his property, because the value of his property determines, roughly speaking, the amount of protection which he needs. He who has fifty millions of dollars invested in mines, railroads, oil-wells, ought to pay nearly ten thousand times as much taxes as the householder who has a home in the village or a farm in the country worth five thousand dollars. But if the tax is levied upon imports, he who has fifty million dollars to protect does not pay ten thousand times more taxes than he who has five thousand dollars in a homestead to be protected. The millionaire wears somewhat more expensive clothing, lives in a somewhat more expensive house, has somewhat more expensive furniture, eats somewhat more expensive food; but it is perfectly evident that he cannot, if he tries, expend on himself and his family ten thousand times as much as his humbler neighbor. Taxes, therefore, levied on expenditure are always and necessarily unjust.

The second tax is one on incomes. The income can generally be ascertained only by the statement of the man who has the income; an income tax, therefore, tempts every man to make false a statement of his income in order to reduce his tax. A tax system which involves wholesale temptation is not a system to be commended if any better one

can be devised. But this is not all. Men who live upon salaries can state their income accurately; men who live upon profits derived from business cannot state their income accurately. It often happens that a business man cannot tell in any given year whether he has made any profit. He never can tell accurately how much profit he has made, for he must always make allowance for the rise in value of some things he has purchased and the fall in value of others, and this estimate of stock in hand is rarely more than a shrewd guess. An income tax, therefore, falls proportionately more heavily on the man whose income is in salaries or wages than on the man whose income is in profits. That is, it falls more heavily on the dependent, if not on the poorer, classes. But that is not all. Income, again, may be derived from industry, or it may be derived from investment. The investment is property which the government must protect, and the protection of this property requires governmental expenditure, while the protection of the individual requires but little governmental expenditure, and practically no more for the man who is earning a hundred dollars a day than for the man who is earning one dollar a day. An income tax, therefore, is, in the third place, inequable because it is not proportioned to the expenditure demanded of the government by the persons taxed. A tax on income derived from industry is a tax on industry itself, which should be the last to be taxed.

The third source of government revenue is a tax upon property, real and personal. If the value of all property, real and personal, could be justly estimated, and the tax could be levied on the property thus estimated in the proportion of its actual value, the result would be a just and reasonable tax; but in effect this is impossible. For government is dependent upon the citizen's own statement for its knowledge of the citizen's personal property. It is largely dependent on his statement for its estimate of the value of that property. The citizen is thus brought under temptation both to conceal the possession of personal property and underestimate its value, and in point of fact this temptation is so considerable that personal property largely escapes taxation. This escape of personal property from taxation is so common, and the frauds and falsehoods into which men are led by the desire to secure the same exemption which their neighbors secure is so great, that the abolition of all tax on personal property has been very earnestly urged by moral reformers and by financial reformers in the interest both of simplicity and of justice. Yet it seems difficult, if not impossible, to defend on abstract principles a system of taxation which levies all the expenses of government on real estate, for no other reason than that real estate cannot be hidden away from the assessor's inspection. Why should the man who has put his industry into a house pay a tax, while the man who has put his industry into horses, car-

riages, dresses, or bank stock, — that is, money loaned to others, — not pay a tax? The one derives benefit from the government no less than the other. Justice would seem to require that he should pay as well as the other.

The so-called Single Tax proposes to rid government of all these perplexities by assuming as true what in the previous article I have tried to show is true, that land and its contents are not proper subjects of private ownership; that the land which in the Hebrew commonwealth belonged to God, and in the feudal system belonged to the king, in a republic belongs to all the people. It proposes to make them the landlord, and it asserts that if as landlord they receive a rental which fairly represents the value of the land and its contents, no one will need to pay any taxes; that if, in other words, the people come by their own, they have income enough for all the expenses of government, and probably some to spare.

Thus, properly speaking, the Single Tax is not a tax at all. It is an exemption from all taxation by means of a resumption of the common wealth by its owners, the common people. What would be called a tax would really be a rental, and this rental would be based, not on the idea that the man who pays it pays for the protection which government affords his property; it would be based on the idea that the man who pays it pays to the owner of the land a rental for the land of which he is the tenant. This rental would be paid in the

form of a tax which would be levied not on real estate, but on the land and its contents. All that human industry had done to improve the land would belong to the owner, — he would pay no tax on it; all the value inherent in the land as God has made it, and all the value added to the land by what the public has done for it, would belong to the public, and this value the public would receive in rental or taxation.

Thus let the reader imagine two plots of ground, each one hundred acres in extent, side by side in a rural district where wild land sells for five dollars an acre. One of them is wild. No tree is felled, no plow has ever turned the virgin soil, no fence has been erected. Everything is as nature made it. The other is a cultivated farm, with house, barns, outhouses, orchard, cultivated meadow-land. The uncultivated land is worth in the market five hundred dollars; the cultivated farm would be worth five thousand dollars. But for purposes of taxation each would be estimated as worth five hundred dollars, and on that five hundred dollars the tax or rent would be estimated, and for the simple reason that the man who had built the house and the barn and the outhouses, and planted the orchard, and constructed the fences, would not pay any tax on this wealth, which is the product of his industry. Of this the people are not the owners; he is the owner. Or, again, let the reader imagine two lots side by side in the centre of a great city, where a lot one hun-

dred feet by fifty is worth a thousand dollars. One stands vacant; on the other a ten thousand dollar building has been erected. On each lot the same tax would be paid, or, to speak more accurately, for each lot the same rent would be collected; the owner of the building would pay no rent for that building, because it is the product of his industry; he would pay rent only for the land, which is not the product of his industry, the value of which has been created partly by God who made it, partly by the entire community who live in its vicinity, and who, therefore, should receive the benefit of the value which their presence and activity have conferred upon it.

In a similar manner the owner of a mine — whether coal, gold, copper, or iron — would pay in rent the value of the mine as fairly estimated before ever a pick had been put into the hillside. All the product of the industry which had opened up the mine and made its treasure available would belong to him. All the value of the mine as raw material, and all the increased value of that mine due to the opening of railroads, the increase of population, the development of civilization, would belong to the state, not to the owner, because it would be the gift of God enhanced by the product of the general activity of the community. The value thus added by the general social conditions which surround land is the “unearned increment” of which the reader so often hears in the discussion of this subject.

But, as we have seen, it is not only land and its contents that belong to the public. Forces of nature belong to the public also. The right of the public to these forces is now recognized by our patent laws, which give to the patentee a right to his special use of them only for a limited term. It is quite conceivable that these patent laws should be so modified as to enable government, and perhaps any individual, to take advantage of the patented device on paying, not whatever the patentee may choose to ask for his device, but what a disinterested tribunal may think that it is worth. Not only the forces of nature, but also the great franchises created by the state, belong to the state. The exclusive right to run a car-track through the street of a great city, the exclusive right of a railroad corporation to run a railroad from New York to Buffalo, belongs primarily to the people, in the one case of the city, in the other case of the state. That it belongs to them is evident from the fact that the track cannot be laid down in the street of the city, nor the railroad built from New York to Buffalo, without special authority from the people. The work which the car company or the railroad corporation does is to be paid for. The fruit of their industry belongs to them. But the highway of which they make use in their industry belongs to the people of the city or the state, and the franchise tax paid by the railroad corporation should be so adjusted that the industry of muscle and of brain which has pro-

duced and carried on the railroad shall receive its just compensation, which should be paid to those who have constructed and are managing the railroad; and the rental of the highway, whether in the municipality or across the state, should be paid to the people to whom that highway really belongs.

This rental may be charged either in the form of a tax or in the form of a rental. Hitherto franchises, that is, the exclusive right to use a public highway, have been given to private owners, personal or corporate. Sometimes, as in the case of the Pacific Railroad, not only the highway has been given, but a bonus has been added in order to induce the private owner to take the highway as a gift. This was always folly. The folly has been now so demonstrated that to continue to give away these highways is scarcely less than criminal. A single case will serve to illustrate the value to a city which takes possession of its highway and rents it instead of giving it to a corporation.

The Boston subway has been let to the corporation which operates the trolley-cars of that city for $4\frac{7}{8}$ per cent. annually on the cost. This $4\frac{7}{8}$ per cent. meets all interest on municipal bonds, and leaves a surplus sufficient to repay the entire principal invested in less than forty years. The corporation which has hired the subway has leased its lines to another corporation which guarantees seven per cent. on its common stock and eight per cent. on its preferred stock. That is, in the city of Boston, the corporation which operates the

trolley-car system makes a profit such as enables it to give satisfactory dividends to its stockholders and pay the whole cost of the subway, principal and interest, in less than forty years. The city of New York, learning a lesson from this and other analogous experiments, has now in a similar manner undertaken to build its own subway. It will build this on money borrowed upon its bonds. It has already leased this subway to a corporation on such terms that at the end of the fifty years the bonds, principal and interest, will have been paid. In other words, the subway will belong to the municipality, though it will not have expended a dollar of the people's taxes in its construction. It is clear that the same principle might be applied to surface roads in town and country, long or short, operated by steam or operated by electricity. Whether this rent shall be paid for the highway by the railroad corporation in the form of a rent or in the form of a tax is immaterial. The essential fact to be noted is that, if the people keep possession of the highways which belong to them, the rentals therefrom will go far toward paying the expenses of the government.

It does not come within the province of this article to go into detailed argument with figures in support of any particular scheme. My object is to give the general reader as clear and coherent an account as I can, in a limited space, of the method which modern thinkers have wrought out, by which the common people can secure joint

benefit of the common wealth, without revolution. He who desires to study the philosophy of this plan more fully will find material for his study in Henry George's "Progress and Poverty." He who desires to estimate scientifically its economic effect will find material for his study in Thomas G. Shearman's "Natural Taxation." He will in the latter book find reasons given for the belief that a fair rental to the people as landlord for the value of wild land and its contents, and of public franchises created by and belonging to the people, would be adequate to pay all the expenses of government, municipal, State, and Federal.¹ He will also find there given the reasons for believing that such a rental, instead of increasing the burdens of the agricultural class, would decrease them;² and, finally, the reasons for believing that such a rental could be collected with almost absolute equity, since there would be no possibility of concealing the land or the franchise for which the rent would be paid, and not much difficulty in estimating their natural market value. This last, the moral argument for the Single Tax, will, to him who regards ethical considerations as more important than economic, appear of the first im-

¹ "Thus all national and local taxes, if collected exclusively from ground rents, would absorb only $44\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. of those rents, leaving to the owners of bare land a clear annual rent of \$763,-252,000, besides the absolutely untaxed income from all buildings and improvements upon their land." *Natural Taxation*, p. 147.

² "Thus the farmers would save much more than one third of their present tax burdens by the concentration of taxes on ground rents alone." *Natural Taxation*, p. 196.

portance. It is thus stated in a recent letter by Mr. Charles Francis Adams: —

On this moral side, which to my mind is the most important side of all, there can, so far as I see, be but one way of looking at the thing. The Single Tax would be an enormous improvement over the existing system, or over any other system which I think could be devised. It would reduce taxation to a basis of absolute certainty and fairness, rendering evasion impossible. A complete stop would thus be put to the whole system of cheating, and consequent unjust transfer of a burden from those who have no conscience to those who have a conscience — from those who can escape the law to those who cannot escape the law — which is the unanswerable argument against the continuance of the present system — a system which puts a confessed, because quite undeniable, premium on perjury ; and no system which puts a premium on perjury admits of justification. This argument alone, to my mind, would be conclusive in favor of the Single Tax. Any possible amount of wrong or injury it might incidentally inflict would to my mind be little more than dust in the balance compared with the advantage which would result, after the thing fairly adjusted itself, from the complete freedom it would bring about from all temptation to evasion and false swearing. From the moral point of view, consequently, there do not seem to be any two sides to the question ; and the moral point of view is, in my judgment, the all-important point of view.

The question may be and has been asked, would not the carrying out of this plan amount to a confiscation of landed values? Henry George con-

cedes that it would, and defends such confiscation on the ground that land is not a proper subject of ownership. He compares the loss to the landowner involved in the Single Tax with the loss to the slaveholder involved in emancipation. The cases do not seem to me parallel. Society has no right to organize a system involving ownership of man; society has a right to organize a system involving ownership in land. If the community thinks the private ownership and control of land is best for the community, it has a right to provide for such private ownership and control; but it has no right to provide for the private ownership and control of one man by another, against the protest of that other, though he be but a minority of one. Society having provided for the private ownership and control of land, and individuals having invested their earnings in that land on the faith of that provision of society, society has no right by revolutionary act to confiscate the property and destroy for the individual owner the economic values which it has itself created. If, therefore, it were proposed suddenly to abolish all taxes on imports, on incomes, on personal and real property, and levy them all on land and its contents and on franchises, the proposition would involve an industrial revolution which would be at once inexpedient and unjust. But no such sudden change is possible. If taxation is taken off from all other objects, and levied only on those things which are properly a common wealth, the change

can be wrought out gradually, and there will be time for industry to adjust itself to the new conditions as they are created. There is very little reason to believe that the practical injustice to individuals which would grow out of the adoption of the Single Tax theory, in any way which would be possible in America, would be so great as the injury which has come to individuals through the use of steam and electricity, through the influence of machinery, through the organization of labor and of capital, and through the consequent necessary changes in industrial conditions and in values depending on those conditions.

This and all other changes in economic conditions are, however, in the last analysis, dependent upon changes to be wrought in personal character. Industrial democracy is dependent upon educational democracy. There is no possible way by which the people can obtain the benefits of the common wealth except as they are intelligent and thrifty. They must understand the forces of nature in order to get the fruit which nature is ready to drop into their lap. They must have, in other words, industrial intelligence, and they must have thrift, — that is, the moral capacity to spend less than they earn, and not before they have earned it. In a nomadic state man catches a fish or shoots a deer in the morning, cooks it and eats it at night. He lives literally from hand to mouth. In the agricultural period this is no longer possible. He plants corn in the spring, harvests it in

the fall, and cannot plant again until the next spring. He therefore must wait for one year from the time of his planting until he is able to plant again, or from the time of his reaping until he is able to reap again. In this one year he will starve if he has not capital; that is, if he, or some one before him, has not laid by, out of previous industry, enough for food supply until the new harvest is ready. In the agricultural state the world may be said to pay its wages once a year; and as agriculture is the basis of all industry, speaking broadly, it may be said that no man has caught up with the world unless he has laid by as much as is equivalent to one year of his expenditures. If he has not done this, he is not living on his real income, but is borrowing from the future. But all investment beyond a year's income is properly investment for power, not for pleasure. The aphorism, Money is power, expresses a very substantial truth. It is power because it is hoarded or solidified industry, the industry of past years, hoarded as sunlight is hoarded in the coal, to be set free for future activities. Until these two simple capacities have been acquired—the capacity to understand and use nature, and the capacity to reservoir, in capital, industry for future necessity—no economic changes will or can permanently secure economic equality or any approximation to it. Thus the considerations presented in this paper lead to the subject of the next lecture, which will be the Educational Rights of Man.

LECTURE V

EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS

THE child lies in his cradle, the feeblest of all creatures. He knows not how to use his eyes, nor his ears, nor his hand, nor his feet. He knows not how to use the germs within him, of imagination, of reason, of conscience. He knows nothing. At the other extreme is the great poet, the great statesman, the great scientist, the great captain of industry: Tennyson, Gladstone, Huxley, Vanderbilt. The difference between this creature in the cradle, and this man who reaches out into all the universe and counts nothing too large for his investigation, is made by education. The fundamental principle of education is this: that every being whom God ever made has a right to become all that it is possible that he should become; and therefore a right to whatever may be necessary to enable him to fulfill the divine ideal. Man's right to education will not be fulfilled in society until this is accomplished. Let us trace historically how the progress of education has been leading toward this consummation.

In imperial Rome there were no schools; no education but of the tongue for rhetoric and of the fist for gladiatorial combat. But at this very

time in connection with every synagogue in Palestine, was a parish school. The curriculum was certainly very imperfect, the teachers were but illy trained; but underlying Hebraism was this fundamental principle, that the children of the common people are to have an education, though what education means the world was yet to learn. Into Europe passed, with Christianity, the synagogue schools developed into parochial schools. Out of these parochial schools grew in time, on the one hand the great universities, on the other hand the primary schools for the common people. The monks and nuns were the teachers; the convents and monasteries had their libraries; the church directed, controlled, administered education. To know how to write was almost demonstration that he who knew had been under the tuition of the church. But the teaching was limited in its scope as in its purpose. The church which was doing this teaching assumed to know the truth and to know it infallibly; its object was to give so much of its infallible knowledge as it thought advantageous for the common people to possess. The teacher was a giver, the pupil was a recipient; it was the duty of the pupil to receive without questioning what the church imparted with authority. Obedience, acceptance, reception, — this was the duty of the pupil in the mediæval school. The object of the school was to prepare men for heaven and for death, and in order that they might be prepared for heaven, and as a means to that end,

to prepare priests who should prepare men for heaven and for death as the entrance to heaven.

The Renaissance came and with the Renaissance a protest against the narrowness of conception which regards religious topics as the only proper themes for popular education. Ancient literature in all its forms was brought back into the life of the people, in spite of the protests of some ecclesiastics, with the enthusiastic support of others. Thus both the curriculum and the conception of education were changed; for although the Renaissance in form only demanded that the literature of the ancient classical authors should be studied, there was really involved in that a demand that everything of vital interest to humanity should be studied. The classicists opened one door for the introduction of secular knowledge, but when they opened that door all secular knowledge came trooping in. Thus the Renaissance changed the scope of education, though the method of education remained unchanged. The pupils continued to be recipients and the teachers givers.

Luther introduced a new conception, not only of religion but of education. Luther maintained the right of private judgment and he was therefore compelled to maintain the necessity of educating the private judgment. Thus while the Renaissance changed the curriculum of education the Reformation changed its nature. Education became no longer an information, given to receptive pupils by teachers who assumed to possess infallible

knowledge; it became a training in intellectual power of men and women, who were to exercise that power for themselves. Thus Luther laid the foundations of that great school system which was to grow up in Germany, to which our indebtedness is perhaps larger than we think. Education is partly acquiring, at second hand, information as to facts which men before us have ascertained. We cannot all go round the world; so we accept as true the reports of what other men have seen who have traveled around the world. We cannot all use the telescope to study the heavens, so we take the information which has been obtained by those who have used their telescope to study the heavens. Up to the time of Luther it may almost be said that this acquisition of information was the only object of education; but since Luther's time education has been something more than this: it has been not only the acquisition of information, it has been even more the development of capacity to deal with the facts thus ascertained; it has come to be the acquisition of power even more than the acquisition of information.

Some earnest temperance reformers have been, within the last fifteen or twenty years, introducing into our public schools what are known as "approved temperance text-books." These approved text-books are in form books of physiology, in fact books for the advocacy of a certain doctrine respecting alcohol. In so far as they are books for information, in so far as their aim is to tell

the boys and girls in school what are the qualities of their bodies and what is the nature of food, and how that food operates on the body, they are quite legitimate; in so far as the object of these text-books is to inspire the child with certain emotions respecting alcohol or to impart to the child certain formulated principles respecting the use of alcohol, the temperance text-book is a return to mediævalism. It is an attempt on the part of the school to teach dogmatically, and it is not the function of the school to teach dogmatically either in the realm of ethics or in the realm of religion. The function of the school is, first, to give information as to well-ascertained facts, and, second, to equip the boy or girl with power to decide for himself what are the principles which those facts indicate.

In imperial Rome education was first for the few; by primitive and mediæval Christianity it was enlarged in its scope so as to provide for the many; by the Renaissance it was broadened in its themes so as to include a larger field of knowledge than ecclesiasticism had ever included; by the Reformation it was changed in its object and methods so that it should create power as well as confer information. Under Comenius, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Rousseau, the educational system took one further step forward. Not agreed in all, they were agreed in this, that the function of education is not to add something to man from without, but to develop man from within; in other words, that education is development. Education

proceeds, they said, in accordance with nature. It is not an addition to nature, still less is it something antagonistic to nature. The child grows as the plant grows, and it is the function of education to help the child to grow, to feed the root, to furnish sunlight, to train the plant upward toward light and away from groveling on the earth, to be sometimes a stake that the plant may be supported until it has strength to stand by itself; — but the teacher is always to work with nature, always to study the nature of the child, always to learn what are his aspirations and coöperate with them, always to recognize that education is not a pouring in from without, but a developing from within.

Thus the history of eighteen centuries brings us back to the truth that education is nothing else than development. It is the whole process by which the child who is but a seed, may be developed into the tree, the child who is but a germ, may be developed into the man, the child who is but a beginning, may be carried on towards completion. This, and nothing less than this, is education. It is the training of the whole man — of his hand, of his eye, of his feet, of his reason, of his judgment, of his taste, of his conscience, of his physical, intellectual, and moral powers, — in a word, of the man.

Says Professor Huxley: —

Education is the instruction of the intellect in the laws of nature; under which name I include not merely

things and their forces but men and their ways, and the fashioning of the affections and of the will into an earnest and loving desire to move in harmony with those laws. For me education means neither more nor less than this. Anything which professes to call itself education must be tried by this standard, and if it fails to stand the test I will not call it education, whatever may be the force of authority or of numbers upon the other side.¹

This seems to me an admirable definition of education. It is the right of every man to have this education — this instruction of his intellect and this training of his affections and his will, in short, this development of his personality: not the superimposition upon him of another will, another intellect, another personality; not a reconstruction into a different will, a different intellect, a different personality: but the development of his own true, ideal, divine personality.

Let me restate these principles as they have been historically interpreted. Education is for all men. This education is to be in all subjects. As the whole material world is given to man to control, so the whole intellectual world is given to man to enter. There is no field so set apart, so sacred, that a man may not enter upon it. It may not be said by an hierarchical class, this belongs to the ministers of religion, the common people must not investigate here; it may not be said by a scientific class, this belongs to science,

¹ Huxley's *Essays*, "Science and Education," p. 83.

laymen must not enter here; it may not be said by a philosophic class, this belongs in a realm so high that no man may enter here. There is no place for either dogmatism or agnosticism. There is nothing which man may not inquire into; no problem which he may not investigate; no affirmation which he may not question. But it is not enough that man enters all fields and examines all subjects, he must have capacity to exercise judgment and will, he must be a man in the possession of power, not a mere vessel in the possession of information. And, finally, the whole process of education from the cradle to manhood is a process of growth, in which nature is not to be set aside, but in which the teacher is to coöperate with nature.

By whom is this education to be furnished? The answer of modern democracy is that certain important phases of it are to be furnished by the state. What phases? What has the state to do with education?

The public school is not a charity school; it is not a school for the children of the poor; it is not a kind of intellectual "soup-house."

The public school is not a socialistic venture. The state has not assumed functions which belong to individuals in furnishing public education. We do not provide our public schools because it is cheaper to maintain schoolmasters than it is to maintain policemen — though it is cheaper. It has been proved by statistics that it costs a great

deal more to kill an Indian in war than it does to educate an Indian in school. It is good economy, therefore, to provide schools rather than to provide soldiers. But that is not the ground on which the public school stands.

The state, in establishing and maintaining a public school system, is not usurping the place of the church. It is not primarily the function of the church to educate and secondarily the function of the state. The state has not interfered with or taken up the work that naturally belongs to the church. The aim and the method of the church are different from that of the state. The church, as we have seen, is, and always has been, in its teaching dogmatic. Its object is to impart truth to the student; but the object of the public school is not to impart truth to the student: its object is to impart power to the student to find truth for himself. And this makes the radical difference between the ecclesiastical and the non-ecclesiastical system of education. The question at issue between the public school and the parochial school, whether that parochial school is Roman Catholic or Protestant, is not shall education be Roman Catholic or Protestant, shall it be denominational or undenominational, shall it be supported by the pence of the few or by the taxes of the many; it is not shall it be controlled by the state by popular vote or controlled through the church by its bishops — the fundamental question in education between the two systems, parochial and public, is

this: Is it our aim, ourselves knowing the truth, to impart this truth to pupils? Or, being ourselves ambitious to know the truth, is it our aim to give to those who are in the schools power to determine for themselves what is the truth?

Finally the state in assuming an educational function does not stand *in loco parentis*. It is not a kind of father to the children. It does not establish public schools as it establishes orphanages for children who have no parents. It does not step in to take the place of a poverty stricken parent.

In assuming the direction of education, the state acts from a very different motive than any of those thus suggested. The free school rests on the fundamental postulate that education is a condition precedent to self-government. The statement that men have a right to govern themselves does not mean that all men possess, without education, the capacity for self-government; it means that all men, with a few abnormal exceptions, possess the capacity for education, and, being educated, they possess the power, first to govern themselves, and then to take share in governing their fellow citizens. If we had recognized the fact that education precedes government, that the individual must know how to govern himself before he knows how to govern his fellow citizens, we should not have to confront in the South the political problem which we have to confront to-day. The public school system stands on the broad ground that

wherever democracy undertakes the problem of self-government it must, as a necessary condition precedent, undertake the problem of universal education. Therefore it is that, historically, wherever democracy has gone education has gone. So soon as the United States begins its democratic life it begins the creation of a school system. So soon as slavery is overthrown at the South and the South truly becomes democratic, the whole Southern people, with a heroism and self-sacrifice which deserve a great deal more praise than they have ever received from the North, undertakes in its poverty, the problem of universal education. France becomes a republic: at once it establishes a state school system. So long as England is a feudal power, it leaves the schools in the hands of the church; when feudalism is abolished, the Board schools are established, under the control of the state. Democracy and the public school always go together — necessarily go together; one cannot exist without the other. To attempt to build a democracy without a public school is to build on a morass. It was the instinct of the American people, as well as the wisdom of a great teacher, that led Harvard College to invite fifteen hundred Cuban teachers to go to Harvard University last summer, in order that they might learn what an American system of education is and carry back that learning to their own shore. If Cuba is to become a republic, first of all there must be a public school system in Cuba. This,

then, is the fundamental principle: as in monarchies, the children of the king are educated by the state because they are to exercise the power of the state, so in a democracy the children of the people are educated by the state because they are to rule the state.

In America we all belong to the royal family; therefore the state educates us all.

But if it is the function of a free state to educate its citizens in order to make them good citizens, worthy to be intrusted with the powers and prerogatives of citizenship, it is the function of the state to give all the education that is necessary to make a good citizen worthy to be intrusted with such powers and prerogatives.

What, then, are the conditions necessary to good citizenship? Evidently the tenets of our various theological schools are not necessary to good citizenship. No Congregationalist would say that an Episcopalian cannot be a good citizen. No Roman Catholic would say that a Protestant cannot be a good citizen. Very few Protestants, outside the North of Ireland, would say that a Roman Catholic cannot be a good citizen. No Christian would say that a Jew cannot be a good citizen. I do not say that the differences between Romanism and Protestantism, between Judaism and Christianity, even between Congregationalism and Episcopalianism, are unimportant; but they do not affect citizenship. A man may be a good citizen of the Republic, whatever his theology; indeed, there are

many very good citizens in the Republic who have not any theology at all. What is necessary to make a good citizen?

First, this citizen must know the language of the people among whom he lives. He must know how to communicate his ideas to them, and he must know how to understand their ideas when they wish to communicate with him. If the country is made up of a great number of various tribes who cannot understand one another, it is not possible in the nature of the case that there should be a common government or a common society, except as the government is government by an oligarchy or an aristocracy or a monarchy. If when we landed on these shores we had undertaken to establish the federal government out of the Indian tribes here it would have been absolutely impossible, if for no other reason because the Indians did not understand one another's language. I had a letter the other day from a personal friend who was living in the Philippines, in which he said that persons on one side of the border-line of a province cannot understand the language of the people who are living on the other side of the border-line of the province. These tribes cannot comprehend one another, and if they cannot comprehend one another, they cannot make one nationality, except as they are kept in one nationality by a superior power. It may be Aguinaldo's power, it may be ours, but it must be external to the people unless the people can communicate with

one another. Intercommunication of ideas is essential to nationality. Therefore in this country our first duty is to teach all our children the English language, because we are going to be an English-speaking nation on this continent one of these days. Every citizen, therefore, must know how to read and write and speak the English language.

In order to be a good citizen one must know something about the world he lives in; something of his own land and something of other lands. It is not necessary that he should be able to recite by rote the length of a long list of rivers or the height of a long list of mountains. He can go to the last cyclopædia to get information on those subjects if he wants it. But it is necessary that he should know something about the nature of his country and the nature of other countries. If he is not measurably familiar with these facts, he is in no condition to take part in the government of his own country or in determining what shall be the relation of his country to other countries. He must know about our products, about our exports and our imports, about what we have shown ourselves able in the past to do; he must know something about our soil and the configuration of our land, or he cannot exercise any wise judgment on the question what, for example, should be our tariff laws. All he can do is to ask his newspaper or his leader and act accordingly. And this is not democratic; this is something else — I don't

know what to call it. Some knowledge of geography is an essential part in public education, because it is necessary to make intelligent citizens in a great republic.

But the world is not only made up of material things, it is also made of physical forces. The citizen must know something about the forces of this world in which he lives; something about light, heat, electricity. He must know something about nature, for he has to coöperate with nature; and more and more as civilization increases will his coöperation with nature be necessary to his well-being. Therefore some knowledge of science, some comprehension of the great laws and forces of nature, are essential to intelligent citizenship.

The world has been trying experiments ever since it was in long clothes, and he who would be wise respecting the future must know something respecting these experiments of the past. Wise men learn by the experiences of others, says the proverb, fools learn only by their own. If the citizen is to be a wise man, and if he is to have a part and a wise part in the government of the nation, it is necessary that he should know something of the experiments which have been made in the past — that is, of history. It is not necessary that he should be able to give the list of the crowned heads of England. This is not to know history. What is necessary is that he should understand what is the rise, progress, and development of the human race; where it has succeeded

and where it has failed; why it has succeeded and why it has failed. He should know in order that he may not repeat to-day the experiments which were the failures of yesterday. It is necessary in order that he may not think that the methods which did well in one age and under one circumstance must necessarily be applied in another age and under other circumstances. He must know history because he must know the world's experience; otherwise he cannot be wise in shaping the destiny of the nation for the future.

There have been in this world great men. They have had great thoughts, and have uttered these great thoughts. They live in some sense immortal in these great thoughts. The world's true history is its intellectual history, and its intellectual history has been written by its great leaders. If you ask what Palestine was, you look to its prophets; if you ask what Greece was, you look to its poets and its philosophers; if you ask what Rome was, you look to its great statesmen and jurists; if you ask what Italy was, you think of Dante; of England, you think of Shakespeare; of France, you think of Rousseau or Voltaire or Victor Hugo. The great men of past ages have done great thinking, and their thoughts live in literature. The good citizen, he who is to have the power to direct or participate in directing the destinies of a great nation, must know something of these great thoughts of these great men. A book is not a dead thing, it is a living man. A library

is not a mausoleum, it is the abode of the living. We go into our library and ask, now Milton, now Shakespeare, now Dante, now Homer, now Plato, now Aristotle, to talk to us. All the wise men of the world are on these shelves; wiser than they were when they lived, for now they are wise enough to speak when you want them to speak, and wise enough to keep silent when you want them to keep silent. The educated man, the voter, or the wife who will influence the voter, needs to know the great thoughts of the great thinkers. He needs to know literature.

In all — language, geography, history, literature — he needs to have not merely the symbol but its vital meaning. He needs to know, not names of books, but the spirit in the books; not the dates of the history, but the trend of events in the history; not the mere natural forces, but their expression and their coördination and their coöperation; not the names of boundaries and states, but what various countries, and especially what his own country in its physical aspect, stand for; not mere alphabet and words, but how to use words so as to express the mind that is in him, and how to understand words so that he can comprehend the mind that is in another man. Thus the educated man must know language, geography, science, history, literature. And it is the function of the state to teach these things, because these things are necessary to make a good citizen of a state.

Is there anything else? Certainly. Almost the

first requisite of good citizenship is that the citizen shall be able to support himself. He may have large information, excellent ideas, good judgment, he may be a good talker, he may even be a good listener, but if he is dependent on the charity of the public, he is not a good citizen. It should be the function, therefore, of the free state to furnish such elements of education as will enable this man to be a self-supporting citizen of the United States. How far industrial education will go is a question which I do not undertake here to discuss. I doubt whether as yet we are ready to answer the question; but it should go far enough to make all graduates of public school systems able to give to the community in work at least as much as they have to take back from the community in wages. Industrial education, in this broad sense of the term, is a function of the state; not because it is the duty of the state to give to every or to any man a training for his profession, but because it is the function of the state to prepare men for self-support. One difficulty with our systems of education thus far seems to me to be that we have paid too much attention to the higher education and too little to the broader education. We need to broaden it at the base even if we have to trim it a little at the top. For when all the education of a public school system tends towards literary proficiency, and when the boy or girl graduating from the school can do nothing but write school compositions, or the most proficient

among them articles for newspapers, it is evident that the provision of self-support is not adequate. Education should be such as to make intelligent workmen; not skilled workmen, but intelligent workmen; and there is a great difference between the two. The workman in a factory may do a particular piece of work for one or two years and may become a very skilled mechanic in the doing of that one particular piece of work, and yet he may have no intelligence about his work whatever. He may not know what is done before or after him in making the finished product. If he is taken from that particular piece of work, he may be as helpless as if he were a child. There is many a skilled mechanic who knows how to do a particular thing, if the particular thing is one that he has done fifty times before, but if there happens to be a new combination of circumstances demanding a variation in the work, the intelligent wife has to stand over him and tell him, the skilled mechanic, how to do it. We ought in our public school system to give such an industrial education as will make intelligent workingmen. Then let them go out and become skilled workingmen by practice in their several departments.

Is this all? No. A man may read and write the English language, he may know geography and science and history and literature and some form of industry, and all his knowledge may simply equip him to be a greater rascal than he could otherwise have been. Life is not made up of in-

telligence ; into life enters that which is more important than mere intelligence, — will and conscience, — the ability to know what is right and wrong, the ability to resist the wrong and to do the right. This is absolutely essential to good citizenship. To be a good citizen the man must be trained morally. I do not urge that he should be taught in school certain ethical dogmas, any more than I urge that he should be taught certain theological dogmas; but he should be so trained that he can and will use his conscience and his moral will in all the varied exigencies of life. If this is not done, his skill in writing simply makes him an ingenious forger, his knowledge of science simply makes him a skillful dynamiter. The better educated he is, the greater peril he may be to society, if moral training has not accompanied intellectual equipment.

It has been proposed to leave the moral training to the churches and the families, and to assign only the intellectual equipment to the schools. It was at one time popular thus to divide education into two departments, and to assign all secular education to the state and all religious education to the church. But there is no such division between the secular and the religious; it does not exist. Religion is carrying the right spirit into all life. We cannot divide man into compartments and direct one institution to develop one compartment and another institution to develop the other compartment, any more than we can draw a line of

cleavage in a tree, and say we will feed this side of the tree with one sort of manure and that side of the tree with another sort of manure. The whole man must be educated, the whole man must be trained. It is not enough to teach the man what are the laws of nature and of life, it is also necessary to fashion the affections and the will to move in harmony with those laws. And if it is the function of the state to furnish education in order to make men and women good citizens, and if in the exercise of this function it is the duty of the state to give all that is necessary to citizenship, then it is the duty of the state to fashion the affections and the will in harmony with the great laws of society.

Of all the books available for this purpose there is none so useful as the English Bible. I do not advocate the reading of the Bible and the use of prayer in the public schools if any one objects, because the reading of the Bible and the use of prayer in public schools is worship, and it is not the function of the state to conduct worship, certainly not to conduct compulsory worship, whether the worshipers are little children or grown men. I do advocate the study of the Bible in the public schools as a means of acquainting our pupils with the laws, the literature, and the life of the ancient Hebrews, because the genius of the Hebrew people, pervading their laws, their literature, and their life, was a spiritual genius.

Every nation has its function in the develop-

ment of the human race. Every nation contributes its quota to the complex sum of human civilization. Speaking broadly, Greece may be said to have contributed philosophy, Rome law, Italy art, Germany liberty, England commerce, the United States democracy, — which is more than liberty, — and the Hebrew people what we call religion. I do not mean that there has been no philosophy except in Greece, no law except in Rome, no art except in Italy, no liberty except in Germany, no commerce except in Great Britain, nor that there has been no religion except among the Hebrew people; but more of the great moral forces of the world may be traced back to that people, and to the literature of that people, than to any other historic or literary source. The United States is more intimately connected with the Hebrew people than with any other ancient people. Our literature abounds with references to the literature of the ancient Hebrews; they are probably more frequent than the references to the literature either of the Greeks or the Romans. No man can read the great English or American poets or authors understandingly unless he knows something of his English Bible. Historically we are more closely connected with the Hebrew people than with the Greeks. Our free institutions are all rooted in the institutions of the Hebrew people, and have grown out of them, as the result of the long conflict between their political principles and those of pagan imperialism. A man is not a truly educated man

who knows nothing of the sources and fountains of our national life, and they are preëminently to be found in the Bible.

Why should he not know them? Why should they not be taught in the public schools? Because the Bible cannot be taught without teaching religion in the public schools? No! No one objects to teaching religion in the public schools. No one objects to teaching the public school children what was the religion of the ancient Greeks or the religion of the ancient Romans. We cannot read Homer nor Virgil without learning something of the religion of the Greeks and the Romans. Why, then, should we object to teaching in the schools what was the religion of the Hebrews? Is it so dangerous a religion? "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? He that hath clean hands and a pure heart" — would that be a perilous teaching for the men who are to become aldermen in our great cities? "What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" — would that be a dangerous teaching for boys who are to become business men in this commercial age? What is the religion of the Hebrews? This ancient people believed that God was the authority behind all law, that no law was just which did not conform to divine ideals, and no people free whose laws were not enforced by an enlightened conscience. They believed that God was in history, and that the record of human events was the record of a divine

progress of humanity toward justice, liberty, and mercy. They believed that God is in all natural phenomena; that nature alike conceals and reveals him; that God is in all human experience, the King, the Father, the Companion, the Friend of man. The laws of this religion are summarized in the Ten Commandments, demanding in the name of Jehovah protection for person, property, reputation, and the family; it is summarized for the historian by such a statement as that of the psalmist, "Thou leddest thy people like a flock by the hand of Moses and Aaron;" it is summarized by the poet of nature in the affirmation, "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork;" it is summarized by the poet of human experience in the declaration, "The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want." The religion of the Hebrews assumes that God is a righteous God, that he demands righteousness of his children, that he demands nothing else, and that he will forgive their unrighteousness if they turn from it, and help them to righteous living if they desire his help.

I do not here discuss the question whether this religion is true or false. It can certainly do no harm to teach our children in the public schools that this religious faith was held by an ancient people. Surely, if we may teach them that the Greeks and Romans held these conceptions respecting the gods, and the relation of men to the gods, and the duties of men toward one another and toward

the gods, which Homer portrays and Plato satirizes, we may teach them those conceptions respecting the character of God, and the relation of man to God, and the relation of man to his fellow man, which the Hebrew prophets inculcated. It cannot harm our children to become acquainted with the laws of the Pentateuch, the visions of the Psalter, the wisdom of the Proverbs, the righteousness of Amos, the mercy of Hosea, the hopefulness of Isaiah. It is not the function of the school to teach that the Bible is an authority, any more than to teach that the church is an authority. But it is the function of the school to make its pupils familiar with the sources of our life, — national, social, and individual, — and no one source has contributed so much to make the American people what it is, in its political institutions, in its social organism, and in its fundamental ethical principles and spiritual faiths, as has the life and literature of this ancient people.

Professor Huxley is not to be accused of ecclesiastical or theological prejudice in favor of orthodoxy, and Professor Huxley has thus summarized the argument in favor of the use of the Bible in public schools supported and carried on by the state: —

I have always been strongly in favor of secular education, in the sense of education without theology; but I must confess I have been no less seriously perplexed to know by what practical measures the religious feeling, which is the essential basis of conduct, was to be kept up,

in the present utterly chaotic state of opinion on those matters, without the use of the Bible. The pagan moralists lack life and color, and even the noble Stoic Marcus Antoninus is too high and refined for an ordinary child. Take the Bible as a whole ; make the severest deductions which fair criticism can dictate for shortcomings and positive errors ; eliminate, as a sensible lay teacher would do, if left to himself, all that is not desirable for children to occupy themselves with ; and there still remains in this old literature a vast residuum of moral beauty and grandeur. And then consider the great historical fact that for three centuries this book has been woven into the life of all that is best and noblest in English history ; that it has become the national epic of Britain, and is as familiar to noble and simple, from John-o'-Groat's House to Land's End, as Dante and Tasso once were to the Italians ; that it is written in the noblest and purest English, and abounds in exquisite beauties of mere literary form ; and, finally, that it forbids the veriest hind who never left his village to be ignorant of the existence of other countries and other civilizations, and of a great past, stretching back to the furthest limits of the oldest nations in the world. By the study of what other book could children be so much humanized and made to feel that each figure in that vast historical procession fills, like themselves, but a momentary space in the interval between two eternities ; and earns the blessings or the curses of all time, according to its effort to do good and hate evil, even as they also are earning their payment for their work ? ¹

Education is development of character ; and democracy requires that the state shall furnish to

¹ Huxley : *Essays*, "Science and Education," pp. 387, 388.

the children and to all the children of the state development in all those elements of character which are essential to good citizenship. If we are to be a free, self-governing people, we must be a people of free, self-governing individuals. If we are to be a people of free, self-governing individuals, each individual in the nation must be educated to understand himself, the world he lives in, the men and women with whom he is to live, and the laws which govern both the world of matter and the world of men; and he must not only be educated to know those laws, but he must be trained to conform his life to them. Nothing less than this is the function of the state in education; nothing less than this will make a free, self-governing republic composed of free, self-governing individuals.

LECTURE VI

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

WHAT are the relations of the state to religion? In most countries until a very recent period it has been believed that the duty of the church is to protect its subjects from irreligious teachers and from false religious teachers. In practically all countries excepting the United States it is still the opinion that it is the duty of the state to support, sustain, and sanction true religious teaching; and in substantially all churches, whether in the United States or out of it, it is believed to be the duty of the church, though not necessarily of the state, to prevent and to punish false religious teaching, and, therefore, to determine what is true religious teaching, and to determine it with a certain degree of authority. Before it is possible for us to understand the religious rights of man, at least as I desire to present them to you, it is necessary to understand this view which has been held up to a very recent period throughout the civilized world, and is to-day held in a very considerable proportion of the civilized world, though in a modified form. That doctrine I wish to state, free from prejudice and in as sympathetic

a manner as possible; for I desire to get for myself, and to give to my reader, the point of view of those who believe in some kind of organic authority in religion, exercised either by church or by state, or by both combined.

The Hebrew commonwealth was a theocracy. The king of that commonwealth was Jehovah. All power was supposed to be derived from him, all authority centred in him. Therefore, to attempt to turn the minds and loyalty of the people away from him was treason. It is not proper to say that there was a union of church and state in the Hebrew commonwealth: they were really one organization exercising different functions. The church was the state conducting public worship; the state was the church administering law. In all lands — including our own in theory, though not in practice — treason is a capital offense. The attempt to destroy the loyalty of people to their country or to their king has been in all ages punished with death, and it was so punished in the Hebrew commonwealth. A single extract from its laws will suffice: —

If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart

and with all your soul. Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and fear him, and keep his commandments, and obey his voice, and cleave unto him. And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death ; because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed you out of the house of bondage, to thrust thee out of the way which the Lord thy God commanded thee to walk in.

He was to be put to death, not because he prophesied falsely: the fact that the event which he prophesied came to pass made no difference. He was to be put to death because he was guilty of treason, in attempting to turn away the loyalty of the people from their king.

Jesus Christ came preaching that the kingdom of heaven is at hand; but he gave to this phrase, kingdom of heaven, a new significance. He declared that the kingdom of God was not to be a kingdom like other kingdoms. It was not to dominate other kingdoms. It was spiritual in its nature, and it was to dominate the world by pervading the other kingdoms. There was no room, therefore, in the kingdom as he proclaimed it for political treason, for there was no political organization, and no political head to which the individual could be traitor. There was a spiritual organization, which was endeavoring to implant new principles and to inspire with new life all political organizations; the ultimate end of its work could not be seen until the kingdoms of this world had become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his

Christ. The kingdoms of the world would remain world-kingdoms, but they would be world-kingdoms subject to, because pervaded by, the spirit of Christianity. But though this was a spiritual kingdom and would proceed by spiritual forces, the same absolute loyalty was required by Christ in the new theocracy that had been required by Jehovah in the old theocracy. Christ was infinitely patient in dealing with error and with faults; but whoever desired to join his organization must give to him absolute and implicit obedience. When he called his first disciples, he told them that they must forsake all in order to follow him; and they did. When a rich young man came running to him, and knelt down in the way, asking what he should do to inherit eternal life, he said to him in effect: You cannot come into this fellowship unless you forsake everything and come after me. When he would have washed Peter's feet, and Peter objected, he refused to give any explanation: I shall either wash your feet, he said, or this is an end of your relationship to this society; you have no more part in me. When certain scribes came and said, We will follow thee, but first let us go and bury our dead, he replied, No, there is no "first." Absolute, immediate, instant, unconditional obedience is required; nothing less will suffice.

Thus as the old theocracy was centred around Jehovah, the new theocracy was centred around Jesus Christ. As the new theocracy went forth

to imbue the kingdoms of the world with its spirit, Christ was recognized as a risen Christ, and the new theocracy was centred around an invisible Master, as the old theocracy had been centred around an invisible King. This new Christian theocracy went out into the Roman world, which was preëminently a world of order and organization, into the Greek world, which was preëminently a world of philosophy and thought. It pervaded them, it did something to transform them; but they also did something to transform this new theocracy. In a very little while the Christian Church became a great imperial hierarchy; it became organized in accordance with the Roman spirit; it came to have a philosophy of religion, which was pervaded by the Greek spirit. And by the fifth or sixth century this new theocracy had become a hierarchical organization, teaching a philosophy of religion. It required the same loyalty that the old Hebrew commonwealth required; it required the same loyalty that the primitive Christian Church required; but it required loyalty to a different object. It was no longer loyalty to an invisible King; it was loyalty to a visible hierarchy and a visible creed.

The nature of the organization had been changed, the nature of the object to which the loyalty was attached had been changed, but the loyalty was still required by this third religious organization, the mediæval church. This loyalty was required to an organization and to the philosophy which the organization taught.

At first the mediæval church contented itself with employing no other penalty than that which the primitive church had employed in apostolic times; it simply said to men, If you do not accept our creed and our authority, you are outside our church; we excommunicate you. But as the church grew in power, as it acquired control of political organizations, and as mere banishment from the ecclesiastical organization did not suffice to prevent independence of thought, the church reëstablished the old Hebraic penalty; it said, If you are disloyal to our teaching, if you teach that which is contrary to it, you must suffer death. And it quoted from the Old Testament and from the New Testament in support of its doctrine that disloyalty to the principles of the order required death. It quoted such passages as I have just referred to; it quoted such a parable as that in which Christ said, "Go out and compel them to come in," or that in which he said, "The branch that beareth no fruit shall be cut down and cast into the fire."

The cruelties of the ecclesiastical penalties of the Middle Ages were not peculiarly ecclesiastical; it is a mistake to charge them to the church; they belong to the epoch. The age was one which believed in the deterrent power of penalty. It believed that the greater the penalty, the greater the deterrent power; the more horrible and the more manifest the suffering, the more likely that the offense would not be repeated. An age in which

violations of person and property were punished by burning at the stake, by flaying alive, by boiling in oil, by tearing men asunder by wild horses, naturally punished heresy in similar fashion. And yet, in theory, the church never inflicted penalties. The church assumed the authority to determine what was true, and whether any particular teacher was teaching in accordance with the truth. That question decided, it handed over the individual convicted of teaching against the truth to the civil authorities, and they inflicted the penalty. It is true that the church taught that the state ought to inflict penalties; it did this in no uncertain language. Thomas Aquinas said: "The corruption of doctrine is worse than the corruption of coin; because the corruption of doctrine threatens the eternal soul, and corruption of coin only impairs the present commercial prosperity." But theoretically the church left the state to protect the community from false doctrine; while it determined what was true and what was false.

Thus, historically, grew up the doctrine that the state and church combined are to determine what is religious truth, and are to protect the community from religious error. This doctrine rests on four postulates. The first postulate is, that the fundamental need of humanity, preëminent and transcending all other needs, is the need of religious truth; that there is a system of comprehensive religious truth, which can be known, and every man ought to be enabled to learn it; that if every

individual is left to find out the truth for himself, and to preach truth or error as he pleases, room is left for perpetual confusion, and the foundations of accuracy and certitude in the whole realm of religious teaching are destroyed. This doctrine is clearly expressed by John Henry Newman in his essay on Private Judgment, written before he became a Roman Catholic: —

There is this obvious, undeniable difficulty in the attempt to form a theory of Private Judgment, in the choice of a religion, that Private Judgment leads different minds in such different directions. If, indeed, there be no religious truth, or at least no sufficient means of arriving at it, then the difficulty vanishes: for where there is nothing to find there can be no rules for seeking, and contradiction in the result is but a *reductio ad absurdum* of the attempt. But such a conclusion is intolerable to those who search, else they would not search; and therefore on them the obligation lies to explain, if they can, how it comes to pass that Private Judgment is a duty, and an advantage, and a success, considering it leads the way not only to their own faith, whatever that may be, but to opinions which are diametrically opposite to it; considering it not only leads them right, but leads others wrong, landing them as it may be in the Church of Rome, or in the Wesleyan connection, or in the Society of Friends.

This assumes that the object of the quest of man is to know religious truth, and that the knowledge of such truth is a fundamental necessity of the religious life.

The second postulate is that, inasmuch as there is a necessity for a revelation of a complete and comprehensive system of religious truth, there has been given to the world by God a complete and comprehensive organization to furnish this system of religious truth. This postulate is thus stated by William Ewart Gladstone; after speaking of the necessity of developing the religious life, he goes on as follows:—

This was to be done by making men sensible that God's dispensation of love was not a dispensation to communicate his gifts by ten thousand separate channels, nor to establish with ten thousand elected souls as many distinct, independent relations. Nor, again, was it to leave them unaided, to devise and set in motion for themselves a machinery for making sympathy available and coöperation practicable among the children of a common Father. But it was to call them all into one spacious fold, under one tender Shepherd; to place them all upon one level; to feed them all with one food; to surround them all with one defense; to impart to them all the deepest, the most inward and vital sentiment of community and brotherhood and identity, as in their fall so in their recovery, as in their perils so in their hopes, as in their sins so in their graces, and in the means and channels for receiving them.¹

The third postulate is that it is wrong for individuals to set themselves apart from this divine order or to teach something different from that which the order is teaching. Such teachers are

¹ W. E. Gladstone: *Gleanings of Past Years*, vol. i.

disturbers of the public peace, they are underminers of the Christian faith, they are enemies of the church, they are foes to religion, and they ought not to complain if they are made to suffer. Even if it be granted that some agitation is necessary, even if it be granted that some criticism of the church is permissible, the men who criticise should be willing to suffer for the sake of their convictions. This doctrine is thus stated by John Henry Newman, in his essay on Private Judgment, from which I have already quoted: —

The first remark which occurs is an obvious one, and, we suppose, will be suffered to pass without much opposition, that, whatever be the intrinsic merits of Private Judgment, yet, if it at all exerts itself in the direction of proselytism and conversion, a certain "*onus probandi*" lies upon it, and it must show cause why it should be tolerated, and not rather treated as a breach of the peace and silenced "*instanter*" as a mere disturber of the existing constitution of things. Of course it may be safely exercised in defending what is established; and we are far indeed from saying that it is never to advance in the direction of change or revolution, else the Gospel itself could never have been introduced; but we consider that serious religious changes have a "*primâ facie*" case against them; they have something to get over, and have to prove their admissibility before it can reasonably be allowed; and their agents may be called upon to suffer, in order to prove their earnestness, and to pay the penalty of the trouble they are causing.

Both these statements are by Protestants — one a Protestant up to the time of his death, the other

a Protestant at the time of writing the essay, though afterward a Roman Catholic.

The fourth postulate is based on the other three. It is that, if the state has the power, it should punish the teachers of error; if the state has not the power, or if the state is indifferent, the church should punish the teacher by turning out of its membership the man who does not agree with the comprehensive and complete system of truth held by the church of which he is a member.

I have tried to state this doctrine as fairly as I can. I could easily have given quotations from authorities that would have made it seem more offensive. I wish to be equally explicit in my repudiation of the doctrine in all its parts. I deny that a knowledge of religious truth is the great desideratum of life. I deny that there is or can be any complete or comprehensive system of religious truth. I deny that there is or can be any organization which can furnish such a system of religious truth. And, therefore, of course I deny that there can be any right, either in church or state, to punish, by either physical or moral penalty, the man who dissents from the commonly received religious opinion.

What is religion? Max Müller defines it as "such a perception of the manifestations of the Infinite as produces a moral influence on the conduct and character of man." The perception of the Infinite is not religion, that is theology; a recognition of the moral relation of man with his

fellow man is not religion, that is ethics; but such a perception as enlarges and enriches the moral life and conduct of man is religion.

An examination of other definitions confirms the accuracy of Max Müller's. Religion has been defined by John Henry Newman as "the knowledge of God and of his will, and of our duties toward him."¹ That is included in Max Müller's definition; but religion is more than "a knowledge of God and of his will, and of our duties toward him." One may have such a knowledge and be morally indifferent to it. Religion has been defined as "communion between a worshiping subject and a worshiped object." That is a part of religion; but religion is not confined to worship. Religion, indeed, may exist where there is no conscious worship; religion is the play of the infinite on the finite in the moral realm. Religion has been defined by Matthew Arnold as "conduct touched by emotion;" but it depends on what the emotion is: if the emotion comes from the infinite, that is a good definition; but there are emotions of a baser sort. Religion is a perception of God, and such a perception as affects the moral conduct and character of the one who perceives. This is the religion of the Old Testament. The Old Testament is not a book *about* religion; it is not a book written by men who had studied in the phenomena of life the manifestations of God, and written philosophically about them. It is a book

¹ *A Grammar of Assent*, p. 378.

of religion; it is the expression of the life of men who had perceived God in his world. Poet, historian, prophet, law-giver, all bear testimony to what they have seen; they record their own perception of the divine within themselves, or in their fellows, or in external nature. Turning from the Old Testament to the New, we find this also a book of religion as religion is defined by Max Müller. The Four Gospels are written by men who had seen the divine in one man, and wrote to show what they had seen. The Book of Acts is written by men who had perceived this Infinite working in and through the church. The Epistles are letters of men who had perceived this Infinite in their own souls or in the souls of their fellow men. The Apocalypse is written by some one who had seen, even in the Neronian persecution, the hand of God, and foreseen the triumphs of the kingdom of God. Old and New Testament alike answer to this definition of religion, that it is such a perception of the Infinite as affects the conduct and the character of man.

The quest of humanity is after this perception of the Infinite. It is a quest, not after truth about God, but after God himself. The two are not the same. Knowing the life of Queen Victoria as you read it in the daily papers is not knowing Queen Victoria. Reading a skillful analysis of her character is not knowing Queen Victoria. Knowing a man is not the same as knowing about a man. Knowing God is not the same as knowing

about God. The office of religion is not to tell men about God; it is to bring them into personal acquaintance with God; it is to bring them into a perception of the Infinite himself. Truth about God is some one else's perception of the Infinite. It is not the perception of a perception that is religion; it is the perception of God. It is not the understanding of what some one else says about him; it is acquaintance with him.

Therefore the Bible cannot take the place of God. Faith in the Bible is not religion; faith in God is religion. Faith is seeing Him who is invisible; faith is the evidence of things not seen: but the Bible is not unseen. If we are to say that there may be faith in the Bible, then it is faith in the invisible spiritual experiences of the men who wrote the book; faith is not in the book, but in the life which is transcribed in the book; and that means faith in God, the perception of whom is testified to by the writers of the book. Faith in the church is not religion. The church is a body of men and women who, more or less clearly, have had some perception of the Infinite. If we come into their fellowship, and through sympathy get from that fellowship some perception of God for ourselves, then we are getting a true religious life. But the church and the witness of the church cannot give religion: all that the church can do is to report the experience of men who have had religion. Religion is the personal perception, the individual experience. Acceptance of a creed is

not religion. The creed is something which the philosopher, more or less skillfully, has wrought out of the experiences of those who have perceived the Infinite. To perceive their perception is not religion. Nothing is religion except to perceive what they perceived or what the men perceived out of whose perceptions they have wrought their creed. Reading Nansen is not going to the North Pole. Believing a creed is not perceiving God.

This is religion, — the personal perception of the Infinite. This is the quest of humanity, — not a complete knowledge, not a comprehensive system, but God himself, — nothing less than God himself. And such a quest must necessarily be personal. It must be conducted by each man for himself; it cannot be done vicariously. One man may tell a thousand men about a great statesman, but if the thousand men are to know the great statesman they must meet him one by one. There is no possible way by which a personal and intimate acquaintance can be acquired for one soul vicariously by other souls. The acquaintance must be acquired by each man for himself. This is the testimony of the Bible; this is the testimony of history. The accessibility of God to every soul, the possibility of every soul coming to God, — this is the teaching of the Bible, from its opening statement that God made man in his own image, to its closing statement that whosoever will may take the water of life freely. The whole record of the Bible is the record of a personal re-

lation between the individual soul and God. These writers talk to God, God answers them; they walk with him, they have fellowship with him, they report that fellowship. He is their friend, their companion, their inspirer, their counselor, their helper, their king, their father. This which is the teaching of the Bible is the teaching of history. The Hebrews thought they were the children of God, and that God had no paternal relationship with the pagan. The mediæval church thought the baptized were the children of God, and he had no paternal relation with the unbaptized. The Calvinist thought the elect were the children of God, and that he had no paternal relation with the non-elect. The Methodist thought that God was the father of those who had passed through a certain religious experience, and that he was not the father of the rest of the world. We are now coming to recognize that he is the father of Jew and Gentile, baptized and unbaptized, elect and non-elect, repentant and unrepentant, regenerate and unregenerate, — of the whole world. Fatherhood means personal relation. A father and an orphan asylum are not identical. One may get food and shelter from the orphan asylum; but he cannot get fatherhood. When Christ says to us, "Say 'Our Father which art in heaven,'" he really says, "Recognize that there is a personal relation between you and God." Neither the Bible, the church, nor the creed can serve as a substitute for this personal relationship with God as a Father and a Friend.

The whole world is consciously or unconsciously seeking acquaintance and coöperation with God. The little child lies in the cradle, knowing nothing. He begins to observe the world about him. At first he does not know the difference between the distance to an electric light and the distance to the moon; only gradually does he comprehend space; at last he learns that he is surrounded by infinity. He begins to study the nature of matter: its complexity, and finds its forms infinite; its history, and finds for it no beginning; its probable future, and can forecast for it no end; thus again he finds himself surrounded by infinity. He becomes an artist or a musician, studies beauty in color, form, and sound, and soon learns that there is no limit to the combinations which produce beauty, none to the ideal world, a little of which he is trying to translate into visible or audible forms; he also is studying the Infinite. Or he becomes an engineer; deals with forces, the various manifestations of which are beyond all computation, learns that all forces are one force, gives himself to a study of its nature that, by obeying its laws, he may command its service: he also is studying the Infinite. Or he goes out into society, becomes a lawyer or a statesman, studies the laws of human nature, seeks both to understand their nature and their application to the varied relations of life, and in this endeavor learns that there are such laws which man does not make and cannot unmake: he also is studying the Infinite.

And all the time as scientist, artist, engineer, statesman, he is seeking the coöperation of the Infinite. Unseen forces coöperate with the farmer in his sowing and his reaping; with the mechanic in his factory; with the artist in his painting; with the statesman in his building and his guiding of the state. Always is man coöperating with a Partner whom he never sees, of whom he knows a little, of whom he is always seeking to know more, of whom he can never know all.

This quest after God must be individual and personal, because it is a quest after a personal God; the result must always be partial, because the quest is by the finite concerning the infinite; the knowledge which the finite gains of the infinite must always be fragmentary and imperfect. A complete and perfect system of truth regarding God and divine law is absolutely impossible; because God and divine law are infinite, and we are finite. All, therefore, that any man can ever see is some of the manifestations of God; all that he can ever report is something of the divine. We make our different excursions into the infinite; we bring back our different reports. Let me quote once more from John Henry Newman:—

There is this obvious and undeniable difficulty in attempting to form a theory of private judgment in the choice of a religion, that private judgment leads different minds in such different directions.

That is the glory of it—the splendor of it!

Send ten thousand men in different directions, each to look with his own eyes, feel with his own heart, realize in his own experience some aspect of the divine character, and they will bring back from their quest ten thousand manifestations of God, — each that manifestation which he is capable of receiving.

So it is that the engineer gets a conception of the power of God which the artist never has; and the artist a conception of the beauty of God which the mechanic never has; and the mechanic a conception of the skill of God which the statesman never has; and the statesman a conception of the justice of God which the divine never has; and the divine a conception of the kinship of man in the spiritual realm with God which the others do not easily get. Each has his own point of view, each sees his own vision. Private judgment has broken the church up, — thank God for it! For it is not individuals alone, it is churches also, that get their different points of view. Each sees a little, none sees all. The Calvinist says, "God is a sovereign, and rules the whole world with infinite, unvarying, unalterable law." The Methodist says, "Man is a free moral agent; he can do what he will, he is personally responsible for his actions." And not till after centuries of controversy does it at last begin to dawn on both that we may be living in a world of free moral agents, under a divine sovereign. One theologian declares that God is just and must maintain his law, and will to the end of time, cost what it may.

Another theologian declares that God is merciful, tender, and compassionate, and cares for the individual. Not till after centuries of controversy do we at last begin to learn that mercy and justice are simply different phases of the same character, that their demands are confirmatory, not contradictory, and that the greatest penalty which society can put upon a deliberate criminal is to place him under redemptive influences until he is reformed. Formerly the Unitarian said, Christ cannot be God, he is merely man; the Trinitarian said, Christ cannot be merely man, he is God. We are beginning to learn that there is a human life in God, that there is a divine life in man, that God is best seen in humanity, that humanity is never seen at its best and truest self except as God dwells in it and makes it divine.

I hear a great deal about the virtue of toleration. I do not believe in toleration. I do not thank any man for tolerating me; and I cannot conceive of myself as tolerating Cardinal Gibbons, who represents one extreme in ecclesiasticism, or President Eliot, who represents another extreme in ecclesiasticism. It is not toleration, it is catholicity we need; it is not indifference to error, it is the humility of mind which says, I see in part and I prophesy in part; my brother sees in part and prophesies in part; and by and by we will put these parts together, and then we shall — know it all? No. Then we shall know a little more than we know at present.

These, then, are my postulates. There is no complete and comprehensive system of the infinite, and cannot be. If there were, it would do us no great good to have it; it is not what we need. There is a personal quest after the Infinite, and there is possible, what is far better than a knowledge of truth, a personal acquaintance with God. It is the right of man to pursue this quest unhindered; to find God for himself, in his own way, with his own faculties, after his own fashion. This is the absolute right of every man; his absolute right because God is accessible to all men; his absolute right because this acquaintance with God is the divine end of his existence. When a state interposes and prohibits this quest; when it says to any man, "You must not find out God for yourself, or tell what you have found out to others," that state is violating the fundamental right of man. When any church says to any man, "You must not look for God yourself, you must take our definition of him; you must not go beyond the lines of that definition, or expect to find any new thing about him," that church is not only not doing its function, it is directly antagonizing its function. It is preventing men from seeking God for themselves, by putting an ecclesiastical organization between the soul and its Father. When a creed is offered to men, and they are required to take it under penalty of some obloquy if they reject it, the imposition of such a creed violates the fundamental right of man to

find God for himself. All creeds have some truth in them; no creeds have all truth in them. I am almost prepared to say that it would be safe to believe all the affirmations of all the creeds, and to reject all their denials. Whenever a body of devout men have come saying, "We have found this in the infinite," their report of what they have found is presumptively true. Whenever they have come back saying, "We have not found this," it does not in the least indicate that what they have not found may not be there.

In all other ranks of life we recognize the fact that the infinite is infinite, and that finite discoveries are but fragmentary and partial. We crown with honor the man who brings back from the infinite a new discovery. He has been out into the infinite space and found a new world with his telescope; he has been out into the infinite forces of nature and discovered a new force which he can set to work for the good of mankind; he has been out into the infinite of music and created a new symphony; he has been out into the infinite realm of color and learned how to paint, not merely trees and rocks, but the very atmosphere through which we see trees and rocks. We honor the new school of art, of music, of astronomy. It is only the church that has thought God little and has thought man big. It is only the church that has condemned the man who has gone out into the infinite and brought back a new vision of God. I have sometimes thought I should like to write

a history of the church, for the purpose of showing that Christianity must be supernatural to have lived despite so many blunders by its friends.

Agnosticism says, "We can know nothing about the Infinite." "All talk of God," says Professor Huxley, "is like sounding brass and tinkling cymbals;" and then he goes on to write four or five volumes on the subject! Dogmatism is first cousin to agnosticism, for dogmatism says, "We cannot know anything about God except what other people tell us." Over against both I here put the foundations of religious liberty, — the accessibility of God to every soul, and the consequent right of every soul to find God by its own quest, in its own way. We need to get away from the notion that the end of religious life is the acquisition of truth, and to realize that it is the acquisition of God; away from the notion that there is or can be a complete system of truth about God and divine law, and realize that he is infinite and we are finite, and that we can but know in part and prophesy in part; away from the notion that the church is primarily a teaching institution, equipped with truth which it is to give to others, and to learn that the church is a life-giving institution, stirring men up to do their own thinking, that each may reach for himself his own result; away from the mediæval notion that the loyalty of the Christian is to be to an organization, a creed, or a book, and learn that it is to be to the Jehovah of the Old Testament, the Christ of the New Testament, the God of all life.

LECTURE VII

THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

I SHALL venture to-night to recall your attention to the principles which I have endeavored, in the preceding lectures of this course, to illustrate.

In the first lecture, I endeavored to trace the conflict between the Hebraic commonwealth and Roman imperialism, and to show how, as the result of that conflict, Roman imperialism was overthrown; in the second lecture I endeavored to show how the fundamental principle — that the world and life are made for all men and not for a few — has been gradually wrought out in religion, in politics, in industry, in education; in the third lecture I applied this fundamental principle to government, and endeavored to show that just governments are organized and administered for the benefit of those that are governed, not for the benefit of those who do the governing, but that this does not necessarily mean that those who are governed must have a share in the government; in the fourth lecture I attempted to apply the same principle to industry, and to show that the industrial rights of man involve the right of every man

to the profit of his own industry and to his share in the common wealth, that is, that wealth which is not the product of any man's industry but the gift of God, but this does not necessarily involve the doctrine that all such property shall be held or administered in common; in the fifth lecture, applying the same principle to education, I endeavored to show the right of every man to a free and full development of all his powers, physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, and that in a government which rests on the political coöperation of its citizens, it is the duty of the state to provide such education as is necessary to enable every member of society to fulfill the functions of good citizenship; in the sixth lecture, applying the same principle in the sphere of religion, I attempted to show that every man stands in a personal relation to God, somewhat analogous to that of a child to its father, and that therefore every man has a right to go to God, to learn what he can of God, and to bring back and tell to his fellow men what he has learned, or what he thinks he has learned, without let, hindrance, obstacle, or interference of any kind, from either state or church. These fundamental principles all rest on the postulate that the world and life are made for all men, not for a few: consequently government must be for the benefit of the governed, the common wealth must be administered for the benefit of the common people, education must be for all, not for a few, and both church and state must recognize and

respect the right and liberty of every man to give forth as he will his own interpretation of the Infinite and the Eternal.

America represents these four fundamental principles better than any other nation now represents them, and better than they ever have been represented by any nation in the past. But America represents more than these principles. Democracy, as represented in America, means that the people themselves are trusted to administer their own government, to carry on their own industries, to organize their own educational system, to develop their own religious life. Democracy is more than a scheme of government, more than a theory of economics, more than a plan of education, more than a form of religious institutions. Democracy is a great religious faith: a superstitious faith, if you will, but a great religious faith. It is faith in man. It is not merely good will toward man, —autocracy might be that; not merely hope for man, —autocracy might be that: it is faith in man; autocracy never is that.

Every man has his distinctive peculiarities. He is a poet, an orator, a statesman; he is great in some virtue, as courage or gentleness or patience. Rarely is any man great in all virtues; never is any man great on all sides of his nature. As every man has his own distinctive characteristics, so has every nation. It is not always conscious of its own characteristics, it is not always consistent in manifesting those characteristics. But a nation

has its distinctive characteristic, as does the race or the tribe or the individual. Thus the distinctive characteristic of ancient Rome was autocracy, of Venice oligarchy, of England in the eighteenth century aristocracy. In the sense in which Rome was autocratic, Venice oligarchic, England aristocratic, America is democratic. That is, the institutions, the history, the life of America, have been pervaded by the spirit, not merely of good will toward man, and of large hope for man, but also of faith in man. America has not always been conscious of the spirit which has possessed her; she has not always consistently carried out the principles which she has professed. Neither has any nation, neither has any individual. But as distinguished from the other nations of the earth, America is distinctively democratic. That is, she has distinctively a spirit of good will toward all men, hope for all men, faith in all men. This good will may have sometimes been unwise, this hope may have sometimes been visionary and extravagant, this faith may have sometimes been audacious and ill-based. I am not eulogizing America; I am not even defending America; I am only trying to describe America.

What are the distinguishing characteristics of this nation? Let us forget for a moment that we are Americans, and stand apart and look at our country. Not greatness of territory: Russia has greater territory than America. Not greatness of population: China has a greater and a far denser

population than America. Not wealth: Great Britain has perhaps as great wealth as America. Not the tendency to crowd into cities: that tendency is as marked in Germany and in England as in our own West. Not any of these things are distinctively characteristic of America. Nor are the vices which are sometimes attributed to her, and of which she is indeed guilty; they are characteristic, but they are not distinctive. It is sometimes said that drunkenness is distinctively characteristic of the American people; it is not true. There is a great deal too much drunkenness in America, but on the whole it may safely be said that there is proportionally more drinking and less drunkenness in America than in any other country possessing a similar climate. There is certainly less than in England or Scotland or France; and if in the term "drunkenness" you include the stupefying influence of alcohol as well as its inebriating effect, then there is more drunkenness in Germany than in America. There are more drunken people to be met in a day in London or Edinburgh than one will meet in a week in Boston or New York.

Corruption is not a distinctive characteristic of America. If one were to form his judgment from some of our orators, and our newspapers, he would imagine this was the most corrupt nation on the face of the earth. But it is not. Our own Credit Mobilier scandals were equaled if not surpassed by those in France in connection with the Panama Canal. Our own political corruption, even in

New York, has been surpassed by the political corruption unearthed in the last war in Spain. And every man who is familiar with the political history of England in the latter half of the eighteenth and in the early part of the nineteenth century knows that England was more honeycombed with corruption, and corruption in higher quarters, than America has ever known in any period of her history. I do not palliate American corruption. I am not apologizing for it by the plea that we are no worse than our neighbors. I am simply saying that corruption is not distinctively American. It is characteristic of the commercial age in which we live, and it belongs to Berlin and Paris as well as to New York or Washington. It is the vice of our age, not of our peculiar democratic development. It is all the more dangerous because it is world-wide; but it is not the distinguishing characteristic of the American people.

There is, perhaps, more reason to say that lawlessness is a characteristic of America. Lynch law in our more sparsely settled regions is undoubtedly common, — lynch law aggravated in some instances by race prejudice. And yet lawlessness is by no means a distinctive peculiarity of America. There is more violence in an English election than there is in an American election. The scenes of lawlessness in the French Assembly, in the Austro-Hungarian Reichsrath, and in the Italian Chamber, within the last few years, have far surpassed anything that has been witnessed in

either our Congress or any one of our state legislatures. The spirit of lawlessness belongs to the uprising of democracy; it belongs to an age in which men have had the manacles taken off and have not yet learned how to use their hands. It belongs to an age in which men have been set free from the control of others and have not yet fully acquired control of themselves. It belongs to the nineteenth century rather than to the United States.

Are there any characteristics of America which differentiate it from other lands, — which are unlike those of France or Germany or Italy or Spain or England?

In the first place, in America the people are trusted to govern themselves, and they are thus recognized as the source of authority. The democracy of America differs from that of France and from that of England in this fundamental respect. All the powers of the locality in France, and in England, are derived from the central government. In England the county has just so much power as Parliament chooses to give. In France the *arrondissement* has just so much power as the French Assembly chooses to give. The process is exactly reversed in America. Our Constitution assumes, first, that every man is not necessarily competent to govern himself, but more competent to govern himself than any one else is to govern him; second, that each locality is able to take care of its own affairs better than any other locality is to

take care of its affairs for it. So we have, first, individual self-government; next, local self-government, — home-rule in town or city or county; then the larger affairs of the state cared for by all the people of the state; and finally, those things which belong neither to the individual nor to the city nor to the county nor to the state, but to the whole federation of states, — those, and those alone, are relegated to the federal Congress. The authority of the people is initiative and primary in America; it is derived and secondary in Europe. All the powers of the central government are derivative here; all the powers of the individual and the locality are derivative there. In other words, the American nation started with the assumption that the people should be permitted to govern themselves; this is faith in the people. It was not at first as wide a faith as it is to-day. In the original constitutions of our several states, there were qualifications for suffrage that no longer exist; some of them were religious qualifications, some of them property qualifications, some of them educational qualifications. Most of these have been swept away, whether wisely or unwisely, I do not now stop to discuss. I only point out that faith in the ability of men to govern themselves has been increasing. Democracy is faith in man.

Nor has it only been faith in man's judgment to decide great questions, but also faith in his power of self-restraint to submit to the decision when it is made. We are so accustomed to our American

method that we hardly recognize the greatness of the experiment upon which we have entered. Will we have silver or gold for our currency? We do not ask experts to decide the question for us. We submit it to the whole American people, and the porter who sweeps out the bank has as much power — though not as much influence — in determining that question as the president or the cashier of the bank. The question confronts us, Shall we enter into new world-relations? What shall be our relation to Cuba, to Porto Rico, to Hawaii, to the Philippine Islands? We do not gather a small body of expert statesmen and leave to them the decision of the problem; we do not even submit it to a few college professors, or to men skilled in diplomatic affairs, or versed in constitutional history. The whole American people organize themselves into a great debating society; and after the debate has been carried on one or two years, — in the last three months with great excitement and sometimes too much passion, — fourteen million people decide the question, fourteen million of all classes, conditions, characters, and grades of education. Nor is that all; we not only trust the American people to decide, but we trust in their self-restraint to abide by the decision. If, as has happened more than once, the majority of the people vote in one way, and the majority of the presidential electors vote the other, the majority submits to the decision of the minority and helps to carry it out. We not only believe in the

potential capacity of men to decide the most fundamental questions of national life for themselves: we also believe — and act on that belief and incorporate it into our institutions — that when a question is decided against their judgment, or even against their conscience, they will submit until they have changed the judgment or the conscience of their fellow men. The most striking illustration of this trust of the American people in the self-restraining power of man is seen in the organization of our United States Supreme Court, which is regarded by all writers on law as the greatest contribution which our fathers made, in the formation of the Constitution of the United States, to political organization. We have on this continent forty-five independent states. Questions arise between these states. If such questions were to arise between European states, they would arm and go to war. Some forty or fifty questions have so arisen in the history of the United States, which would have been quite sufficient cause for war in Europe. They have been submitted to a selected body of a dozen or fifteen gentlemen sitting in Washington. Those gentlemen are not the wisest men in the world, they are not necessarily the wisest men in the United States; there are scores, perhaps hundreds of lawyers as wise, disinterested, and dispassionate. But we have selected these particular gentlemen, put them on the bench, and said to them, "These great questions we will leave to you." To-day the Ameri-

can people is divided in opinion as to the right of this people, under its constitution, to hold territory which is not incorporated within the nation. We have our different opinions, and we have a right to them. The ablest men are divided on the question. The question has been submitted to these judges of a Supreme Court; it is decided, by a majority of one, and the whole country accepts that decision without a suggestion of resistance or revolt. We had a hotly contested presidential election: was Mr. Tilden elected, or Mr. Hayes? The South American republics would have been in a flame of revolution. We organized a tribunal, submitted the question to the tribunal, and accepted its decision. We had a hotly debated question about the income tax: half our people said, It is right to levy an income tax; it is just, honest, constitutional, it ought to be levied; the other half said, It is wrong, dishonest, unconstitutional, it ought not to be levied. This affected more than our consciences: it affected our pockets. We submitted that question to the Supreme Court; first they decided in favor of the tax, then they decided against the tax, and the final decision was reached, as it was wittily said, "by the *indecision* of the Supreme Court of the United States." When it was decided, no one thought of resistance, and the bare suggestion that the composition of the court might be changed in order to secure a reversal of the decision was received with deep and widespread indignation. This is the

faith which the American people have in the great masses of mankind, not only that they have capacity potentially to decide great questions, but power of moral self-restraint to submit when questions are decided against them, not only by majorities but even by minorities, not only by minorities but even by single men.

Along with this faith in humanity is a great hope for man; with the faith that every man ought to have a chance goes a hope for every man if he gets the chance. This is the meaning of the abolition of all caste and class distinctions. It is a distinctive peculiarity of America that every man has an open door set before him. In England, at least until very recently, the son of a porter was expected to be a porter, the son of an omnibus driver to be an omnibus driver, the son of a landed owner became as matter of course a landed owner, and the man who held a seat in Parliament handed it down to his son. All this we have done away with in America. Why? Because we believe every man ought to have a chance, because we have hope for every man that he can make something out of his chance. This spirit of hopefulness is a very distinctive characteristic of American life; of this spirit and the grounds of it I shall have something to say in a succeeding lecture.

Out of this has grown, not merely a chance for every man, but a system of education to give men the ability to take advantage of that chance. Not only the workshop is open, but the school to teach

how to handle tools; not only the professorship, but the school to teach how to use language; not only the mercantile career, but the school to teach book-keeping. We have not only opened the door, but we have gone to the very cradle and said to every child, You shall have an education that will fit you to enter into this door, to take advantage of this chance, and to be what you can. Our school system is founded on nothing less than a belief in the potentiality of man and of every man. Children in the cradle are like seeds, and in India the seeds are assorted, put in separate bins, and called castes. In America there is no assortment; no man knows when a seed is dropped into the ground whether it will be a thistle, a stalk of wheat, or a tree. We leave the process of development to make what can be made out of each seed.

At the same time we have thrown, as no other nation has, the religious responsibility wholly upon the people. America is the only considerable country on the globe which has not a state church, or which does not give support to some form of religion or to certain forms of religion. There are two distinguishing features in the religious life of the United States: one that it puts no obstacle in the way of any man's religion or irreligion; the other that religion is the free expression of the national life. A man may advocate worship or he may denounce worship; he may preach Christianity or he may vilify Christianity; he may lecture against

it in halls to applauding thousands or he may preach in support of it in the church to unapplauding hundreds; the law does not interfere. Robert Ingersoll has rendered incidental and unintentional service, for the very fact that he traveled throughout this country, and no man attempted to forbid him, is a splendid witness to the truth that we believe in America that religion and irreligion are absolutely free. As a result, we have on the one hand no obstacle put upon any man's worship or no worship, and on the other hand all our worship is the frank expression of the life of the people. Our churches are not as splendid as the cathedrals of England, of France, of Germany, and of Italy; but there is not a brick, nor a timber, nor a shingle, nor a pane of glass that is not the witness either to the free religion of the people who built the church, or to the vanity, the pride, and the self-glorification that apes and assumes the habits of religion. Our religious institutions in America are, every one of them, the free-will offering of a free people.

And we have not only trusted ourselves, but we have beckoned to other peoples, and they have come from Europe flocking to our shores, — men without education, without training, without previous background of history, men unfitted, one would say, for all these functions. Steam has bridged the Atlantic Ocean, and over this bridge a long procession marches, half a million every year, — Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, Swiss, Norwe-

gians, Spaniards, Irish, Hungarians, Poles. For a long time we asked no questions; for a long time we let any man come. Now we exclude the pauper, the diseased, the unmistakably incompetent and unworthy. But in the main the door is thrown wide open. Nor is that all: we have offered our lands to them. We have offered to every man a section of land if he would but occupy and cultivate it. Never before in the history of the world has a nation thus invited the men of other nations to come and compete with them in industry. It may be said that this was a wise financial policy? I think it was. That it has helped to develop the wealth of the nation? I believe it has. That it has enriched us? I also think so. But it has been distinctively a policy of good will, working out good for others as well as for ourselves; and a policy of faith in man, — faith that the ignorant, the uncultivated, the poorer classes of foreign lands, had in them, for themselves and for their children, the potentiality of a great manhood.

To these immigrants we have given equal share in all the advantages we possessed ourselves: we have given them our land, we have opened to them our schools, we have welcomed them to our industries, and then, with the smallest possible apprenticeship, we have invited them to a share in our government, to take part in controlling the destinies of this great nation. Was this wise? I shall have something to say about that by and by. But

this is what we have done, and doing it was characteristic of us. It may have been too audacious, but it has been faith in man, and not in Anglo-Saxon man alone, faith in all men, of all classes and conditions.

These are the distinguishing characteristics of our American people: faith in man's capacity for self-government, in his power of self-restraint, in his readiness to receive education, in his ability to solve all religious problems for himself; and this faith, not merely in ourselves and our kin, but in all classes and conditions of men of all races and countries. It has been a spirit of faith in man, hope for man, good will toward man.

How has this experiment worked? What has been the result?

In the first place, this nation has grown in territory marvelously. Within this hundred years, beginning as a little strip along the coast, with a population not greater than that now inhabiting Greater New York, it has spread out until it reaches from ocean to ocean, and from the Lakes to the Gulf. In the second place, there has been a marvelous growth in population; from five million in 1800 to seventy-five million in 1900, — a growth in population, I believe, absolutely unparalleled in the whole history of the globe. But this growth in population has been less than the growth in wealth. We have asked the poor to come over here, and we have grown richer. We have asked the ignorant to come over here, and we have grown

richer. While our population has increased four-fold, from 1840 to 1890, our wealth has increased thirteen-fold. In other words, while we have invited the poor of other lands to come hither and share our wealth with us, that wealth has grown more than three times as fast as our population. There has never been, in the history of the globe, such a growth in wealth as in America.

The external development of our religious institutions has been equally great. We have thrown the responsibility for religious institutions upon the people. We have been warned against this course; English writers said, It will never do; you cannot maintain the church if you do not support it by the state. But our churches have grown faster than our population. Dr. Dorchester, in some statistics published in the "Congregationalist" of December 29, 1900, tells us that in the hundred years 1800-1900, the population has increased fourteen-fold, and the membership in the Evangelical Protestant churches has increased fifty-fold. Consider what that means: with all the rapidity of our growth, increased by immigration from foreign sources, the growth in the Evangelical Protestant churches has been fifty-fold, against fourteen-fold growth in population. And this does not begin to indicate what has been the numerical growth of the churches; for to these figures must be added the communicants in the Roman Catholic Church, the adherents in the Jewish synagogues, and the members in all the so-called

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Liberal churches and Ethical Societies. Along with this growth in numbers and in organization, there has also been growth in the material prosperity of the churches, in the character of the buildings, in financial equipment, in facility for service.

Along with all this, there has been an analogous growth in education. On the people themselves has been thrown the whole responsibility for the education of the nation, and they have responded. At first, public schools existed practically only in the New England states; now, there is not a state or territory in the Union without its public school system; at first, no school system whatever for negroes or Indians; now, education is provided and open to nearly all negroes and all Indians. Nor has this education consisted solely of the simpler elements of learning. In my boyhood the youth who wished to get the higher education must go to England or Germany or France. There are still two or three specialties which he can acquire better abroad, but with these exceptions he can do post-graduate work as well in America as anywhere in the world, if not better. While our educational institutions have been multiplied, they have both grown broader and grown upward.

There are certain elements of life which cannot be summed up in statistics. What has been the moral product of this democracy? what the moral accompaniment of this growth in territory, in population, in wealth, in religious and educational equipment? The moral power of America is cer-

tainly not inferior to that of any other nation. The love of country never was subjected to a severer test than it was in America during the civil war. What patriotism means to democracy, what love of country means, what the love of man for his fellow-man, what the love of man for the institutions that represent or appear to him to represent liberty, justice, equality, the graves of our soldiers and the monuments in every town and village bear witness.

It is the conscience of America which abolished slavery. It is the conscience of America which has diminished drunkenness and put a curb-bit in the mouth of the liquor traffic. It is the conscience of America which has wrought the industrial reforms which have already been accomplished. It is the humane conscience of America which has built up hospitals and asylums and libraries, some founded and maintained by the state or the city, some by the benevolent enterprise of individuals.

Whatever else may be said of Americans, they are not mean or narrow or niggardly. They may be selfish, they may be grasping, but they do not hoard. They may be provincial, but they are not narrow. Democracy has made a nation of broad and generous men.

We are to remember, too, what has been the spiritual and ethical development of the churches. Their growth in numbers, in equipment, has not been their only growth. Within this century the

city mission movement, the home mission movement, the foreign mission movement, have all been organized. They are products of democracy in religion. The churches are no longer merely worshiping places, nor places where people gather for æsthetic enjoyment, nor where their piety is kept alive by the assiduous calls of a busy pastor. The church has become, in Parkhurst's phrase, the pastor's force, not his field. Every church that is worthy of the name in America is to-day a working church. Democracy has made working churches, because democracy has thrown the responsibility of the religious institution on the individual member. And out from these churches have gone forth spiritual forces, reaching far beyond ecclesiastical walls, — the Young Men's Christian Associations, the Young Women's Christian Associations, the Societies of Christian Endeavor, the King's Daughters, and cognate organizations.

This is what has been wrought in America by a century of faith in man, hope for man, good will toward man. A land wide in extent, rich in population, growing in wealth and in the diffusion of wealth, in education and in the diffusion of education, growing in religious institutions and in the power of an awakened conscience and an awakened spirit of faith and hope and love. The distinguishing spirit of America is this spirit of faith in man, hope for man, and good will toward man. This is its history, this is its vital constitution, this is its essential nature.

There are those who think, or seem to think, that suddenly this nation has thrown away its birth-right, has forgotten its faith in man, has lost its hope for man, has ceased to have good will toward man, and that now, at the close of the century, it has suddenly become dominated by an imperial and imperious ambition. Some of these are men for whose views I have great respect, whose intellectual conclusions Americans ought to weigh with candor and with consideration; but I cannot believe that a nation is either converted or perverted in a day. I cannot believe that a great nation, founded on faith in man and hope for man and good will toward man, — a nation which has shown its faith in man by its institutions, and by its history, has suddenly broken with all the traditions of the past, lost all the spirit of its youth and early manhood, and has been instantaneously converted from a great example of faith and hope and good will toward man into an imperial Republic. The spirit which has emancipated the negro, which has opened all the lands to the immigrant, which has founded the public school and taxed the state for the education of the common people, this spirit is not lost. We may differ among ourselves as to the facts, and as to the application of fundamental principles to those facts; some of us may be too eager to enter upon untried paths in the future, and some of us too reluctant; some of us may be glad that new days bring new duties and be too ready to assume them; some of us may be

sorry that new days bring new duties and wish only to fulfill the duties of our fathers; but the great heart of America is a heart of faith in humanity, of hope for humanity, of good will toward humanity. The American people are true to their past traditions, their present institutions, their real life. We shall go on with this experiment we are making, of trust in the people, hope for the people, and good will to the people, until we have carried it out to its final and uttermost end. How this spirit is to be applied, how these principles are to be interpreted in their application to the solution of the problems of the future, both foreign and domestic, will be the subject for consideration in the next two of these lectures.

LECTURE VIII

AMERICAN DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

IN preceding lectures I have expounded certain fundamental political principles, which in the succeeding lectures of this course I shall assume to be true. These principles may be thus rehearsed: The object of government is the protection of person, property, reputation, family, and liberty — by which last I mean the right of every individual to use his person and his property as he pleases, so long as he does not violate the rights or impair the welfare of his fellow-men. All just governments exist for the benefit of those that are governed — that is, they exist in equal measure for the protection of all these rights in all men, not for the protection of the rights of special classes more than others. That is the best government, whatever its form, which best protects person, property, reputation, family, and liberty. The ultimate government is self-government — that is, it is that state of society in which the best in each man governs the worst in each man, so that there is no longer the need that some better man outside of him shall govern him and keep him from wrongdoing. Therefore the true government, the ideal

government, while it is primarily protecting person, property, family, reputation, and liberty, also ought to be so administered as to develop in man a capacity for self-government, and thus bring about that state of society in which every man shall govern himself, and there shall be no need of external government over him.

This development of character is accomplished, not only by systems of education established and maintained by the state, as such systems are maintained by all free states in the measure in which they become free; but it is also accomplished by throwing on the people of each particular community the largest measure of responsibility which they are able to bear, consistently with the protection of person, property, reputation, and family. But if greater responsibility is thrown upon the people than they are able to bear, if they are not competent to protect the inherent and inalienable rights of the individual, then the government is a bad government, no matter who shares in it, no matter what its form. For the fundamental nature of government and its sole justification is that it is a mutual protection society, organized for the preservation of human rights. If it does not preserve the rights of the individual, it is a bad government; if it does protect his rights, it is a good government; if it so preserves human rights as to develop in the governed people the power to govern themselves, it is the best government. I wish in this lecture to apply these fundamental princi-

ples to certain political problems that confront us: they are five in number, — the Indian question; the negro question; the woman suffrage question; the question of the relation of the political machine to human liberty in a democratic government; and the question of the rights of the majority over the minority in a free community. This is a large theme; it can be treated only in outline.

I. When our fathers landed in this country, they found something like half a million savages roaming over it, who lived on the continent, but did not truly occupy the continent. They hunted in the woods, but felled no timber; fished in the streams, but made no mills; roamed over the prairies, but got out of them no wheat or corn of any consequence; roamed over the hills, but found not the gold, the silver, the copper, or the coal. They merely played on the surface of the continent. Our fathers landed, took possession of a little strip of land along the Atlantic coast, and began to grow — by natural increase and by immigration. At first it was a serious question whether the whites or the Indians would possess this continent. But the white race grew and the white civilization developed, and the Indians neither increased in numbers nor improved in capacity. Wars ensued; sometimes the Indian was the aggressor, sometimes the white man; but the Indian was always, sooner or later, defeated. At the end of every war was a treaty; a new boundary line was laid down; and the white man said, "We will

keep on this side, you shall keep on that." But the white race grew, and the Indian race did not grow, and the boundary line was pushed steadily westward. At last the result of all these years of conflict and struggle was the reservation of certain territories for the Indians, where they might hunt and fish, and leave the forest unfelled and the prairie uncultivated, the hills unmined, and the rivers to flow unvexed to the sea. These districts are called "reservations," because they are reserved, not for Indians merely, not for barbarians merely, but for barbarism. Barbarians have rights which civilized folk are bound to respect; but barbarism has no rights which civilization is bound to respect. In the history of the human race nothing is more certain than that civilization must conquer and barbarism must be subdued.

When two forms of civilization come in conflict, a higher and a lower, one of three results inevitably ensues. The higher civilization may destroy the lower and extirpate the barbarians, as the Hebrews did the Canaanites; the higher civilization may subjugate the lower and hold it under control, as we held the African race in this country, and as England is now holding the Hindu race in India; or the higher civilization may pervade the lower, convert and transform it, and so make it over, as primitive Christianity did imperial Rome. One of these three results is certain to ensue — extirpation, subjugation, or transformation. In this country we have tried to avoid

that inevitable, eternal, inflexible law of God; we have tried so to fence around the Indian civilization (which is barbarism) that it should remain permanently in this country alongside with the higher civilization. And this cannot be done.

It cannot be done because it ought not to be done. It ought not to be possible for a civilized nation to leave in its territory its great forests unfelled that would make houses, its great mines undug that would furnish tools, its great prairies uncultivated that would furnish food, its great rivers unharnessed that would grind out grists for civilized people. It ought not to be possible to put a fence around a particular people and leave them uncivilized.

What is a reservation? It is a yard of a great many thousand acres in extent, with an imaginary but very effective wall built about it. Within that yard barbarism is sacred. The Indian can own no land within the reservation, and he cannot go out of the reservation to seek the benefits of civilization elsewhere. The railroad comes to the border, and stops there; the post-office, and stops; the newspaper, and stops; the telegraph, and stops. Commerce, trade, the market—all stop. The Indian is left without that play of life which makes us what we are. For character is not only produced by those institutions which are organized for that specific purpose, but by all the activities of human life. A telegraph will teach men conciseness in language as no professor can teach it. A savings bank will teach thrift as no preacher in

the pulpit can teach it. A railroad in a community will teach promptness as a church will not teach it; for if we get to the railroad late the train is gone, but if we get to the church late the sermon is still there.

All this play of life, that makes us what we are, we have shut out from the reservation, and then we have wondered that the Indian did not grow! Suppose we had pursued the same course respecting our immigrant population — suppose all the Italians had been put in one reservation by themselves, all the Hungarians in another, and all the Irish in a third — how long would they have lived in these reservations, without a market, without commerce, without industry, and supported by rations given them by the government, before they would have become self-respecting, self-supporting, self-governing American citizens?

Our Indian problem is to be solved by the same process by which we have solved our immigrant problem. The imaginary wall around every reservation ought to be taken down. The land which has been held in trust for the Indian should be given him, that he may own it absolutely, as we own ours. He should be as free to seek an open market as any American. He should have a right to appeal to the courts for the protection of his rights, as have all other Americans, and he should be made amenable to the courts for his violation of law, as are all other Americans. He should be protected in his right to go where he will and do

what he will, provided he does not will to wrong his fellow men. In brief, he should be treated, not as an Indian, but as a man—thrown upon his own resources, given the protection to person, property, family, and reputation which it is the function of government to give to all who are subject to it, and left at liberty to use his person and his property as he chooses, provided he does not so use it as to injure his neighbor. If it be said that he is a child, and that if he is free to sell or lease his property it will be expended in drink and gambling and he will become a charge upon the community and his children will be paupers, the answer is that the law has long since found an adequate method of protecting those who are not able to protect themselves. His land should be treated as an estate given to him and to his heirs after him; he should be treated as a ward of the courts; and his alienation of his land should be permitted only upon application to the court and with adequate protection to his children. He is not to be condemned to barbarism because he is not yet equal to the competitions involved in civilization.

Will not some Indians die in the process? Yes; perhaps many. Will they not suffer in the process? Yes; perhaps much. But God's way of making men and women is through suffering and by struggle, and there is no other way. The philanthropy which would shield the Indian from all the perils of civilized life, which would keep him

in a reservation and feed him there, in the expectation of fitting him for civilization before subjecting him to its danger, is a philanthropy which imperils, undermines, dwarfs, and destroys his manhood, under the impression that it is protecting his rights and providing for his well-being.

Something of the larger and wiser policy has already been adopted. The nation some years ago resolved to make no more treaties with Indians. It has more recently abolished the reservation in many cases. And yet, in those instances where the Indian has been given his land in severalty and set to take care of himself, it has still left the agent to be his guardian, and treated him as a ward. This very session of Congress, in spite of the urgent recommendation of our Indian Commissioner, has kept in office something like a dozen or fifteen Indian agents, whose chief use is to draw their salaries for themselves, and who inflict incalculable injury on the Indian by keeping him under pupilage when he should be thrown into the struggle of life, that out of the struggle he may come forth a man.

II. The race problem at the South is more complicated and more difficult, but it is to be solved by the same fundamental principle. At the end of the Civil War our fathers were confronted with a very difficult problem. What should they do? Should they give the ballot back into the hand of the ex-slaveholder who had been in rebellion against the national government, and leave the

destinies of the Southern states in his hands? This was perilous to national interests, and they believed it would be perilous to the rights of the negro race. There was current talk in the Southern states at the time of establishing some system of serfdom to take the place of slavery. Should they put the political power into the hands of the Union men? They were hard to find; and when they had been found, conferring political power upon them and depriving all others of it would have been to create an insignificant and not very intelligent oligarchy. Should they control this conquered territory from Washington by imperial administration? The nation had no gifts for imperial administration and no desire for imperial administration, and our fathers justly feared the effects on the nation as well as on the conquered country. The experiment which we finally resolved to try was this: they established universal suffrage, gave the political power equally to blacks and whites, ignorant and educated, thrifty and thriftless, and said to them, "Take care of yourselves." At the same time they intimated, through many a hot political debate and many a public utterance in press and platform, a profound distrust of the Southern people in general, and a profound distrust of their good will and fair treatment toward the negro race who lived among them. Thus, on the one hand they showed a strange and extraordinary confidence in the black race, and a not so strange but equally marked distrust of the white race.

The confidence and the distrust have alike been proved erroneous. It is not necessary for me to trace here the results of the carpet-bag rule in the South, growing out of negro domination. The facts are fresh in the recollection of most of us. The page is a dark, even a terrible one, and there is little inclination on any of our parts to re-read it. That era of despotism, of corruption, of evil, was introduced and carried on for a time. Under that government of ignorance, incompetence, and corruption the fundamental function of government was not fulfilled; persons were not protected, property was not protected, the family was not protected, reputation was not protected. The ends of government were for the time lost sight of; the object of government was not accomplished.

Our distrust of the white man in the South has also been proved false. He has shown himself the friend of the slave who used to work in his home and on his farm. We may well be proud of the nation's record since the close of the Civil War. A great stream of beneficence has flowed from Northern churches and Northern philanthropists into the South to establish and maintain schools for the negro race. But it has been insignificant in comparison with the record which the South has made by its gifts to Southern education. Forty million dollars a year, Marian L. Dawson tells us in the last number of the "North American Review,"¹ are spent by the Southern states

¹ For February, 1901.

for education; one thirtieth of it contributed by the negroes, nearly one half of it given to the negroes.¹ We may search the pages of human history in vain for a parallel; a community of ex-slaveholders, whose slave system compelled the keeping of their slaves in ignorance, have suddenly reversed all their precedent history, and out of their poverty have contributed with such largeness of generosity for the education of those whom, a little while before, it was a penal offense to instruct.

The solution of the race problem in the South is a reversal, on the one hand, of the unreasonable confidence, and the reversal, on the other hand, of the unreasonable distrust. It is a mistake to suppose that every man has a right to vote in any community. It is a still greater mistake to suppose that a people who have never learned how to govern themselves can suddenly, by an act of Congress, be empowered with capacity to govern a great Republic. This was our mistake — forced upon us, indeed, by alternatives that might have brought us into equal disaster had we followed them; but none the less a real and serious mistake; a mistake on which perhaps I should not lay stress now, were there not many who are urging us to fall into the same mistake in new conditions and under

¹ Since the Civil War it is estimated that about thirty million dollars have been expended by the North in missionary and educational work among the negroes of the South, and one hundred and twenty million dollars have been raised by taxation chiefly from the Southern whites for the education of the negroes.

new circumstances.¹ We are now beginning to learn that a people who had behind them three centuries of slavery in the United States, and unnumbered centuries of barbarism in Africa, could not become suddenly competent to take equal share in government with a race who had been educated by centuries of struggle in England, followed by years of equally trying struggle in the United States, who had written with their own hands, by pens dipped in their own blood, the Magna Charta, the Constitutions of Clarendon, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of the United States. The power of a community to govern itself depends on the power of the individuals in that community to govern themselves. Before a community can be self-governing, there must be a background of history or at least a contemporaneous and adequate method of education.

The South found a condition of society intolerable in which the bottom controlled the top. So did France after the French Revolution; so would Hayti if there were any top to be controlled. The South has endeavored to reverse the conditions and put the top of society at the head of government and the bottom of society under government. I do not justify the violence and the frauds by which that has been attempted; I do not justify the process. But the South is right and deserves

¹ The perils of this mistake are being illustrated, as this lecture is revised for the press, by the results of an almost unqualified suffrage in Hawaii.

our sympathy and our support in its supreme desire to have the intellect and the conscience rule. What we have a right to demand of the South is this — that the line shall not be a color line or a race line, but a line of character; that an educated and cultivated Booker T. Washington shall not be turned from the polls because his face is black, while an ignorant, incompetent, drunken white man is permitted to cast his vote because his face is white. Our problem in the North is not to withstand the South and be reluctantly forced back, little by little, to acquiesce in a system which gives the power of governing to those who are competent to govern, but to offer the open hand of cordial fellowship to Southern reformers, and say to them, We will help you in securing for your states government that will protect person and property and reputation and family and liberty. We have a right to demand that this shall be done for the negro and for the white man; and, on the whole, it is done. The person and property, the life and liberty, the family and reputation, of the negro are in the main protected in the Southern states. If they were not, the results could not have been secured which are secured. Says Marian L. Dawson in the article already quoted from: —

In the South all trades are open to them, and they receive every encouragement to become proficient in industrial arts. A large number of negroes have eagerly taken advantage of these opportunities, and have made unprecedented progress in bettering their condition in

every way. They have amassed in one state property, the assessed value of which is nearly thirty millions of dollars, and it is estimated that they own, all told, about three hundred million dollars' worth of personal and real estate. They have their own doctors, lawyers, and preachers; they have colleges and universities, and they own military companies.¹

A community in which it is possible for a race to accumulate, from a condition of absolute poverty, three hundred millions of dollars of personal and real estate is not a community which has signally failed in protecting the rights of person and property. I know the tragic story of lynch law. Who has not been horrified by this recrudescence of barbarism? But let us be just; it is not distinctively Southern. When negroes are mobbed in Ohio and in Kansas, when lynch law is executed in Indiana, in Colorado, and in

¹ The following statistics have been made up from the Report of the Auditor of the state of Virginia for 1900, and apply only to the country landholdings, not to town lots:—

1. The negroes now own one twenty-sixth of all the land in Virginia.
2. They own a little over one sixteenth of all the land in Virginia, east of the Blue Ridge.
3. They own about one tenth of all the land in twenty-five counties in the state.
4. They own one sixth of Middlesex County.
5. They own about one fourth of Hanover County.
6. They own about one eighth of Charles City County.
7. The negroes acquired land from 1895 to 1898 at the rate of over fifty-two thousand acres a year.

In addition it may be said that the landholdings of the negroes in the state have increased one third in the last six years.

Montana, as well as in Mississippi and Alabama and Kentucky; when even the women become lynchers, destroying saloons in Kansas with some sort of excuse, and drug-stores in Chicago without any excuse at all, let us recognize the fact that lynch law is not distinctively Southern. We may not have as large a beam in our eye as our neighbor, but it will be well to remember that we need, as well as he, to submit to a surgical operation.

It is true that the Southerner does not grant to the negro what we call social equality. He does not invite him into his parlor, ask him to sit at his table, introduce him as a friend to his wife and children, or even allow the children of the two races to attend the same school. How much of this is due to unjust and unreasonable prejudice, how much of it is nature's own protection against a too intimate intermingling of the races, it is not necessary here to discuss; because it is not the function of government to protect social privileges. The function of government is fulfilled when the rights of person, of property, of reputation, and of the family, and the liberty that results therefrom, are maintained. It has nothing to do with purely social relations. It is the right of each individual to choose social companions for himself and for his children. Whatever there may be of race prejudice in the South is to be removed, if removed at all, by the gradual, pervasive influence of teaching, not by the power of government. Social prejudice presents a moral, not a political problem.

III. Ought women to vote?

As we have already seen, no one has by nature a right to vote in any government. The right to vote is an artificial right, created by the community, defined, limited, and determined by the community. We talk of universal suffrage, but we do not have it. In the last presidential election, out of seventy-five million people, fourteen million voted. Women do not vote; nor aliens; nor non-residents, although they may be taxed in the district; nor men under twenty-one years of age. The conditions under which one may vote are determined by the state in which he resides, and they differ in different states. Sometimes an educational qualification is attached, sometimes a property qualification; in the early colonies a religious qualification was sometimes attached.. There is no natural right of suffrage. The question is not, therefore, Has woman a right to vote as she has a right to the protection of her person, her property, her family, and her reputation? The real question is twofold: Is it necessary for the protection of her rights that she should vote? If not, is it for the interest of the community that the suffrage should be multiplied by two?

Democracy does not demand that every one should vote; it only demands that every class shall be represented in the voting. It is undemocratic that there should be a certain portion of the community set apart by itself, without political representation in the community. Is woman, then,

a class, so that she can be set apart by herself? Has she interests distinct from those of the husband or the brother or the father? Are her rights to person and property violated under the system in which she is not a voter? The simple answer to this is the history of the last fifty years, in which all the progress, in the way of opening vocations, protecting property rights, enlarging liberty for women, has been wrought out by manhood suffrage. . Jeremy Bentham said, many years ago, that it could be trusted to the fathers to protect the rights of the children. So history shows us that the personal and property rights of women can safely be intrusted to the rest of the community.

The other question which presents itself, at least to men, is this: Shall the duty of voting be imposed on women? For thus far nothing is more clear than that in most communities the majority of women do not wish to vote. They regard it as an irksome duty, if it be a duty at all. They desire to be excused from it, or they are absolutely indifferent to it. Nevertheless, if they can be convinced that it is their duty, no doubt they would, with whatever reluctance, assume it. For it may be safely taken for granted that if the women of the country ever conclude that it is their duty to vote, the men will give them the suffrage. The question is, then, really one to be answered by the women themselves. Is it the duty of women to assume the responsibility of suffrage in a free state?

What is the function of government? It is the function of government to protect person, property, family, reputation, liberty. The function of government is protection — of the community against foreign foes, of the individual against domestic wrong-doers. The ballot is not merely an expression of judgment, it is an expression of the will. It says, Thou shalt, or Thou shalt not. This Thou shalt or Thou shalt not is said in order that society as a whole and each individual in society may be protected in carrying on the essential functions of life. Of these functions the most important is the rearing and training of children. Apparently it is for this preparatory work for some other life, we know not what, that we are put into the world. Children are given to the parents. They grow up to manhood, marry, and receive for training other children. The grandparents, in the order of nature, remain for a few years upon the earth, years of rest after the life-work is largely done, and then depart, leaving their successors to do in turn what they have done. Hitherto the functions have been divided between the sexes, in the family, which is the first and fundamental organism, the one on which all other social organization is based. The father has been the breadwinner and the protector; the mother has at home nurtured and trained the children. If now she must become breadwinner and protector, if she must support the home and protect the home, either he must share with her in the duties of the

home-stayer, and so each must fulfill a double function, or she must double her duties while he adds none to his. This is the answer to the question, Ought women to vote? Suffrage is not woman's natural right, for suffrage is never a natural right. Suffrage is not woman's necessity, for her rights have been and will be adequately protected without her suffrage; the chivalry of man furnishes a better protection than would his submission to her commands issued through the ballot-box — such submission is very problematical. Suffrage is not woman's duty, for it is not the duty of woman to act as the protector of the natural rights of man, and the ballot is, in the last analysis, nothing but a means of protection; as government is, in the last analysis, nothing but a mutually protective society. There is no duty of suffrage resting on women, because it is not the duty of woman to be the protector of person, property, reputation, family. There is no right, because rights are only co-relative terms for duties. There is no need to multiply the suffrage by two; it would be better to lessen it rather than to increase the number of voters.

IV. What are the relations of what we call the political machine to a democratic government?

We are accustomed to say that we elect, that is, choose, our officers; but that is a mistake. Originally the fathers proposed that we should elect a certain number of presidential electors; these electors were to gather together at Washington,

or in their several states, and determine who should be our President. We think we have abolished the electoral college. No, we have substituted another electoral college. No one supposes that the convention that met at Philadelphia nominated Mr. McKinley. We all knew that Mr. McKinley was selected before the convention met. No one supposes that the convention which gathered at Kansas City selected Mr. Bryan; we all knew that Mr. Bryan had been selected before the convention met. A small body of gentlemen, more or less intelligent, patriotic, disinterested — if you please, the ablest, the most patriotic, the most disinterested men in the country; for their personal or political character has nothing to do with the method of nomination — met together and decided that Mr. McKinley was the man the Republican party should nominate for President. Another small body of men similarly selected Mr. Bryan for the Democratic candidate. The one body of men organized primaries, out of which grew the one convention which came together ready to shout itself hoarse when Mr. McKinley was proposed; the other body of men organized primaries, out of which grew another great convention which came together ready to shout itself hoarse when Mr. Bryan was proposed. Then the people went to the polls; if a voter did not like Mr. McKinley, he could vote for Mr. Bryan; if he did not like Mr. Bryan, he could vote for Mr. McKinley; and if he did not like either Mr.

McKinley or Mr. Bryan, he could vote for Mr. Debs. In point of fact, in state and nation, our officers are primarily selected for us by a small, self-appointed committee, and the people at the polls exercise a veto power over their selection.

This is partly the result of having an ignorant and an uninterested voting population. A great body of voters who either do not know or do not much care about candidates, and do not know or do not much care about political questions, will necessarily follow a leader or leaders, whoever the leaders may be, and will do whatever the leaders tell them to do. Universal suffrage, if it is exercised by men who are either ignorant or indifferent respecting political principles and political duties, necessarily means government by an irresponsible oligarchy; though the majority have this recourse, that they can, whenever they please, turn the oligarchy out of office, when a new and sometimes better oligarchy takes its place. This is called overturning the machine. In short, the actual results of democratic institutions do not justify the very optimistic expectations of Jeremy Bentham as Mr. Leslie Stephen has interpreted them to us in his admirable volumes on "The English Utilitarians."

There are two primary principles: the "self-preference" principle, in virtue of which every man always desires his own greatest happiness; and the "greatest happiness" principle, in virtue of which "the right and proper end" of government is the "greatest happiness to

the greatest number." The "actual end of every government, again, is the greatest happiness of the governors." Hence, the whole problem is to produce a coincidence of the two ends, by securing an identity of interest between governors and governed. To secure that we have only to identify the two classes, or to put the government in the hands of all. In a monarchy the ruler aims at the interest of one — himself; in a "limited monarchy" the aim is at the happiness of the king and the small privileged class; in a democracy the end is the right one — the greatest happiness of the greatest number. . . . The people will naturally choose "morally apt agents," and men who wish to be chosen will desire truly to become "morally apt," for they can only recommend themselves by showing their desire to serve the general interest. "All experience testifies to this theory," though the evidence is "too bulky" to be given. Other proofs, however, may at once be rendered superfluous by appealing to "the uninterrupted and most notorious experience of the United States."¹

There are three answers to this very optimistic argument: the first is Senator Clark, of Montana; the second is Senator Quay, of Pennsylvania; the third is Richard Croker, of New York.

What we have to do is, in the first place, to diminish the ignorant, the uninterested and careless class of voters; in the second place, to increase the power of the interested and thoughtful class of voters. The first is to be accomplished, not by a formal educational or property qualification,

¹ Leslie Stephen: *The English Utilitarians*, i., Jeremy Bentham, pp. 284-286.

because the formal property qualification is liable to develop a class which cares more for property than it does for fundamental principles, and because a formal educational qualification is always liable to be misused and misconstrued. Make it a rule that a man must read the Constitution of the United States in order to vote, and the judges of elections will be rigid in their interpretation of the intellectual qualifications of one party, and lax in their interpretation of another. Add the provision that he must also understand the Constitution, and Democratic judges will be sure to think that a Republican voter does not understand, and Republican judges will be sure to think that a Democratic voter does not understand. What is needed is an automatically working ballot which will not only compel thought but also consideration and interest — which will not only exclude the ignorant, but also the careless voter. In Maryland to-day there is a proposal pending for the use of an Australian ballot without any party emblems upon it.¹ Simply the names of the men to be voted for are upon the ticket. The man who cannot read the name cannot vote the ticket, for he will not know for whom he is voting. The man who does not care enough about politics to inquire about the candidates cannot vote, for he will have

¹ This has been adopted since this lecture was given, and it is reported that the adoption of this ballot has already caused the opening of night-schools to teach illiterate voters to read, that they may not be excluded from the polls.

no emblem to guide him. A ticket so constructed that every man who votes it must know who the men are whose names are on the ticket, and what they represent, would automatically exclude from the polls a large proportion of those who are careless voters, and practically all absolutely ignorant voters. This is the advantage of the Australian ballot, and I have no wish to see it supplemented by any such provision as that in New York state, which allows to the man who declares that he cannot read and write permission to take a political friend with him to show him how to read and how to mark his ballot.

The other remedy is to increase the power of the careful and interested voters; and this is to be done by enabling them to nominate as well as to elect their officers. This nomination of officers is to be brought about by what is known as the direct primary.

It is idle to tell busy men that they ought to go to the primaries: idle because they are busy men; idle because politics takes all the time they can now give to it out of their business and personal affairs; idle because, when they get to the primary, they find a slate made up for them for which they must vote, or vote in solitary grandeur against it. There may be exceptions, but, generally speaking, the primary as at present conducted is a contrivance for enabling a few men to determine for whom the many may vote.

The direct primary does away with such prima-

ries and with the delegate conventions which grow out of them. On certain conditions prescribed by the law, any person may announce himself, or be announced, as a candidate for any office. On the day of registration every voter, when he registers, drops a ballot in the box which indicates whom he elects to be the candidate of his party. The person receiving the greatest number of Republican votes becomes the Republican candidate, the person receiving the greatest number of Democratic votes becomes the Democratic candidate; the same principle applies to the candidates of other parties, including any who choose to regard themselves as Independents. The best way to indicate both the method and its results is to give a concrete illustration of its operation in a single instance.

“The direct method of voting at primaries was first adopted by the Republican party in this county in 1897. It is called the Crawford County system, deriving its name from the county first to adopt it. Any member of the Republican party, by registering his name with the Republican county committee, can become a candidate for the nomination for any office he may elect. All the members of the party, on a day stated, vote, as in elections, directly for the man of their choice. There are often as many as five or seven candidates for the same nomination. The ones receiving the highest number of votes for the different offices are declared to be the nominees of the party. Under the delegate system an aspirant for

political office secured the consent of the boss. Under the present system this would injure the candidate's chances of success. Under the delegate system the consent of the boss was given in return for contributions assessed according to the emoluments of the respective offices. The money thus pooled was used in buying the votes of a sufficient number of the delegates to control the convention. These delegates were chosen by about one fifth the entire vote of the party. How vicious, corrupt, and oligarchal this system had become is illustrated by an editorial in the Scranton 'Truth' of September 8, 1897, immediately after the last of the conventions, reporting that the price of a delegate was in the neighborhood of two hundred dollars, and that something like twenty thousand dollars had been spent in controlling the convention."¹

The writer from whose report this account is taken is authority for the statement that the nomination of Captain James Moir, as Mayor, by the direct primary system cost him \$98.50, and he adds that "the greatest compliment that can be paid him is that he is the kind of a man who could never have been nominated under the old system." In the primary election by which he was nominated 7000 votes were cast; in South Carolina, out of 120,000 possible white voters, over 90,000 participated in a direct primary for Governor. These

¹ Letter of Mr. Arthur Dunn, of Scranton, Pa., quoted in *The Outlook* of December 8, 1900, pp. 861, 862.

facts indicate the three advantages of the direct primary: first, the number of voters who participate in it; second, the removal of temptation to bribery by the removal of the necessity for it; third, the improvement in the character of candidates, who are willing to accept a nomination spontaneously given by all the people, but are not willing to enter into competition for a nomination by a committee of professional politicians.

The evils of democracy are mostly due to corruptions or adulterations of democracy; the general remedy for the evils of democracy is more democracy. Democracy does not mean merely universal suffrage; it means the universal exercise of judgment, conscience, and common sense by every man in the community. We have not given a fair trial to democracy until every member of the community is brought to exercise and act upon his own judgment, not merely to ratify and confirm the judgment of another. A ballot which automatically excludes the ignorant and the indifferent voter, and a direct primary which enables all voters who are not ignorant and indifferent to participate in the nomination of candidates, will not constitute a panacea nor exclude all corrupt or inefficient officials from the Republic, but, by decreasing the power of the ignorant and the indifferent, and increasing the power of the intelligent and the interested, such a system will do much to overthrow the oligarchy which now too often wears the democratic mask, and pretends to be the ser-

vant while it is really the master or "boss" of the people.

V. What are the rights of a minority in a democratic state?

The theory of paternalism in government is simple of statement though difficult of application. The father is not merely the guardian of his children, he is their guide, their superior, their law-giver, in a word, their final authority. To them he is taste, judgment, conscience. "Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right," says Paul. That is, this is the children's righteousness. In the early days of childhood this authority of the father is necessarily exercised in every department of life and over every act. The father determines what shall be the food and the clothing; he regulates the hours of sleep, of play, of study; he decides whether the child shall go to school, to what school, and during what hours; whether the child shall go to church, to what church, and on what occasions. He takes the child's earnings, if he earns anything, and directs their expenditure. He is not merely a protector of the child from the wrongs of others, but is the child's supreme arbiter in every question of life. Only gradually, as the child comes into the possession of a taste, a judgment, and a conscience of its own, is he set free from this supreme and pervasive authority of his father.

In a paternal government this principle is more or less consistently applied, whether the govern-

ment be monarchic, oligarchic, or aristocratic. It is assumed that one or a few men of superior wisdom and superior righteousness should direct the destinies of the community and its members. This paternal government therefore decides what the people may eat and what they may wear; it regulates the cost and character of the garments permitted to different classes; it decides what their worship shall be; it establishes one church by law and prohibits another; it fixes the limits allowable in education, and determines what shall be both the minimum and the maximum for the pupils; it regulates the hours of industry for the laborer, and the wages which he may receive; it leaves in the hands of the common people barely enough money for their subsistence, and spends the rest, theoretically for the benefit of the entire community; it subsidizes theatres, pensions authors, promotes one trade, discourages or prohibits another trade. In all this it is assumed that the government has the superior wisdom of the father, and that the people are children. It was demonstrated in the French Revolution that this paternal despotism may be exercised as despotically by a majority in a nominally democratic community as by a monarchy or an aristocracy. The Jacobin programme required dealers in grain to offer the grain publicly for sale, to bring it every week to market, to keep no more on hand than was needed for personal subsistence, to sell at the price fixed by the state; to go on with their business at this price,

whatever peril of bankruptcy might be imminent by reason of their conformity to the standard; and all these laws were enforced by the death penalty. In a similar spirit it took charge of the education of the children, determined the curriculum, required all teaching to conform to the Revolutionary morality, and its representative thinkers affirmed that all ought, "under the sacred law of equality, to receive the same clothing, the same food, the same education, the same attention." M. Taine has set forth with great specification these characteristics of the Jacobin programme in his work on the French Revolution.

But we have seen that democracy, at least American democracy, is in theory wholly inconsistent with this theory of paternalism. It assumes, not that every sane man is competent to take care of his own interests, but that it is safer to intrust them to him than to any guardian. It similarly assumes that the people of each locality are better able to take care of their own local interests than are those of any other locality. It thus denies the postulate of paternalism that one man, or class of men, is possessed of a superior intelligence or virtue which fits him to provide for the interests and to control the conduct of other men or classes of men. There is some reason for the assumption that a king, an oligarchy, or an aristocracy especially selected may be more competent to regulate the affairs of the mass of the community than they are to regulate their own affairs, as the father is

more competent to regulate the life of his child than the child is to regulate his own life; but there is no reason whatever for the assumption that the majority in a community are more competent to regulate the affairs of individuals than the individuals are to regulate their own affairs. Theoretically, an argument can be made for the doctrine that a king should take the earnings of his subjects and direct them to the general good of the community; but no theoretical argument can be found for the doctrine that the majority of the community should take the earnings of the individual and direct them for the general interests. Some argument can be made, theoretically, for the doctrine that a king may advantageously, by sumptuary law, regulate the attire or the food of his subjects, but none theoretically for the doctrine that a majority may, by sumptuary laws, regulate the food and attire of the individual. "Democracy," says M. Taine, "in its nature and composition, is a system in which the individual awards to his representatives the least trust and confidence; hence it is the system in which he should intrust them with the least power."¹

The history of the United States, however, illustrates the truth that democracies in America have not always recognized this principle, still less have they always consistently acted upon it. The majority has frequently assumed the functions of a paternal government, although the postulate on

¹ *The French Revolution*, iii. p. 100.

which those functions are assumed by a paternal government are wholly inconsistent with the postulate of democracy. Two instances may serve to illustrate this general fact.

At the present time (February, 1901) a serious and energetic effort is being made to pass a subsidy bill in aid of American commerce. This subsidy bill would appropriate out of the people's earnings nine millions of dollars a year, four fifths of which would be paid to four great corporations. If the expenditure were equally divided among all the voters, it would cost each voter a little over sixty cents a year. Whatever advantage America might derive through its shipping from such a subsidy, it is evident that the bill is founded upon an assumption that the majority can make better use of the sixty cents of each taxpayer for his benefit than he can make of it for himself. This sixty cents will not be paid to protect his person, his property, his reputation, his family, or his liberty. It will be paid theoretically to enhance the general prosperity of the community, practically to promote activity in a single industry, and add to the welfare of the comparatively few who are engaged in it. The few who will divide the nine millions of dollars a year between them are greatly interested in securing the passage of such a bill. The many who will contribute each a comparatively insignificant sum toward the nine millions of dollars a year are not greatly interested in defeating it. Thus, such legislation, through the concen-

trated and active interest of the few, outweighing the comparatively insignificant interest and comparatively practical indifference of the many, is very apt to succeed in a democratic government; but it is based upon the notion that the representatives of all the people are better able to judge what is the pecuniary interest of each of the people than each individual is to judge for himself. The subsidizing of ships belongs with a system which gives pensions to authors and newspapers, subsidies to theatres, tithes to churches and ministers. It does not belong to a system in which the recognized function of government is the function of protection, and the political assumption of the government is that every man can spend his money for himself better than government can spend it for him.

The same problem is presented by the attempted domination over the conscience of the individual by the conscience of the majority. My objection to prohibitory laws is not that they cannot be enforced, but that they ought not to be enforced. A local community may legitimately agree that it will allow no sale of liquor except for medicinal purposes within its bounds. It may do this, not because even the local community has a right to determine that men shall not drink alcohol, but because the public sale of alcohol entails, in poverty, disorder, and crime, burdens upon the community against which they have a right to protect themselves, as they have a right to protect them-

selves against contagious disease. But the right of a state to prohibit all sale of liquor except for medicinal purposes presents an entirely different question. Has a rural county in Maine, which thinks the saloon is an injury, a right to prohibit the saloon to the people of Bangor or Portland, who entertain a different opinion? If so, on what is that right based? It is not based on their right to protect themselves, for drunkenness and disorder in Portland or Bangor inflicts an insignificant amount of injury upon the inhabitants of the remote rural county. It must be based on the supposed right of the majority to impose their conscience on the minority, to determine for them what is safe and right, to act toward them *in loco parentis*; and this right of the majority to act *in loco parentis* toward the minority is fundamentally antagonistic to the essential principle of a democracy, which is founded upon local self-government.

The American statute-books are full of illustrations of this attempt by the majority to act as judgment and conscience for the minority or for the individual. It is not always easy to draw the line between such legislation as is necessary for the protection of the many against the ignorance, the incompetence, or the wrong-doing of the few, and such legislation by the many as undertakes to regulate the conduct of the few in accordance with their supposed highest interest or with supposed moral laws. But the principle never can be de-

parted from by a self-governing democracy without peril of injustice, that the function of law, uttered by authority and enforced by power, is with rare if any exceptions to be confined, in a democracy, to the protection of person, property, family, reputation, and liberty; and whenever the majority, passing beyond this boundary, endeavor, from either pecuniary or conscientious motives, to regulate the expenditures or the conduct of the minority according to a standard of judgment or conscience which the majority have set up, they are acting in violation of the fundamental principle that every man is to be left free, in a self-governing community, to regulate his own conduct, provided he does not impair the rights or injure the well-being of his neighbor.

LECTURE IX

AMERICAN FOREIGN PROBLEMS

IN considering our foreign problems, I purpose to apply to the questions which confront us the principles which I have already elucidated in previous lectures in this course.

The earliest state of man is that of independence. He builds his wigwam, cultivates the soil, makes the moccasins, fashions the bow and arrows, constructs the canoe. He is carpenter, farmer, shoemaker, tailor, armorer, boat-builder. The various industries are carried on by one household, if not by one man. He is industrially independent of his fellow man. As with the individual, so with the tribe: it is both politically and industrially independent of the neighboring tribes. Peace is preserved only so long as each tribe continues upon its own territory. Encroachment upon a neighbor's territory is a signal for war. There is no commerce; exchange of industrial products is unknown. Wars between the various tribes either compel a union of tribes in one nation for purposes of offensive or defensive warfare, or result in the subjugation of one tribe by its neighbor. Thus slowly, out of wars between independent

communities, a great world-empire arises, like the Chaldæan, the Macedonian, or the Roman. But the unity of this great empire is formal rather than real. It is dependent upon one central head; it is preserved by military force. The community is heterogeneous in language, in habits, in religion, and presently it drops to pieces, as the Macedonian Empire did after the death of Alexander the Great, as the Roman Empire did by a slower process of dissolution. The formal unity has disappeared, the nations are separated again.

But they have learned in this process something of the value of unity; and now a more real, though a less apparent unity begins to appear. These independent nations are also enemies; they also fight with one another; but the end of the fighting is not subjugation, it is not absorption, it is agreement. They make treaties with one another, they come into alliances one with another — sometimes offensive, sometimes defensive, sometimes purely commercial; they are affiliated and federated in temporary relationships. Commerce — that is, the interchange of industries between these different nations — begins to appear; and this commerce binds the nations together in an invisible unity. It is less apparent, but it is more real, than that which was due to conquest. Colonization begins. This nation, sending out members from its centre into new and comparatively unoccupied countries, produces what I may call shoots of its national tree. Thus a third step in the unity of the human

race is taken; a great world-empire grows up, like that of Great Britain—initiated by force, as was the Roman Empire, centred in one head, as was the Roman Empire, but not held together by military force. With heterogeneous populations, different languages, alien religions, the communities which constitute this empire are yet bound together by a real recognition of mutual interests and by some recognition of a common purpose.

Beyond this lies a still further step toward that unity of the race which is the goal of social progress; independent states freely combining form a permanent federation. They retain local self-government for the individual state, they relinquish to the united body the administration of their common interests. Thus a great world-empire grows up, not by the subjugation of one power by another power, not by the absorption of one power by another power, but by the voluntary unity of various powers in one common organism.

All these phases of national life are to be seen to-day on the globe. Tribes independent industrially and politically, always indifferent and often hostile to one another—this is Africa. Nations each having its separate life, yet entering into occasional and temporary alliances with one another, recognizing some mutual obligations, developing something which they call international law, and finally, in our day, agreeing to the constitution of a court to which their differences shall be submitted—this is Europe. The subjugation

of foreign nations by a great central power, determined, remorseless, irresistible, moving through the centuries with unchanged purpose, accomplishing a kind of national unity through the subjugation of the inferior by the superior — this is Russia. The evolution of an empire, with branches growing out of it and correlated to it and to each other, each with independent life yet each dependent on the central organism — this is Great Britain. Federated states united in one national union, with a common judiciary, with a common parliament, and yet with individual local government — this is the United States. Except the tribal state, all of them — Russia, Europe, Great Britain, the United States — mark successive steps in the progress toward that unity of the human race which has been the ideal of poets and the vision of dreamers since the world began to think.

For a considerable time we in this country were separated from this unifying process of the nations of the world. We stood apart from all the other peoples of the globe. We were glad to do so; it was wise that we should do so. We were separated from them by three thousand miles of ocean; we were not, therefore, compelled to enter into relations with them. We had sufficient demand for all our activities in taking possession of this continent; felling the trees, opening the mines, clearing the pasture-lands, initiating and organizing our industries. We had no time to engage in

world-problems; we had no power to exert any influence on world-policies. If we entered into world-relations, we were in danger of being entangled, enmeshed, crushed. Washington gave us wise advice — to preserve as far as possible our isolation. Even this counsel was phrased with characteristic and studied moderation. “It is our true policy,” he said, “to steer clear of foreign alliances with any portion of the foreign world — so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it.”¹

But for a hundred years we have been steadily drawn into world-relations, and were unconscious of the process. Material civilization was annihilating distance; as with hooks of steel our continent was drawn across the ocean. Whereas in the beginning of the century it was six weeks from New York to Liverpool, to-day it is less than six days. We acquired power to speak so that we could be heard three thousand miles away. Steam and electricity annihilated the barrier of distance, and made Liverpool much nearer to New York than in the days of our fathers New York had been to Charleston. Physically, we were brought nearer. Commerce combined with invention to destroy our isolation.

Europe needed our agricultural products; we needed the products of French, German, and English industry. We began to interchange our products one with another. The interchange grew in extent and complication; we became in business

¹ Washington's *Farewell Address*.

intertwined with European nations, so intertwined that there grew upon us a consciousness that we needed a common currency, at least a common standard of values; that we must be able to measure our commercial products as England, France, Germany, measured theirs. As a people we had preferred bimetallism; we had declared our preferences in both Republican and Democratic platforms; but when we had to decide whether we would take a standard of value which we preferred, or would accept the standard of value which the nations of the earth had adopted, we decided to surrender our preference for the sake of international unity.

Closer bonds knit us to Europe: immigrants had come from the Old World, leaving their kinsfolk there, and thus as a nation we came to be united to European countries by innumerable letters, and by all that those letters signified — common hopes, anticipations, affections. Love is stronger than commerce; and love began to bind the New World to the Old. Not the English alone are our kin across the sea; Scandinavian, German, Hungarian, Italian, Pole — they are all kinsfolk of America. It is said that there are more German dialects spoken in New York city than in any city in Germany; and it is not improbable that there is more political power exercised by Irishmen in New York city than in any city in Ireland. Thus, by kinship, by commerce, by propinquity, we have become attached and our

life has become interwoven with the life of the Old World. Meanwhile the Old World has been learning something from us. The fundamental republican principle that government exists for the benefit of the governed has been adopted by European governments which did not recognize it a hundred years ago. It is theoretically accepted to-day as the basis of government by all the nations of Christendom. The radicalism of the Declaration of Independence has become the commonplace of the statesmen of western Europe.

While this fivefold process was going on, we were unconscious of it. Men are generally unconscious of their growth. The boy grows to manhood, and neither he nor his father knows that he is a man, until some sudden exigency arises, some responsibility is thrown upon him, some duty is unexpectedly thrust upon his shoulders, and—behold! yesterday he was a boy, to-day he is a man. We had heard the story of cruel outrage across the sea. We had read with hot hearts the story of Armenian massacres; we had wondered that European powers did not interfere with the independence of Turkey and stop the cruel wrong; we had wondered that England did not throw down the gauntlet of defiance to Turkey and take up the cause of oppressed Armenia and come to her rescue. We said so in the press, in the pulpit, on the public platform, and in many a private conversation. We can generally see the defects in another more easily than in ourselves,

the duty before another more easily than the duty before ourselves. The right, the duty, of a strong nation to interfere for the protection of a weak, oppressed, and suffering people burned itself into the heart of America, through the story of Armenian outrages. Then suddenly we were awakened to the fact that outrages quite as great were being perpetrated at our very door. A missionary who went through the horrors of Armenia, and afterwards went to Cuba, said to me personally, "There was nothing so bad in Armenia as the effects of the reconcentrado policy in Cuba." We had learned in another school and concerning another nation that no nation liveth unto itself and no nation dieth unto itself; we had learned in another school and by the observation of another nation that there is a duty of the strong to protect the weak. When at last the blowing up of the *Maine* seemed to the people as a challenge of defiance, they grew weary of the delays of diplomacy, demanded instant justice, and rushed, perhaps too precipitately, into war.

The moment we did so we found we could not love the neighbor at our door without becoming entangled in European politics. We were at war with a European nation, and that involved us in diplomatic difficulties with other European nations. France had large financial interests in Spain; we must avoid war with France. German absolutism was inclined to sympathize with Spain and to fear the growing power of this young re-

public; we must appeal to popular sentiment in Germany lest the imperial authority in Germany should be exercised against us. We remembered that Spain was a Roman Catholic country, and we feared — though, as events turned out, without cause — that the Pope of Rome would interfere on behalf of Spain and against the United States. We were entangled in European diplomacy as well as engaged in a European war; and we found that we needed, and were glad to welcome, all the moral support, all the practical aid, which could be secured by an informal and unphrased alliance with our kinsmen across the sea in Great Britain.

The war came to its end. What followed? Our men were sent abroad to Paris, to carry on their negotiations, in the Old World with the Old World power, for the settlement of a new treaty between the old empire and the young republic. Our representatives were there in Europe, deciding our destiny and the destiny of a dependent people. We had learned from the voyage of the Oregon that we could not longer delay the construction of an interoceanic canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and we must enter into negotiations with Great Britain to modify if not to set aside the treaty previously made, in order that we might have a free hand for the construction of the Nicaragua Canal. We found ourselves made responsible by the fate of war for law, for order, for the protection of persons and property, in the Philippine Archipelago, on the other side of the

globe; and we must fulfill that obligation. Almost simultaneously with the close of the war, a sudden and violent outbreak took place in China; our property was destroyed, our citizens were put to death, and our national representatives were besieged in the capital of China, and their lives depended on our intervention. Our diplomacy led the way, our soldiers marched side by side with French and German and Russian and Japanese soldiers, for the relief of the beleaguered representatives of the great nations of the world—for the punishment of offenders, for the restoration of order.

This, rapidly sketched, is the history of the past four years. This, rapidly sketched, is the outcome of the longer history of the past hundred years. Whether we like it or not, we are in the world. We can no more return to the old policy of isolation than we can return to be but thirteen colonies along the Atlantic coast. We can no more separate ourselves from the destinies, the interests, the life of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Great Britain than we can fly to Mars that we may keep ourselves apart from the globe on which we live. When the boy has grown to be a man, he cannot be thrust back into the cradle again. Occasionally the old man says, "I wish I were a boy again," or listens with romantic pleasure to the song, "Rock me to sleep, mother." But we are not boys, and mother does not rock us to sleep. We are men; and when the boy becomes

a man, whether he likes it or not, he must face the responsibilities of manhood, and with courage must enter upon their fulfillment. When a nation has emerged from its period of isolation, when by the history of the past it has been brought into a fellowship with other nations, when, looking back upon its hundred years of history, it sees that the very object of events, and of Him who rules in all history, is to break down barriers and bring all nations together in one great brotherhood, it is idle to say, "Let us go back to be as we were, let us resume our isolation, let us in our manhood be governed by the counsels that belong to our babyhood."

If one ventures to speak of manifest destiny, he is scoffed at. "There is no destiny," we are told, "which we do not make ourselves. Our nation is what we compel it to be." We are told that we are fatalists, and are attempting to revive the ancient notion of Greece that life is determined by an irresistible fate outside humanity. If, then, we speak of Providence, and say that God has opened a great door before us and laid upon us a great duty, again we are scoffed at. "Who are you," we are asked, "that undertake to interpret the ways of Providence to men, and tell us glibly what God means and does not mean?" I accept the issue thus presented. I believe heartily and profoundly in manifest destiny; heartily and profoundly in a Providence that directs us in ways we know not of. The destiny of no individual is

determined by himself; the destiny of no nation is determined by the aggregate of the human wills that make up the nation. “There ’s a divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them as we will.” We live in history as we live upon this globe. Travel north or south, east or west; plant corn or wheat or what we will; live in Europe or America — however we travel, whatever we do, wherever we live, we are going round with incredible speed in the world’s orbit, whether we will or whether we will not. Our wills have absolutely nothing to do with it. We can understand what changes from day to night, and from summer to winter, the revolutions of the globe bring, and we can adapt our actions to them, but those changes we cannot modify. So we are a part of the great movements of history; we do not make them; they are made by a power greater than our own; we may call it manifest destiny, or Providence, or God — call it what we will, it exists. It is for us to understand, to interpret, and to conform our lives to its commands. Christ rebuked the Pharisees because they did not discern the signs of the times; it is our function to study the signs of the times, and understand what the Lord God Almighty means by human history, that we may work with him and not against him, and not think we are setting the world back in its orbit because we are traveling in the opposite direction to that in which the world is going.

What is it that history makes clear? What as to the duty of this nation? Anything? We have

seen that for eighteen centuries imperialism has been decaying and democracy has been developing; we have traced the twofold progress, of decay and of development, — in government, industry, education, and religion; we have seen that what we call Anglo-Saxon civilization has its roots in the Hebraic Commonwealth and its life in the principle that the world is for the all, not for the few; we have seen that the Anglo-Saxon race have apprehended and appreciated this principle more fully and embodied it in their institutions more thoroughly than any other race; we have seen that it involves not merely a national but an international unity as a preparation for and a prophecy of the brotherhood of the whole human race; and we have seen that this international unity, this combination of union with that self-government which is the ultimate goal of social progress, is further advanced toward its ideal in the United States of America than in any other form of world-empire. What does all this mean but that the Anglo-Saxon race is to act as a leader, and in the Anglo-Saxon race the United States of America is to take no inferior place in leadership, toward that brotherhood of man founded on justice and liberty which is the kingdom of God?

The duty thus devolving upon this country is emphasized by the issue that confronts us in the future. The old struggle has been between Roman civilization and Hebraic liberty. The new struggle is to be between Slav civilization and the He-

braic liberty. This truth has been so well put by another writer, and one whom no one will accuse of being a poet guided by his imagination, that I venture to read his interpretation to you.

Of late it has dawned upon a few outreaching minds that the one formidable competitor of the liberty-loving, English-speaking people of the world is that gigantic nation of the North, whose political organization is still absolutely autocratic, and whose teeming millions of inhabitants are, for the most part, a superstitious, ignorant multitude, who bow to authority with unquestioning submission. The rapidity with which that nation is extending its territorial possessions and influence indicates that its statesmen are restrained by no such fears of the inherent weakness of empire as have recently been voiced within the United States. Little by little it is tightening its grasp upon the peoples of Eastern Asia ; and its purpose stands clearly revealed to extend its sovereignty and its political organization throughout at least a great part of China. Can any one look forward to the consolidation of a Russian-Chinese empire without serious misgivings as to the future of those things that we are accustomed to regard as the essentials of civilization ? Certain it is that a gigantic struggle impends between that empire and the power from which we have derived our own civilization and institutions, and which to-day is our truest friend and strongest ally. In the broad sense, there is from henceforth but one real political question before mankind. That question is : Are world politics to be dominated by English-speaking people in the interest of an English civilization, with its principles of freedom, self-government, and

opportunity for all, or by the Russian-Chinese combination, with its policy of exclusiveness, and its tradition of irresponsible authority? Let us not deceive ourselves with any notion that we can safely stand apart from this conflict.¹

To this place of leadership history with irresistible force propels us; to this place of leadership an inward force no less impels us. America is a nation of pioneers. The first colonists were pioneers: pioneers selected from these pioneers pushed out from the older colonies into the wilderness, and led the way for others to follow. Those that did follow were again the pioneers selected from the Old World, who came across to make in the New World homes for themselves and their children. They were men of hope, expectation, enterprise, energy. The men without hope, expectation, enterprise, energy, the men of dull content or more dull despair, remained, old men in the Old World. From the days of Columbus's discovery of America to the present day, this nation has been populated by the pioneers. Therefore it is that this nation has in it more energy, more enterprise, more expansive power, than any other nation on the face of the globe. This impelling power from within combines with public events propelling from without to urge the nation forward. It is idle to tell the natural leaders of great commercial enterprises that they must not send their ships across the sea, the masters of

¹ Franklin Henry Giddings: *Democracy and Empire*, pp. 288, 289.

great railroads that they must not look for a commerce from other lands, the energetic manufacturers ever looking for new worlds to conquer that they cannot manufacture for any people but Americans, the progressive American farmers that they can raise corn only for the neighbor at their doors. The world is ours. We know it, and the impelling power from within and the currents of history from the past urge us forward into world-relations. It is in vain to tell the people that the spirit of enterprise is not safe; the American courts danger. It is in vain to tell them that Americans are not competent; the ready answer is upon their lips: We can make ourselves competent, and we will. We may fail; but no fear of failure will prevent us from trying the experiment. We are a world-power; we are likely to be a leader among the world-powers. We could not help ourselves if we would; we would not help ourselves if we could.

What duty does this fact lay upon us? The duty of promoting the world's civilization. What, then, are the essentials of civilization?

The first essential of civilization is law, conformed to justice, uttered with authority, and enforced by power. Without law and obedience to law there can be no civilization. This is the first lesson to be taught the child; it is the first lesson to be taught the community. The babe is lawless; even if he is what his mother calls him, an angel, still he is a lawless angel. The first lesson he must be taught is that he is in subjection to a stronger

will. The first duty of a father or mother to the babe is to compel obedience to "Thou shalt;" the first function of the paternal prophet is to be a Moses coming down from the mountain with a Ten Commandments to the little child below. And what is true of the child is true of the child-race. It must learn obedience. There is no road to liberty excepting the road that leads through obedience to law. There is no liberty which is not founded on justice, and no justice which is not formulated and regulated by law. Law, with force behind it to compel obedience to it, is the *sine qua non* of a civilized condition.

All civilized communities have passed through this tutelage under law. Europe is a civilized continent, more so than any other of the Old World. Why? Because for centuries Europe was under Roman law, learned how to obey law, learned the sanctity and value and worth of law. Of all European countries, England leads in civilization, because, of all European countries, England learned the value and the authority of law. The Norman Conquest, with a mailed hand, compelled her to obey; the Plantagenet kings, through their judges, with sheriffs to enforce their decrees, created throughout England "common law" — that is, a law common to all England. There was no such common law in France; every province had its own law; and therefore in France a Dreyfus trial is possible — never in England. The first step in any civilizing process is to bring a lawless,

barbaric, independent people under the dominion of law; all else rests upon that. There can be neither commerce nor trade nor manufactures, unless there is law protecting persons and property. There cannot be churches nor schools nor a free press nor free speech, unless there is law protecting persons and property. Law is the foundation; all else is built upon it. Law therefore precedes, necessarily precedes, commerce, education, religion. This is the divine order: first comes Sinai, afterwards Bethlehem; the law of God must be promulgated, and a sense of the divine authority of law must be wrought into the consciousness of the Hebrew race, before they can be ready for the other message. Christ's first great public message is a message of law — the Sermon on the Mount. Throughout his ministry he "speaks with authority," and no man is allowed to call himself a disciple unless he accepts that authority with unquestioning obedience. Law is the foundation of Christianity, the foundation of religion, the foundation of civilization.

The next element in the production of civilization is trade, commerce, manufactures. So long as every man by his own handiwork produces all that he needs for himself and his family, there cannot be wealth, nor comfort, nor development of character; the individual is too busy getting his bread out of the soil; he has no opportunity for the development of character; he cannot by his independent efforts acquire enough even to make

life comfortable. There are two essentials of our industrial civilization. The first is a knowledge of nature's forces: we set them to work, and they do our drudgery for us; they grind our grist, run our trains, light our houses, manufacture our wares, and so give us time for brain and heart development. The second is the individualization of industry: one man makes shoes, a second clothes, a third books, a fourth teaches school, and all these men interchange industries one with another. This harnessing of nature to do our drudgery, coupled with this individualization of industry, it is which makes possible civilization.

Commerce cannot be carried anywhere without carrying some ills with it. The larger the life, the more the peril. But the ills that commerce carries with it are but the incident. If we ship goods to China, alcoholic liquors may also be shipped; but the liquor-shop is but a spot on the sun. I hope, indeed, the time will come when Americans will say, "As we do not allow any saloon to sell liquor to children, so we will allow no American to export liquor to a child-race;" but whether we do or not, the fundamental fact is that commerce is a life-giver. Where commerce goes, the life is larger, the comfort greater, the home better. Twenty-five years ago the wheelbarrow was the only vehicle in China; to-day they are importing bicycles and locomotives. Twenty years ago rice was almost the only staple in China; to-day we are sending over shiploads of wheat, to

supplement the rice and fill the vacant place when the rice crop fails. Commerce fills millions of mouths where philanthropy feeds but hundreds. Commerce clothes millions of the naked where philanthropy clothes but scores. Men condemn the commercial spirit of the age; if it is a spirit of greed, of spoliation, it deserves the condemnation; but the commercial spirit is not necessarily a spirit of greed or spoliation. When a nation subjugates a province, holds it under its control, taxes it, for its own benefit, as Rome taxed Palestine and as Spain taxed Cuba, it is highway robbery. When it uses its power to clutch a poorer nation by the throat and rifle its pockets, it is a highway robber and should be treated as one. But when a nation sends its wheat and corn, its locomotives and bicycles, its sewing-machines and agricultural products, to a far-distant country, and brings back some product in return, it is doing a great service. The commercial spirit is essentially a spirit of mutuality of service; for commerce is the interchange of one nation's industry with that of another, as trade is the interchange of one individual's industry with that of another.

Let us have done with the idea that material progress is inimical to human welfare, and that the opening of China and of Africa is to be looked on with suspicion because Russian, German, and American capitalists are taking advantage of it to build great railroads and establish steamship lines as profitable investments. These are the

beginnings of international unity, because these annihilate distance and make every community neighbor to every other community.

The third great factor is education, as Mr. Huxley defines it: "The instruction of the intellect in the laws of nature — under which name I include not merely things and their forces, but men and their ways; and the fashioning of the affections and of the will into an earnest and loving desire to move in harmony with these laws." When we have laid the foundations for civilization by law, established and maintained by such force as is necessary against the lawless, we must pour into the uncivilized regions the moral forces that make for civilization. We must follow the power that compels obedience with the powers that make for life. Where we have established the foundations of law, there we must see that the free press, the free school, free industry, and a free church go also. George Kennan writes that when he first went into Santiago, Cuba, there was not what could properly be called a free school in the city — not one that had a building properly constructed for it, and which was maintained at the public expense. Ecclesiastical schools there were, no doubt. But shortly after the American occupation there were seventeen schools, with nineteen hundred pupils. Under the splendid administration of General Wood, America pushed forward the forces of civilization in Cuba with the same courage with which the army pushed the forces of law and order that

laid the foundations for civilization. An English writer has said that English missions are but an attempt to convert Hindus into second-class Englishmen. If this is true of American missions, if by Christian missions we mean an attempt to make Malays and Hindus and Negroes and Indians into second-hand Puritans, the less we have of such missions the better. On the other hand, if we have a living faith in one God, the Father of the human race, revealed to us through Jesus Christ his Son; if we have faith in love as the law of life, in love as the disposition of God, in love as the ideal of existence; if Christianity means to live and to love; if it means to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with God—it would be the lasting disgrace of Christian men and women if in this hour, when the world is opening to us, and law is being established where law never was known before, and commerce, white-winged, is going where commerce never went before, Christian men and women had no message, or no courage to send their message, to the half-emancipated children of the just opened wildernesses.

Without these three elements, law, commerce, and education, no community is civilized or prosperous, no community has liberty or justice. It is the function of the Anglo-Saxon race to confer these gifts of civilization, through law, commerce, and education, on the uncivilized peoples of the world. If we are to do this, we must begin with law uttered with authority and enforced

by power. We cannot confer law on a recalcitrant people without evil; we cannot do it, as men are constituted, without some measure of hardship and injustice. But when men look at the injustice and the cruelty that go with the enforcement of law, when they look at the incidental evils which commerce carries with it, when they can see only the faults and the failures in missionary enterprises, when, as a result, they scoff alike at the armed hand, commercial enterprise, and the missionary and educational endeavor, I appeal from their scoffs to the history of mankind. Where the Anglo-Saxon race has gone in America, in Australia, in Egypt, in India, in Africa, persons, property, family and reputation are safer than they ever were before. Imagine for one moment that when this country was first settled the English people had said, "The North American Indians must have their own independence; we must not interfere with it." Imagine that they had sent over the Puritan preacher with his Bible, and the Roman Catholic missionary with his baptism, and waited; how long would the continent have been compelled to wait, if left without commerce, without law, with only the Puritan minister and the Jesuit missionary, before it would have become the continent that it is, peopled by seventy-five million people, and alive with active industry, its prairies cultivated, its mines opened, its forests felled, its streams busy, with its schools, its churches, its homes, its prosperous, industrious, educated, virtuous, and happy people?

It is said that we have no right to go to a land occupied by a barbaric people and interfere with their life. It is said that if they prefer barbarism they have a right to remain barbarians. I deny the right of a barbaric people to retain possession of any quarter of the globe. What I have already said I reaffirm: barbarism has no rights which civilization is bound to respect. Barbarians have rights which civilized people are bound to respect, but they have no right to their barbarism. A people do not own a continent because they roam through its forests, travel across its prairies, and hunt on its hillsides; no people own a continent unless they are using the continent. The world belongs to humanity, not to the men that happen to be in one quarter of the globe. And the people who are living in a place and not utilizing the place have no right to warn all other people off as trespassers. The dog has not a right to the manger, even if he is a barbaric dog and the ox is an Anglo-Saxon ox.

It is said that we Americans have no capacity for this work. If that were true, it is high time we acquired the capacity: but it is not true; the history of the past demonstrates that we have the capacity. I admit the truth that every superior race, in dealing with inferior races, has fallen far short of Christ's spirit of patient service and long-suffering sacrifice. But on all the pages of human history there is not to be found the record of any other nation which has come so near fulfilling the

Christ-ideal in dealing with subject races as this American people. We had imposed upon us negro slavery — not by our choice, but by the authority and power of Great Britain, against colonial protest. In the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson made it one ground of complaint against Great Britain that she imposed slavery upon us despite our wish. We sacrificed untold millions of money, and human lives whose value is beyond all estimate, to set those negroes free; and, having set them free, we have spent untold millions of money, North and South combining in the effort, to educate and fit them for manhood. What other nation has done as much for a subject race? In our dealing with the Indians we have blundered, criminally blundered; but, in spite of it all, we have saved much of their lands for them, we have kept much of their money for them, we have furnished them with education, and we are to-day providing for the education of practically every Indian child of school age in the United States. If we had been willing to take their lands without recompense and their money without justice, the Indian problem would have disappeared long ago — with the Indian. Only, our honor would have been lost and our flag disgraced. What other nation in human history has done what we have done for Cuba? We have fought to set this people free, and, when they have been set free by our benevolence, we have brought hundreds of them here at our own cost to give them

at one of our great universities a glimpse of American education, and then have sent them back to educate their own people. What people have shown more moral capacity for dealing with subject peoples than the American? Turkey, in her dealings with the Armenians? Spain, in her dealings with the Moors? Italy, in her treatment of the peasant class? France, in her treatment of the Huguenots? England, in her treatment of Ireland? Russia, in her treatment of the Jews?

It is said that we have not the form of government which fits us for this work. If that were true, we should change the form of government. Forms of government are but tools; let us adapt our tool to our work, not our work to our tool. But our government is admirably adapted for the work God has given us to do. For our work is not to subjugate a people; it is not to govern a people; it is to develop in a people, through law, through commerce, through education, through religion, the power of self-government. And no nation is better fitted, by the structure of its government, by the noble traditions of its past, by the splendid opportunities of the present, by the aspirations and desires of its prophets and poets, to take the lead in this great work of the world's civilization, and make of a barbaric community first a law-abiding people, then an industrious people, then an educated people, finally a self-governing people, than this our republic. Our government, by its structure and in its spirit, more than any other govern-

ment embodies the three essential elements of true democracy — the spirit of good will to man, of hope for man, of faith in man. The nation which in its institutions embodies this threefold spirit is preëminently the nation to rule, to teach, to inspire, so that through rule, through inspiration, through teaching, other nations may become free as we are free.

LECTURE X

THE PERILS OF DEMOCRACY

THE pessimist, who sees only evil in the present and danger in the future, does little to guard us against the evils of the present or to prepare us for meeting with courage and effectiveness the perils of the future. The optimist, who insists that we should look always at the bright side of things, and who desires to close our eyes to present evils and to future perils, does quite as little to prepare us to escape present evil or to avoid or overcome future danger. A brave man does not believe in looking only at the bright side of things. He wishes to look on all sides of things; he wishes to know the evil as well as the good, the peril as well as the promise.

To-night I am to speak of some of the perils which threaten democracy in America — some which seem to me to be inherent in the very organization, structure, and spirit of democracy. To those who at all know me it is hardly necessary to say that I speak of these evils in the faith that they can be eradicated, of these perils in the faith that they can be avoided or overcome; of the elements of moral power in democracy which will

enable us to eradicate the evils and avoid or overcome the perils, I shall speak in the next lecture.

The fundamental principle of American democracy is local self-government. We assume that each individual can take care of his own interests better than his neighbor can take care of them for him, that each locality can take care of its own interests better than the state can take care of them, and that each state can take care of its own affairs better than the nation can take care of them. Thus, by the very structure of our political organization, we are without a central authority. There is no power at the head of the government to enforce decisions, except as those decisions are palatable to the people and receive their indorsement from the people. There is not even any symbol of central power, such as a king or queen. There is no symbol that represents the continuity of the nation. All political power is derived from the people; they are conscious that they have given that power to the so-called authorities; they are conscious that it is given for a little time, and that the officers to whom it is given hold it in trust, and they are ready to resent any exercise of that authority over them against their will. Thus, central political authority is lacking in the nation; that power on which the Old World has in times past depended to prevent *émeutes*, risings, revolutions, is either absolutely wanting or reduced to a minimum.

Not only, however, is this central political au-

thority wanting: there is no recognized social or literary or artistic standard. There is no aristocracy, no higher class, no cultivated few, to whom the great body of the people are accustomed to look up. An astute observer once remarked to me: "In England every one but the Queen looks up to some one above him, and every one but the very lowest tramp looks down to some one below him; but in America we neither look up nor down, we only look off." Thus there is little in America to develop the spirit of reverence for authority, either within or without the realm of politics. Each individual is a standard to himself; and the fact that all authority is localized tends to make the people of each locality provincial in their judgments, whether political, æsthetic, or literary.

Not only this, but the standards of the past are either wholly lacking or but lightly regarded in America. England reveres her traditions; she walks in her old paths; it is difficult to get her out of them; her conservatism in this respect is sometimes amusing to the American. We do not walk in the old paths, because we are not old enough to have any old paths. We are a mere boy among the nations; we have not yet had time to form habits, and the restraining influence which comes upon a man or a nation by reason of habits long formed is almost wholly wanting in America. It would be wanting even if we were all native Americans, with a common past; but we are not all native Americans, and we have not all a com-

mon past. A very large proportion of our people have come hither from the Old World, and have brought with them very differing traditions. Thus, the traditions of the German and of the Puritan are widely different, and to one the tradition is as sacred as to the other. We not only have but few and slight traditions, but in so far as we have any they are varied and often conflicting. There are two statesmen in America whom all Americans practically agree to honor — George Washington and Abraham Lincoln; but it would be difficult to name another. Some of us look back to Hamilton as the great statesman of the Constitution; others think that Hamilton was an impediment to the progress of the nation and bow at the shrine of Jefferson. There is no continuity and no steadfastness of tradition to hold us to the past, as there are no standards of aristocratic or cultivated classes to hold us to what is thought to be higher, and no central political authority to enforce decisions over a recalcitrant multitude.

Moreover, the authority of ecclesiastical religion is greatly less than it was formerly. Whether this is an advantage or a disadvantage I am not engaged to-night to consider; but we must recognize it as a fact. The church may have as great influence as it ever had, but it certainly has not the authority it once had. In the Puritan churches no one supposes that there is the ecclesiastical authority that there was in the days of our fathers; but the change in authority is scarcely less marked

heterogeneous

in the Roman Catholic Church. Those who have lived in the West know how frequently it happens that when men go from New England into the West they leave their church traditions and their church relationship behind them; but we are apt to forget that the men who have come over from the Old World have equally been separated from their traditions, and have equally found their loyalty to their church lessened by the process. Our Roman Catholic divines assure us that there is no such recognition of the supremacy of the church in the American Catholic as in the Italian, the Spanish, or even the German Catholic. Many of them lament the lack of reverential regard for ecclesiastical authority; certainly that regard has been diminished. We no longer believe the creeds of our churches merely because our fathers believed them; we make new creeds to suit ourselves, or we dismiss all creeds to the limbo of the past, or we subscribe to them with so many mental reservations that the subscription is practically meaningless.

Thus the four great restraining authorities of history are either lessened or lacking: the authority of a central power, the authority of a social class, the authority of an historical tradition, and the authority of ecclesiastical or institutional religion.

Along with this absence of restraint have gone influences to develop individualism in extreme forms. It is the fundamental postulate of democracy that the world and life are made for the whole human race. From the belief that the

world is made to meet the wants of humanity, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that it is intended to suit the wishes of humanity. Collective humanity, and sometimes, by an easy transition, the individual man, is made the centre around which all life is made to revolve. Thus there comes to be an apotheosis of humanity, and, growing out of it, a cultivation and intensification of egotism. From the doctrine, Everything is made for us, there easily follows the doctrine, Everything is made for me. From the doctrine, Everything is made to meet the needs of humanity, there easily follows the doctrine, Everything is made to suit the wishes of humanity. Thus the wish of man is made the standard of life. Because government exists for the benefit of the governed, it is concluded that the government must be based on the consent of the governed and must conform to their inclinations. Because the world is made for humanity, it is concluded that all men, without equally sharing in the energy, industry, assiduity, and thrift, must have an equal share in the wealth of the community. Because all men ought to have an opportunity for education, the conclusion is easily reached that every man should take the education that he personally likes, and that he should not be required to do any studying that is contrary to his own inclination. So the wish of the individual, whether in government, in industry, or in education, is enthroned, and man bows down before a Great White Throne, himself sitting upon it.

The result of this apotheosis of humanity and this discrediting of authority is seen in some forms of activity that are praiseworthy and some that are not. Because of these conditions, the American is full of energy and full of hope and expectation. He has confidence in himself, confidence in his nation, confidence in his fellow man. This confidence easily becomes an assurance that we can do anything that any other people can do, and then that each individual can do anything that any other individual can do. Involved in war, we pick out civilians here and there, who never handled a musket or put on a sword, and make them officers in command of our men in the field. In politics, we take an utterly untried man and send him to the House of Representatives to represent us, assured that since he is an American, that is enough; other untried men we send to act as our representatives abroad. One Western party passed, not long ago, a resolution that they would have no lawyers on the bench; that is, the fact that a man was educated in law was sufficient to prevent him from exercising legal judgments in controversies between man and man.

The lack of standard, the lack of authority of any kind, — political, social, ethical, religious, — coupled with this intensification of individualism developing into egotism, is one of the natural results — perhaps not a necessary result — of democratic institutions and the democratic spirit. But we cannot have a government without some final

arbiter somewhere. There must be a power that shall say what the nation shall do, what it shall not do. There need not be in education, for we can have local schools with different methods; nor in industry, for we can there work out our individual problems; nor in religion, for we can have a great variety of sects and each sect may believe and do as it likes; we may worship God according to the dictates of our conscience, or not at all if we so prefer. But in government, in which we must act together, there must be some method of final decision, some ultimate standard; and we have hit upon this as a standard — the wish of the majority of the voters, representing, on the whole, in this country, fairly well the wish of the majority of the families in the nation. This is our political standard, — our necessary standard, but necessarily imperfect.

There are probably no Americans who believe avowedly in what Mr. Bryce calls "the infallibility of the majority." No man, looking back upon history, can be of the opinion that great masses of men always act correctly, or always act with even approximate wisdom or justice. Remembering that the majority cried, "Set Barabbas free; crucify Jesus of Nazareth," no man can think that majorities always decide questions correctly. Looking back to a period not beyond the memory of some of us still living, to a time when the overwhelming majority in this country were strenuously and earnestly opposed to any agitation of

the slavery question, we cannot think that the will of the majority of Americans is always correct or always wise. Still, if we could always have the great questions which we have to pass upon carefully debated and well considered, if we could have the interchange of mind with mind, if the Democrat could look at the question through Republican eyes, and the Republican could look at the question through Democratic eyes; if the expansionist could understand what the anti-imperialist means, and the anti-imperialist could understand what the expansionist means, the decision of the majority would generally, if not uniformly, prove to be a very good method of reaching conclusions on debatable questions in practical politics. But, with all our debates and discussions, I think it must be conceded that a great deal of our political action is taken without any serious interchange of opinion, because without any real understanding of each other's views. Says Professor Bryce: —

Those who know the United States, and have been struck by the quantity of what is called politics there, may think that this description underrates the volume and energy of public political discussion. I admit the endless hubbub, the constant elections in one district or another, the paragraphs in the newspapers as to the movements or relations of this or that prominent man, the reports of what is doing in Congress and in the state legislatures, the decisions of the Federal Courts in constitutional questions, the rumors about new combina-

tions, the revelations of Ring intrigues, the criticisms on appointments. It is nevertheless true that, in proportion to the number of words spoken, articles printed, telegrams sent, and acts performed, less than is needed is done to form serious political thought and bring practical problems toward a solution.¹

I venture to take a single illustration, afforded by an event in connection with this course of lectures, to illustrate my position. In one of this course of lectures I said, "Barbarism has no rights which civilization is bound to respect;" and, that my position might not by any possibility be misunderstood, I added that this did not mean that barbarians had no rights which civilized people are bound to respect. On the contrary, the right of barbarians to justice, liberty, education, and a fair share in the common wealth is the right which barbarism denies them and which it is the duty of civilization to afford them. And I found myself quoted in the press as saying that barbarians had no rights which civilized people were bound to respect. The thing which I had denied I was told I had affirmed. That a public speaker should be misunderstood, misinterpreted, misrepresented, is a matter of no particular consequence; nor should I use this occasion to set the error right. I use the incident simply because it illustrates the principle I want to expound. When one man gets on horseback, puts his lance in rest, and says, "Barbarians have rights which civilized men are bound

¹ James Bryce: *The American Commonwealth*, ii. p. 295.

to respect," and another man gets on horseback, puts his lance in rest, and also says, "Barbarians have rights which civilized men are bound to respect," and they ride full tilt at each other, it is evident that nothing is determined by the mock battle. The real and fundamental problem, "What ought civilized people to do to give to barbarians the blessings of their own civilization?" has not the slightest light thrown upon it by such misunderstandings, such would-be discussions.

The wish of the majority is an imperfect standard even in politics, though it is, for a tolerably educated people, the best which the wit of man has yet devised. But when it is universally accepted as the standard in politics, it easily becomes the standard in art, literature, and morals; and when this is the case, it is, in the nature of the case, impossible that the standard should be the highest. It will be higher than the lowest—it will tend to elevate the taste of some; but it will be lower than the highest—and so will tend to drag down the taste of others. For the will or judgment of the majority can never be the will or judgment of the few supreme thinkers in the community. It can only be something above the average. Thus the tendency of America is to create general averages, and to measure all things by majorities.

This tendency to measure all things by majorities is intensified by the fact that we live in a commercial

majority has
little power

age. Commercialism is better than militarism, but the commercial age involves peculiar perils to human character. When we begin to measure success by financial results, we necessarily begin to measure success by the largeness of the market reached; and when we measure success by the largeness of the market reached, we necessarily measure success by the capacity of the producer to adjust his product to the average taste, the average intellect, the average judgment, not to the highest.

The effect of this is seen on every hand. Photogravure gives us pictures of every sort, from excellent in our higher magazines to execrable in our lowest newspapers. Every one has art, or something that passes for art, in his house — on his parlor table or on his walls. But there is no incentive to create an Albert Dürer; and if he exists, he must fight his way to recognition in spite of what commerce and democracy will call failure. We have in chromo-lithographs on our walls very reputable imitations of fine pictures; but if one desires to give himself to art in America, he must make up his mind, to begin with, to struggle long with poverty, and perhaps to labor all his life unknown, and leave his genius to be discovered after he is dead. Our periodicals and our newspapers carry literature into every home; there is no man so poor that he cannot have a good book; there are few men so ignorant that they cannot read. But the same influence that multiplies literature tends to make it not of the highest quality.

good → Our public-school system has given us a great many people in this country who are sufficiently educated to read, but not sufficiently educated to think, and they form a great constituency which supports not a few newspapers which can be read without thinking. Our periodicals give stories, descriptions, poetry, well worthy of our applause; but it is doubtful whether "Henry Esmond" would have had any such circulation as "To Have and To Hold," or whether any periodical would ever evoke "The Ring and the Book," from the brain of a Browning.

But it is not only in art and literature that the tendency of our age is to lower standards. It is preëminently true in politics. When we come together in a political convention, our problem is not to determine what is true, or right, or just, but what will carry this doubtful state. We put this problem to ourselves with a naive frankness. The convention gathers, the debates are reported all over the country, and apparently there is no sense of humiliation in the fact that the question is not, "Is this proposition true?" but "How will it affect the vote in New York or in Montana?" Sometimes the convention avoids the question by putting the statement in such a way that it will carry both the doubtful states. Thus, not long since we were saying in some quarters that we believed in tariff for revenue only, so adjusted as to protect all American industries, and that we believed in bimetallism, so administered as to give

us a gold standard. Thus one tendency of our method of determining political elections by the will of the majority is to lower the standard of absolute truth in the political and moral realm, a tendency which found a too brutally frank expression from an American politician in the declaration that the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule in American politics are an "iridescent dream." Nor is it possible for one who studies carefully the religious phenomena of this country to doubt that something of the same effect is manifest in our churches. A minister is called to the pulpit to "draw," and he is measured by his drawing capacity. If he fills the church with a great congregation, and the treasury with abundant pew rents, he is a successful preacher. The question how much he has filled the conscience with indignation against wrong, how much he has filled the life with hope, with love, with loyalty, may be asked, but it is not publicly asked. This measure of the ministry may be real, but it is not apparent. Thus, with the lessening of authority, with the lowering of standards of value to suit an average demand, with the development of the egotistic spirit in America, and with the acceptance of the wish of the majority as the rule of all life, comes inevitably a certain element of commonplace in democracy.

Nor is this all. To government two things are necessary — wise judgment, and power to enforce the judgment. For government is always the

exercise of power, either openly or tacitly; either directly exercised or in the background ready to be exercised. In order to make a good government, those that are to govern must not only be wise to determine, but strong to enforce the determination when it is reached. And there is a tendency in democracy, as in all great multitudes of men, to act together under passion and at fever heat, and then, when the time of action has passed, to forget the action and relax into indifference and apathy.

Several results follow from this. In the first place, when on the one side are financial interests widely divided among the whole body of the people, and on the other side the concentrated financial interests of a very small body of people, the interests of the great body are always liable to be set aside by the concentrated interests of the few. If the subsidy bill before Congress,¹ appropriating, in round numbers, nine million dollars a year to shipping, of which by far the greatest amount will go to four great corporations, should be passed, each individual voter will give on an average sixty cents in taxes, and four great corporations will get nine million dollars. The individual voter does not care much about the sixty cents; by giving his attention to other things he can make much more than the sixty cents; but the four great corporations are greatly interested in the nine million dollars. Whether the subsidy bill is right or

¹ March, 1901.

wrong, expedient or inexpedient, it is quite evident that financially the interest of fourteen millions of people scattered all over the country is not or may not be an adequate make-weight for the concentrated interest of four or five men who can afford to give time, strength, energy, and money to carry their point.

This apathy of the American people also shows itself on moral issues in which financial interests are not directly concerned. We pass a law, put it on the statute-books, and are satisfied that we have done our duty. But it is not enough to pass a law; it is also necessary to enforce the law. A very striking illustration of this moral and political peril from unenforced law has been recently afforded in Kansas. The people of that state passed a law prohibiting all saloons; then supposed, apparently, that they had done their duty, and that the saloons were banished from Kansas. But the saloons were not banished. We were told that prohibition did prohibit in Kansas, and we supposed that it must be true, until suddenly the public press informed the country that a woman was going from town to town breaking the mirrors and the glass doors of the saloons that had been abolished. The apathetic conscience of Kansas was awakened, and the citizens in one town assembled and gave the saloon-keepers a definite time to leave the town, with notice that if they had not left at the allotted time a vigilance committee would follow the example which Mrs. Nation had set, and

would break the mirrors and the plate-glass windows of the prohibited saloons. It is claimed that it is better to enforce the law by mob violence than not to enforce it at all; but it is not a pleasant spectacle to the thoughtful American to see a law on the statute-book openly, flagrantly, and continuously disregarded, the officers of the law allowing it to be disregarded, and at last the people waking up, and not holding themselves in leash and with patience waiting until by legitimate and proper methods they can enforce the law, but organizing themselves into a vigilance committee to do a work of demolition by mob violence. Such are at times the operations of democracy — first apathetic and then passionate, then apathetic again.

Thus democracy has two weaknesses: first, the weakness of a standard not the highest, and, second, the weakness of a will that is often not alert. Out of these two, coupled with the spirit of individualism, — the apotheosis of the individual and the enthronement of the individual will, — grows a spirit of lawlessness.

This spirit of lawlessness is seen in many and various manifestations: in the national habit of putting laws upon the statute-book with a tacit understanding that they are not to be obeyed, or with a quiet disregard of them in localities where the law is not popular; in the common saying, which national experience does much to confirm, that law is no stronger than the public opinion which is behind it, and accordingly the law enacted

by state authority is no stronger in any particular city or county than the public sentiment in that locality; in the conscienceless evasion of tax laws, even when such evasion involves deceit and falsehood and sometimes perjury; in sporadic acts of mob violence, especially in the less well-settled portions of the country, where the impatient people will not wait for the slower process of the law; in the occasional open defiance of the law by organized mobs, especially in great cities such as Chicago, Pittsburg, Cleveland, and New York; in not less flagrant violations of law by great corporations, who are very rarely called to account for their disobedience.

While this volume is going through the press the assassination of President McKinley affords a startling and tragical illustration of the perils threatened to democratic institutions by the spirit of lawlessness. Intemperate speech, going far beyond all bounds of legitimate discussion of either public measures or public men, had exhausted the resources of vehement rhetoric in vituperation of the chief magistrate of the nation. He had been assailed by reputable men and women as "unscrupulous and deceitful," "the most unmoral of all the occupants" of the presidential chair, characterized by "vacillation, infirmity of purpose, and general dishonesty," as "affable putty," a "puppet," "watchful for votes alone," a "traitor," one who "stands not only for cheating and robbery, but also for arson and murder," a "shameless

President," "an Ohio twaddler," with "mediocrity of mind and low left-handed cunning," whose name history would "pillory in letters black," "whether as tool or tyrant . . . time alone can tell." While these epithets were flung in widespread publications by reputable Americans in an endeavor to excite popular passion against the man whom the nation had chosen to be its leader, the doctrine was in smaller circles sedulously taught that all government is oppression, that all rulers are "tool or tyrant," and stand "not only for cheating and robbery, but for arson and murder," and that there is a sacred right and even a solemn duty to slay them at sight, as we would slay a prowling wolf or a man-eating tiger. One of the disciples of this school traveled across the sea from America and assassinated the king of Italy, and his fellow disciples here met and glorified his act; still Americans contented themselves with newspaper protests; nowhere was a vigorous, concerted, and continuous effort made either to restrain by law the speeches of Anarchists inciting to crime and glorifying it when committed, or to rebuke by public opinion the speeches of embittered partisans transcending all the bounds of honorable public debate. At last a man of feeble intellect and still feebler conscience, with that ambition for notoriety which a sensational press does much to stimulate even in larger men, put the public teaching of the partisans and the private teachings of the Anarchists together and carried them to their logical

conclusion. The one had told him that William McKinley was a tyrant, the other that all tyrants ought to die, and he resolved to achieve a martyr's crown by carrying into execution the lesson he had learned. It is idle to charge the result to immigration, or to think that repetition of such murders can be guarded against by sentinels placed at the landing piers of our Atlantic cities. Booth, Guiteau, and Czolgosz were all native Americans, and Czolgosz was a graduate of our public schools. The assassination of William McKinley was the ripened fruit of seed sown by lawless tongues in partisan invective which public opinion, regardless of party, should have sternly rebuked, and in Anarchistic counseling of crime which public law ought to have forbidden under severe penalty.

An illustration on a larger scale of the spirit of self-will which democratic institutions foster, and which in turn fosters the spirit and methods of lawlessness, was afforded by the civil war. The tendency of local self-government separated the country into two sections, North and South. Slavery embittered the conflict between the two; war ensued, the cost of which in life and treasure it is impossible to estimate. It is true that the result of the war proved the power of democracy to enforce its will when that will is once thoroughly aroused; but the very fact of such a struggle bears witness to the peril which the enforcement of the national will may at any time involve. The next controversy, if there is one, will probably not be

between different sections of the country, but between different classes in the community.

I do not see how any one looking upon our industrial situation can doubt that there is peril of a serious strife between capitalists and wage-workers. The wage-workers are generally without capital, often without education, sometimes densely ignorant. Masses of them have never been taught the difficult art of self-government. Coming from countries in which the church has been too often an instrument of priestly oppression, and the state too often an instrument of political oppression, they bring with them an inherited hatred of both state and church, and a disbelief in man which is more dangerous to society than that disbelief in God which always accompanies it. Freed from the restraints of the Old World, they are at the same time endowed with powers which in the Old World they never possessed — free ballot, a free press, and free speech. Add to this the fact that, with dynamite carried in a carpet-bag, the modern Guy Fawkes can destroy in an instant the products of a century's industry. In a warfare between classes for the possession of property, civilization has every advantage; in a warfare of Anarchy against all property, anarchy has every advantage. There is no power in the state which the restless and the unprincipled recognize and which they fear, no power in the church to which their conscience or their superstition compels obedience. The public schools address not their conscience, but their

intellect. They live in a country where the chief support of order is an enlightened conscience and the chief protection of property an enlightened self-interest, and neither their conscience nor their self-interest is enlightened.

The number of such discontented, restless, and Anarchic individuals is not large, but their power is out of proportion to their numbers. Trade-unions exist in nearly every state of the Union and in most of the territories. Agriculture is the only considerable industry which has not its industrial organization. These unions are essentially warlike both in their aims and in their methods; that is, they are not primarily organized to promote education, facilitate apprenticeship, introduce new methods of labor, encourage the introduction of labor-saving machines, and equalize wages by equalization of intelligence and industry. They are not organized like a political club, for purposes of personal intercourse; nor like a literary club, for purposes of education; nor like a co-operative club, for purposes of mutual benefit; they are organized to protect their members against real or fancied oppression of employers, or to wrest from employers a larger share of the profits. They are founded on the assumption that the interests of employer and employed are antagonistic. They are ruled over generally by a directory scarcely less absolute than that which governed the Revolutionists in the day of Mirabeau, which meets in secret, demands implicit obedience to its

orders, and forces obedience to them by industrial excommunication, and sometimes by open violence or secret assault. In times of industrial peace these trades-unions are a conservative force. They facilitate coöperation between labor and capital, and they constitute a necessary protection of the individual laborer against the otherwise irresistible power of capital, which is always combined. But in time of industrial war the radicals in these organizations come to the front. Their radicalism gives them a control to which their judgment does not entitle them. The union, organized and maintained in a pacific spirit in time of peace, becomes in a labor war, by its solidarity, by the sympathy of large sections of the community with it, and especially by the opportunity which its action affords to the lawless and to the violent, a menace not only to the employer but to the entire community.

While thus labor is organizing, and the organizations at times pass under the influence of violent and lawless agitators, capital is also organizing, and passes at times under the control of leaders more astute but not more scrupulous. The concentration of the wealth of many in the hands of a few is of great industrial advantage in times of peace, but it gives to the few power perilous to democracy in times when men's passions or their fears are aroused. The wealth invested in American railroads counts by billions, the annual income by hundreds of millions. The owners of this

wealth are combined in great corporations and combinations of corporations. Against them the private citizen is almost powerless. The workingmen must take what work they will furnish at what wages they will give. The shipper must pay what rates they charge. There is no appeal to the law, because in general the law recognizes the right of the corporation to hire its labor in the cheapest market and to charge for freight what the traffic will bear. If the actions of the corporation are illegal, the expense of proving their illegality and bringing the corporation to account is so great that the private citizen is estopped from appeal to the courts for justice. When the country is prosperous and the demand for manufactured goods is great, and money is plenty, and mills are busy, and wages are high, the peril of open controversy between employer and employed disappears; but only to reappear when times are hard, when a glutted market paralyzes industry, when mills are closed, when workmen are thrown out of employment, when hundreds of thousands draw near the starvation line, while a small and wealthy aristocracy know not how to spend their income or even the interest on their investment.¹

These perils are aggravated by four types of leaders in our country, whom I will call respec-

¹ The possible peril here so briefly sketched I have described more fully in an article published in the *Century Magazine* for November, 1885, entitled "Danger Ahead," though it is proper to say that at that time the danger seemed both greater and more imminent than it does now.

tively the demagogue, the boss, the plutocrat, and the medicine-man.

The demagogue is to democracy what the courtier was in olden times to the king; he lives by flattering his sovereign. The majority is sovereign in America, and the demagogue assures this sovereign that he can do no wrong. He appeals to his passions; he cultivates his foibles; he is careful never to irritate or cross his wishes or his whims. He does not hesitate to excite class against class, section against section, sect against sect, if by so doing he can win fame or fortune. If he speaks upon the platform, he speaks that he may win the applause of his audience, not that he may lead them on to a higher ground. If he edits a newspaper, he talks morality in his editorial pages and spreads vice and sensationalism in all its worst forms in his reading columns, and thinks he publishes a great newspaper because he publishes an affidavit that a great many copies of it go out from the printing-press, and never an affidavit how many of them come back to be burned for fuel. This conscious and deliberate demagogue is not so dangerous as the half-unconscious demagogue. Mr. Gladstone is reported to have said, "What my audience gives to me in spray, I give them back in drops." The half-unconscious demagogue speaks to a prejudiced and not too intelligent audience. They give him muddy water in spray, and he gives them back muddy water in drops. He simply reflects the sentiment of the people to

whom he talks; there are innumerable men in America who think the highest compliment they can give to a public speaker, secular or religious, is, "You said just what I have always thought." Such a demagogue, conscious or unconscious, reflecting the sentiments of the people, stirring passions that should be allayed and stimulating hostility that should be pacified, intensifies and energizes the egotism and the self-will which should be corrected and restrained.

The demagogue, whether he speaks from the platform or edits a newspaper, whether he is conscious or unconscious, whether he directly and openly appeals to class prejudice or covers his appeal with a mask of piety and patriotism, is not so dangerous as the boss. Government in a democracy necessitates parties, parties necessitate machinery, and machinery necessitates a leader or leaders, who must give the initiative and furnish the guidance. The boss is a leader who uses this machinery either for personal or for party ends, not for the ends for which the party itself has been organized. We are familiar in church history with three types of ecclesiastic — the place-hunter, who uses the church for his own advancement; the church partisan, who regards his church organization as essential to the cause of religion, and therefore identifies the cause of his church with the cause of religion; and the non-churchman, who affiliates himself with some church simply as a means of promoting the religious life in

others and in himself. The same classification is possible in politics. There are politicians who use the party for their own political advancement; politicians who regard their party organization as essential to the nation's welfare, and regard partisanship and patriotism as substantially identical; and politicians to whom the party is simply a convenient means to accomplish public ends, to be adhered to when it subserves these ends, to be abandoned when it ceases to do so. The "boss" belongs to the first or second class; that is, he is a leader who does not simply attach himself to a party and employ its organization to secure certain political ends which he regards as vital for the welfare of the country, but one who belongs to the party and uses the party machinery either to advance his own interests or that of the party. He is rarely scrupulous, and never very scrupulous. He believes that "all is fair in love and war," and that politics is war; that one must "fight fire with fire," and that the enemy is always using fire; that the "end justifies the means," and that the end is the supremacy of his party in the city, the state, or the nation, and generally his supremacy in the party; that "nothing succeeds like success," and that whatever is successful is justified by the success. The methods of the boss vary; the end is always the same: political success for his party and incidentally for himself, or political success for himself and incidentally for his party. I had the opportunity once of traveling with the lieuten-

ant of one of the widely known political bosses of this country, and he told me, in a burst of frankness for which I was very much obliged to him, how the politics in his state were administered. The corporations, he said, which desired favors from the legislature, or the corporations which feared that they might be blackmailed by members of the legislature, found it easier to work through one man than through many men. They therefore paid to the boss of his party a considerable sum of money for election expenses. "I do not think," he said in substance, "that any of the money stays in his pocket. I do not think he is in politics for what he can personally make out of them. But when an election is coming on, he writes to the candidates for the legislature, asking each candidate who belongs to his party how much he will need in his district, and the money needed is forthcoming. No pledges are taken, no promises are exacted. If in the next legislature that man, having received support for his election by this method, does not vote as the director of his party desires him to vote, at the next election he can pay his own election expenses." This is not a very gross form of corruption; but, coupled with others that are probably more debasing, it puts one man at the centre of political power.

In this instance the ambition of the boss was apparently the success of his party and only incidentally his own success. The case of Mr. Richard Croker and Tammany Hall illustrates the case

of an organization and a boss, both of which are inspired by a more sordid purpose. In a comparatively recent political investigation Mr. Richard Croker, on the stand, without the slightest hesitation and with entire frankness unfolded his theory and his practice as the leader or "boss" of Tammany, both of which terms he accepted as applied to himself; he explained how he distributed city patronage, including various municipal offices and even Supreme Court judgeships, in such a way as to give to him and his associates the largest financial return. The "Outlook" thus summarized at the time a part of his testimony:—

I believe that to the party belong the spoils, and we expect everybody to stand by us. That's what the people voted our ticket for. So long as we offer just as good men for office as any other party, I believe we should have all the offices we can get. We expect to be permitted to make a living. Working for my own pocket? Yes. All the time, every day in the week, the same as you are. Plunder? You may call it whatever you like; because men are loyal to us, you call that plunder. Positions, offices, and money that come in a legitimate way should go to the organization. Tammany nominates judges, for instance, who contribute liberally to her funds—no, not as high as \$18,000 [one judge testified that he contributed \$10,000 at Mr. Croker's request]—these judges appoint as referees Tammany men as a matter of course; these referees give their sales to Tammany auctioneers. I am partner in an auctioneer firm that gets most of these judicial sales. Action of the judges was secured to remove all

sales to 111 Broadway when I became Mr. Meyer's partner there, and our firm has a monopoly of the sales.

The extent to which this spoils system is carried in all parts of the country, in city, state, and nation, and by both political parties, is probably not realized by the country, despite much newspaper denunciation. How absolutely fatal it is to true democracy, how it substitutes the will of one man or a few men, and those too often unscrupulous and self-seeking, for the will of the majority, and how demoralizing it is to the public conscience, from the highest to the lowest, is quite apparent without further comment. How difficult it is to overcome, many a sporadic reform movement, leading to no permanent result, has unhappily illustrated.

More perilous to the country than either demagogue or boss is the plutocrat. A man is not a plutocrat because he is very rich. A plutocrat is one who exercises political control by means of his wealth, one who, having control of money, uses that money to control government for the purpose of having government foster the interests in which he himself is directly or indirectly concerned. Sometimes the plutocrat sends his henchmen to the election districts and buys the votes at so much a head. Since the introduction of the Australian ballot system this is difficult, for he is not sure that the votes will be delivered as promised. Sometimes he goes to the legislature

and buys a few men directly. But the number of legislators who are directly purchasable by money is comparatively small, and is greatly exaggerated by newspaper reports. Still, this form of corruption is not uncommon, nor is it carried on upon a small scale, nor does it shock the American conscience as it ought to shock that conscience. Mr. Clark was elected to the Senate of the United States by his state. An official investigation took place, and it was demonstrated that he expended large sums in the purchase of legislators; the sums were known, the payments were demonstrated; he was refused his seat by the Senate, went back to his state, and his state has reelected him to the Senate of the United States. More frequently the plutocrat works by more indirect methods. He gives, or sells at a low price, the stock of the corporation in which he is interested to legislators on whose vote the future value of the stock will depend; he furnishes legislators, judges, newspaper men, with passes over the railroad which desires special favors; he employs legislators or ex-legislators at large salaries as attorneys to secure desired legislation. In the case of the Pacific Railroad, so largely built out of government moneys loaned to a private corporation, it is matter of official report that stock was sold below market rates to Congressmen whose votes might be of importance in the future; that one United States Commissioner was paid \$25,000 in consideration of signing a report accepting a section of the road;

and that nearly half a million dollars was paid to a representative of the company for securing the passage of an act which made the Government lien a second mortgage. The extent to which in past times the power of the plutocrat has been exercised in national politics is thus illustrated by Mr. Hudson: —

The records of the House of Representatives, however, furnish a terrible warning against the corporate practice of gaining the support of members by pecuniary influence. The most conspicuous instance is found in that cemetery of political reputations, the report on the *Crédit Mobilier*. The insidious approaches by which agents of corporate schemes, unrestrained by any scruples, gradually bind the people's representatives to their interests, are manifold; but this wholesale murder of national characters typifies them all. How many of the Congressmen who were quietly and plausibly induced to take shares in that great and successful public swindle knew that they were becoming tools of corporate adventurers it is hard to tell. . . . The salient fact is that scores of most promising careers were cut short by the discovery that they had been used by the Pacific Railway speculators. Such corruption assumes a hundred forms. Gifts, loans, investments, favors of infinite variety, may be brought to surround a public man, until all his circumstances and prospects tie him to the cause of the corporations. The knowledge of what has been done, and especially the epitaphs on political prospects slaughtered by the *Crédit Mobilier*, must always show what unscrupulous and irresponsible corporations can effect in corrupting the highest political instrumentalities.¹

¹ *Railways and the Republic*, pp. 460.

The fourth leader who adds to our perils I call the "medicine-man." I will not call him "quack," because this would involve too great obloquy; nor "professional reformer," because this pays to him too great deference. I call him medicine-man because he thinks there is one medicine which will cure all the ills to which humanity is subject. Sometimes he is the advocate of two remedies, sometimes he vacillates between two. He is generally morally honest, but intellectually narrow; he is not a hypocrite, but he is apt to be a Pharisee, with a strong sense of "I am holier than thou" pervading his dogmatic utterances. He imagines that universal suffrage will cure all political evils; or free silver all commercial and financial evils; or a single tax on land all industrial evils; or woman suffrage or prohibition, or the two combined, all moral evils. I do not here consider the value of prohibition, or woman suffrage, or the single tax on land, or free silver, or universal suffrage; but he who imagines that all evils are due to one social or political cause, and can be cured by one social or political reform, has studied human nature and human history to little purpose. Unfortunately, there are many good men in America who cannot be influenced by the demagogue — their moral sense resents his appeals to popular prejudices; nor led by the boss — they are too independent; nor purchased by the plutocrat — they are too honest — who are swayed by the medicine-man because he appeals to their con-

science; and their conscience is not very intelligent.

These causes combine to produce certain very apparent tendencies in American life; the tendency to superficial reforms, accomplished by a spasm of virtue and followed by the apathy of discouragement and almost despair; the tendency to substitute bigness for greatness and quantity for quality, to think that much reading means much intelligence, and the existence of pictures everywhere means universal taste; the tendency in politics to think that if in New York we can turn the Democratic party out and put the Republican party in, and in Philadelphia we can turn the Republican party out and put the Democratic party in, we shall have political reform; the tendency in education to accept a superficial knowledge of many subjects for a thorough acquaintance in one; the tendency in morals to imagine that the enactment of a righteous law makes a righteous community, that putting prohibition in the Constitution makes the State temperate, and putting God in the Constitution would make the nation devout; the tendency in religion to substitute emotionalism or dogmatism for life, and to suppose that a church is sound because it is orthodox and a man is religious because he has feeling.

Such are some of the perils which seem to me to threaten America. The root of them all is the lack of a central authority; the cure for all is in finding that central authority. It will not be

found in the central authority of a Cæsar; nor in an aristocracy, hereditary or otherwise; nor in a church, Papal or Protestant; nor in a Bible accepted as the final word of God. It must be found only in the recognition by every individual soul of the voice of God speaking within each man. I look forward sometimes with great exhilaration and sometimes with appalling fear on the future. When the great problem on which we have entered is brought to its close, what will the result be? Will it afford another demonstration that a nation without God will inevitably go on to ruin, whether it be oligarchic or aristocratic or monarchic or democratic? Or will its splendid future demonstrate that every man is akin to God, that all men can find in him a common centre and a common authority, and that government needs no other basis than the authority which it finds in the universal conscience uttering the voice of the Almighty King?

LECTURE XI

SAFEGUARDS

THERE is in literature no better definition of democracy than that furnished by Abraham Lincoln: "Government of the people, for the people, and by the people." It is government: not no-government; not mere individualism; not anarchy; and it has no kinship with anarchy. It is government for the people, and for all the people; it is not for the benefit of any class — neither for an aristocratic class nor for a democratic class; it is not, as all oligarchies have been, for the benefit of the rich; nor as Aristotle feared it would be, for the benefit of the poor. It assumes, therefore, that government can be for all the people; that what is for the interest of one is for the interest of all, and what is an injury to one is an injury to all. It thus assumes the community of humanity, the oneness of their political well-being. The mediæval saints thought that they could benefit their brains by starving their stomachs; they found it a mistake. The body is one organism; an injury to one part is an injury to every part. Democracy assumes that society is an organism, no part of which can be benefited and the rest not

receive benefit, no part of which can be injured and the rest not suffer injury. It is government by the people. It finds the sources of political power in the people. Whatever power is exercised over the people by administrators is exercised derivatively. It is not government in the administration of which every member of the community partakes — only a minority really partake in the administration; nor is it a government in which every individual, or even every household, much less every piece of property, is directly represented by voice or vote. The doctrine “no taxation without representation” does not mean in democracy that wherever property is taxed there must be a vote. Democracy is not a representation of pocketbooks, but of persons; it is a representation of the common judgment and the common conscience, not merely, nor even chiefly, of the common pecuniary interest. But though it is not necessarily government by every one, it is necessarily government in which every class is represented. All class government is antagonistic to democracy. There may be property qualifications, but if so they must be such qualifications that economy, prudence, thrift, can meet them. There may be educational qualifications, but if so they must be such that industry and energy may meet them. There can be no race qualification, there can be no hereditary qualification, in a democracy; democracy is government “by the people.”

Such government “of the people, for the people,

by the people" is a comparatively recent experiment. There were Greek democracies and Roman democracies, but they were neither of them democracies in this sense. Democracy in this sense did not exist in the Southern states until after the Civil War. Democracy in this sense is not much over a hundred years old in any part of the world. It is an infant; it is experimental; we must frankly recognize it as an experiment.

Is it likely to be a successful experiment? I wish to put before you to-night some reasons why I think we have a right to believe it will be a successful experiment, why we have a right to believe that it is permanent.

In the first place, it is, as we have seen, the outcome of a long historical process; the result of the political evolution of eighteen centuries; and the result not only of an evolution, but of a conflict carried on through eighteen centuries between Roman imperialism, where the government was for the few and by the few, and Hebraic liberty, where the government was for the many and in large measure by the many. This controversy of eighteen centuries has developed that democratic spirit and produced those democratic forms of government which exist with modifications in all western Europe, and which have reached their most perfect form in the United States of America. A great river rising among the mountains and flowing steadily in one direction with increasing current is not likely to turn upon its course and flow back

again to the fountain from which it issued. A great stream of tendency which can be traced with widening and deepening current through eighteen centuries may be assumed to be not one liable suddenly to return upon its course, or to perish from sight leaving no result. He who believes that God is carrying on a work in the world, that he is directing the course of human history, that he is working out the ultimate result in human society, may well believe that this great historic movement is not a useless nor an unmeaning one; may well believe that the ultimate result will be, not necessarily our form of government, but necessarily the victory of those principles of government which were germinant in the ancient Hebraic commonwealth, and of which America furnishes to-day the best existing embodiment.

Those principles are not embodied alone in government. Democracy is more than a form of government. England is democratic, but her form of government is different from ours; France also is democratic, but her form of government is different both from ours and from that of England. Democracy is an order of society; it is a spiritual organism. It means, as we have seen, not merely government "of the people, for the people, by the people;" it also means industry and education and religion "of the people, for the people, by the people." It means a recognition of the truth that wealth is in some true sense a common wealth; it means, therefore, a larger distribution of wealth

and a more popular control over wealth. It is hostile to any state of society in which the many labor that the few may be idle. It involves industry of brain or of muscle by all men, and it involves fair recompense for toil to all men. Industrial democracy is not yet, indeed, established. In the realm of industry the controversy between imperialism and the principles of the Hebraic commonwealth has yet to be wrought out, and perhaps so wrought out upon this soil. But even here in America, where the industrial democracy is not yet achieved, there is a larger distribution of wealth and of material happiness, and a greater necessity for universal labor, and a greater recognition of that necessity, than ever existed in the past, or than exists in any other quarter of the globe, Australia alone excepted.

Democracy is also education for the people and by the people; not merely nor mainly for an intellectual class; education, therefore, in those things which all the people need; and education directed and controlled by the people. Occasionally in America we find protests uttered against universal education; occasionally sporadic efforts in the South to lessen education for the negroes; occasionally some man saying in the North that we have carried our common-school system too far, and are educating too many, or are giving them too large an education. But these protests pass by as idle wind which people heed not. On the whole, the great educational movement goes for-

ward, and the whole tendency of the last fifty years has been to widen our educational system both in its curriculum and in its constituency. This has been done not only by public state donations, but by private benefactions, until we have built up, not only the largest and best public-school system of the world, but also, and in an incredibly short time, universities whose doors are open to men of all classes and all conditions.

Democracy is also religion for the people, and in all its institutional forms administered and controlled by the people; that is, religion not for an elect, not for a few special white-robed saints, not for a few specially endowed visionaries, not for those who are able to shut themselves out from life in convents or monasteries. We believe, or are rapidly coming to believe, that religion is of such a character that it can enter into the shop and the store, into the parlor and the school-room, into all the common life of the common people. It is not life set apart from common vocations for special places and special days; it is right living. We are also coming to believe that, as religion is for all the people, so it is to be administered by all the people; that the creeds are not to be framed for them by the saints or scholars of the past, nor by the saints or scholars of the present, but that the people are to do their own thinking, and work out their own results, and formulate those results for themselves; that as their creeds are to be framed by the people, so their religious institutions,

whether ecclesiastical or non-ecclesiastical, however administered, are to be, in the last analysis, controlled and supported by the people; the priests and the pastors are the servants of the people, not their masters.

This broader democracy is triumphant in America; still, perhaps, to win its final victory in industry, but having won it in the realm of politics, of education, and of religion. Democracy pervades society as well as government, and a revolution that would change the government must change the religious spirit, the educational spirit, and the industrial spirit as well as the political forms. A political organism, simply, may be easily changed; but the life of a nation is not easily changed, and the life of the American people, not merely the form of the nation, is democratic. A pyramid resting on its top must be perpetually propped; a pyramid resting on its base cannot easily be overthrown. The democracy of America rests on its base: it is a democracy not merely of politics; it is a democracy religious, educational, social, industrial.

Moreover, this democracy, thus political, industrial, educational, social, and religious, has brought with it a great degree of diffused happiness. There is certainly no people on the globe, except, perhaps, the equally democratic communities of Australia and New Zealand, where happiness is so general as in America; where there are so many happy homes; where there is so little misery.

As we have already seen, nearly one half of the families of the United States own the real estate they occupy, and a very large proportion of the remainder have property in money or bonds or stocks, or hope to have money in property of some sort or other which presently they can put into real estate. With very rare exceptions these men, whether they own or hope to own property, are by the possession or by the hope made conservative; they desire to keep what they have, they fear to lose what they anticipate. Radicalism, therefore, in the United States gets little support from the common people. The socialism which multiplies its adherents in Germany has few adherents in America, and is a losing rather than a gaining cause. When appeals are made — as sometimes they are — to class feeling, they fall either on deaf ears or more likely on ears that are very alert, rousing the will and stimulating the purpose to put at once an end to every such dangerous and inflammable endeavor. The American people are conservative, because the great body of the American people have everything to lose and nothing to gain by any promised revolution. They are careless; they allow sporadic mobs; they shrug their shoulders at the report of such mobs, believing that the disease will cure itself, that the flame will burn itself out. But whenever the mob shows signs of strength such as really threatens the well-being of the community, the nation is alert and its action is quick, vigorous, determined, and effective.

This democracy which has thus changed not merely the form of government, but which has changed the nature of education and even the offices and aims of religion, has also made great changes in the individual character. Something of the American character is due to climate; something to Anglo-Saxon blood; but a great deal is due to American — that is, democratic — institutions. For democracy not only tends to produce the conservative spirit by its distribution of wealth and of happiness, it also tends to produce the hopeful spirit by the eager expectation which it inspires in all men. Nearly every man in America expects to be better off to-morrow than he was yesterday, or, if he does not expect this for himself, he anticipates it for his child. He looks toward a better future for himself or for those who are dependent on him. Thus the prevailing spirit of the American people is one of energy, of enterprise, of hopefulness, even of audacity. And this spirit of energy, of enterprise, of hopefulness, and of audacity pervades all classes. If one will take the trouble to visit the slums of London and investigate a little by personal observation the character of those who live in the slums of London, and then will visit the slums of New York and investigate a little by personal observation the character of the people who live in the slums of New York, he will come away from his comparative study having perceived that while the people in New York are perhaps not better housed than in Lon-

don, nor the filth less, nor the drunkenness less, nor the licentiousness less, and the government is in some respects inferior, in London the men have come down from better conditions into more degraded ones; they are on the down grade, and are without hope for themselves or their children; in New York they have come up out of worse conditions into better ones; they are on the up grade, and are full of hope for themselves and for their children. Whether in the Chinese quarter, or the Italian quarter, or the Hungarian quarter, or the Russian Jew quarter, the inspiration of hope is in the hearts of these people even in the slums. And when we get out of the great cities into the manufacturing towns, or into the great prairies of the West, the faces are set toward the future and the eyes are bright with expectation of coming prosperity.

Paul's statement, We are saved by hope, is as true for society as for the individual. It is despair that is the inspiration of revolution. When men can see nothing better for themselves, and nothing better for their children, in present conditions, they are ready to take up arms to change the conditions; when the conditions themselves inspire hope of betterment for themselves, for their neighbors, and for their children, they are ready to take up arms against any man who proposes to destroy those conditions on the chance that he can create better ones. Democracy is more than a form of government, it is more even than a social order,

it is a spirit; a spirit, first of all, of hopefulness, of resultant energy and activity, and therefore of self-respect. What Christianity said to the freedmen and the slaves in the first century, democracy has said to the poor in Europe: You are men. On this affirmation of their manhood it has based the invitation, Come to America and you will find a chance to develop your manhood. Coming to America, they have found all industries open to them, the school-room open to their children, and presently the ballot put into their hand. Whatever evil may have come from excess of immigration, whatever evil may have come from a too widely extended ballot, there has grown out of it the development of self-respect in the men who have been thus treated on a plane of industrial and political equality.

It is this tendency of democracy in America to appeal to the self-respect of men which develops in America its self-conceit; and it is probably true that we are the most self-conceited people on the face of the globe. But self-conceit is the defect of our virtue, and self-esteem is a very necessary virtue. It is true that self-esteem, unmodified, tends to isolate each man from his neighbor. But democracy develops mutual esteem, as well as self-esteem; it develops in man the tendency to respect the opinion of his fellow man; for it makes his fellow man his equal. Thus two men laboring together in the factory to-day do not know who may be to-morrow a foreman, or ten years from

now the capitalist in control of the factory. Industry, education, social life, religion, as they exist in America, tend to make us have respect one for another.

Out of this grows public opinion, and a great respect for public opinion; sometimes a too great respect for public opinion; sometimes a belief in what Mr. Bryce has called "the infallibility of the majority," a belief that our fellow men when going together cannot go wrong. But this again is the defect of our virtue. Our virtue is a common life in which we are bound together, not merely by a ballot-box, a representative system, a form of government, but by the facts that we have been educated together in the same school, that we labor together without recognized class distinctions in the same industries. No man knows who will rise to a higher stage in the hierarchy of industry; every other man's opinion counts or may count for as much as our own; in order to get the other's opinion to weigh upon our side in politics, we must argue with him as a reasonable man, we must treat him as though he were guided by intellectual and moral principles. Thus democracy is not only in theory a brotherhood, but it tends to produce a true brotherhood, by creating that spirit of self-esteem which is one of the foundations of personal character, and that spirit of mutual esteem which is one of the foundations of organized society.

These tendencies enter into other than our for-

mally organized institutions — they enter into our homes. In Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress" the pilgrim is taken into the Interpreter's house and shown a fire burning in the grate. Beelzebub is throwing water upon the fire, and the more water he throws upon the fire the higher leap up the flames. The pilgrim cannot understand this phenomenon until the Interpreter takes him to the other side of the partition, where he sees an angel feeding the flames with oil, before unobserved. In our homes the flames of patriotism, of purity, of the higher life, are being secretly fed. Our homes are not all they ought to be, but, nevertheless, there are comparatively speaking few homes in America in which, on the whole, the influence is not for the higher and the better living. For this reason a great many fathers who never go to church are very desirous that their children should go to Sunday-school. For this reason a great many men and women who are ill educated themselves are determined that their children shall go to the public school.

Some years ago there was a man in New York who had the newspaper reputation of being the wickedest man in the city. He became a newspaper sensation, and, with some companions, I went down in my college days to make him a call. We were cordially welcomed, and had an interview. He had two sons. One of them, he told us, "is not very bright, but he is a good boy, and I have sent him up to his grandfather's to study,

and he's going to be a minister. The other is as smart as a steel trap." He stood this other boy on the table before us to give us a declamation. "He's going into politics," he said. I asked, "Where will he get his education? Here?" "Oh, no; just as soon as he is old enough I shall send him away from this place to a boarding-school." What became of the boys I do not know; whether the education the father planned for them made of one of them a minister and the other a United States Senator I cannot tell; but this I know, that the father, who kept one of the lowest and worst dens in the city of New York, desired a higher and better life for his boys than he had himself.

While thus our homes are feeding more or less effectively the higher life in the community, our great educational systems are doing much in the same direction. I have already in this course of lectures criticised our public-school system as inadequate, especially in the one direction of moral culture. But in spite of this defect, which we are gradually learning to be a defect, our public-school system is not only an intellectual, it is also a moral educator. Let any man to-morrow morning walk down one of the streets of any of our great cities in the vicinity of one of its public schools, let him see the children hastening to school, not with the lag-gard steps which Shakespeare attributed to school-children, but with eager and glad faces; or let him, later in the day, watch those same children

as they come out from school, and see them carrying their too heavy load of books home for study, — or pretended study, — and then let him try to estimate the value of this education as it is carried on in town and country in every state in the Union. With all its deficiencies and with all its defects and errors, I know not how any American can look on that sight and doubt that from this public-school system is going forth an influence to make worthy citizens of America. Had I the eloquence of an orator, I would like to stop here to pay the tribute that is due to the great army of teachers who are pursuing their work, often with little salary, often in inconvenient quarters, often with inadequate equipment, often with what is worst of all, suppression of their energies and their activities by the great machine of which they are a part and which does not give them the liberty they ought to have. I would like to stop and pay a tribute to this uncanonized sainthood of America; if they have not the cross worn on the bosom, they deserve the crown given by the people.

Another influence making for the better life of America, and for its permanence, is that proceeding from our literature — and from our cheap literature. Many years ago, when the phrase “dime novel” was a stigma, Mr. Fletcher Harper, of the firm of Harper & Brothers, said to me: “I may not live to see the day, but you will, when the best English classics will be sold in America for a dime.” I have lived to see it! No man in

America to-day need be without a library worth the reading. The library may be poorly bound and ill printed, but it will contain the noblest thoughts of the noblest thinkers. There are few so poor that they cannot have within their own home a better collection of literature than our grandfathers of very considerable means were able to possess. This tendency toward a higher type of literature seems to me, from all I can learn from inquiry, to be widespread and substantially universal. A few years ago I was in conversation with Mr. Poole, whom many will know as the editor of "Poole's Index," and who was the librarian of the great Chicago Library. Mr. Poole said to me substantially, "It is the common thing for shop-girls to come into this library to get books, and begin with Miss Southworth, and then follow successively with E. P. Roe, Walter Scott, Charles Dickens, Thackeray, George Eliot, and then some of the best histories and some of the best essays." I fell into conversation a year or two ago with a gentleman traveling on a train, who introduced himself to me as a representative of the American News Company. He said that ten or fifteen years ago he was chiefly selling through the country a cheap, poor literature; to-day he found the greatest demand to be for the highest and the best. It is a question what is the ultimate effect of what we call sensational literature. That it sometimes degenerates and deteriorates the mind, I do not doubt; but, on the whole, I

believe that even the sensational literature teaches people to read; and when they have learned to read, they generally learn to read what is better, though very gradually.

Next to literature as an educative influence in America is the press. It is as customary for ministers and platform orators to jeer at newspapers as it is for newspapers to jeer at ministers and platform orators; but despite many and serious defects in the American press, it renders us one great service — it holds the mirror up to American life, and shows us what that life is. It does not always show it in right proportions. The mirror is not always a well-formed mirror; it is sometimes like one of those convex or concave mirrors that stand in the agricultural fairs — that present your face so out of proportion that you do not recognize yourself when you look in it. Nevertheless the press does bring American people to self-consciousness. If we do not like the records of vice and crime, of ignorance and poverty, which we read in our newspapers, let us change the life. If, when we look in the looking-glass, the face is dirty, it is the face we need to wash, not the looking-glass. The American press, though defective in leadership, though it appeals too much to the sensational, though it lacks in seriousness, sobriety, earnestness, conscience, — qualities which it ought to possess and which I trust it will yet possess in the future, — does one great educative work: it brings the whole history of yesterday before us. I am

glad that it brings the history of the bad as well as of the good. We do not want in America a press which only portrays our virtues and forgets our vices. An *index expurgatorius* administered by one carefully selected tribunal is a very doubtful advantage to the intellectual and moral well-being of the world; an *index expurgatorius* administered in every newspaper office through the country, shutting off what the editor thinks we ought not to read, and allowing us only to know what he thinks we ought to read, would be a very poorly censored press indeed. Let us have from the press the truth, the whole truth, and — also — nothing but the truth.

It is a question much debated whether our politics are not deteriorating; perhaps you may suspect me of being an optimist when I say that I think, on the whole, the American elections are a great preservative of American life.

In the first place, our general suffrage, with all the perils it has brought, furnishes a safety-valve, and a very valuable and important safety-valve. Ignorant voting, it is said, is a peril to the community; so it is; but it is a fair question whether a great ignorant population that cannot vote is not quite as great a peril to the community. The peril is primarily in the ignorance, only secondarily in the voting. The Revolution of France was due to the fact that the great under-population of France had no remedy in their hands but the remedy of a violent revolution. England came near

to a similar revolution in the great Chartist movement, and escaped it by extending the suffrage. When a man has the ballot, he will not resort to the bullet. The anarchists in Chicago are wise in their day and generation in urging their followers not to vote, and in insisting to them that voting does them no good. The fact that a discontented minority can express its will at the polls is itself a protection against the discontented minority. Americans generally are willing to let the majority rule, so long as the minority have an opportunity for free discussion and the free expression of their conviction.

These elections not only furnish a safety-valve, they also furnish a great education. What we call a "campaign" is really a great debate. The whole American people gather together to discuss questions which in an undemocratic community would be left to be settled by a few experts. The result of this discussion is the development of intelligence and of character. If a man has but little judgment, the way to give him more is to bid him exercise what little he has; and this is what we do in every political campaign. Four or five years ago throughout the West night-schools were organized by the two political parties for the discussion of the financial problem; and out of these night-schools grew an understanding of currency questions such as never before had existed in America. Every great election is an education; we go to school every four years in the

nation, every two years in the state. Perhaps it would be as well if the school terms were shorter and did not come so often; nevertheless, though inconvenient, they are great educators.

Moreover, in these elections a comparatively small number of conservative men hold the balance of power. Even when an election is carried by an apparently overwhelming majority, the majority is rarely more than five per cent. This five per cent. of voters which may turn the scale one way or the other is always, in the last analysis, made up of men who hesitate between the two parties; they determine the election, and because they determine the election, their judgment and that of those whom they represent must be taken account of by those who are carrying on the government. If in the last election Mr. Bryan had been elected, he would have had to take account of those gold Democrats who voted for him in spite of his free-silver policy, and of those Americans who voted for him with the belief that we cannot leave the Philippines until liberty, justice, and order are established there. Similarly Mr. McKinley must pay regard to those who voted for him because they could not accept the free-silver policy of Mr. Bryan, and are yet opposed to the commercial spirit in government, or because they were not willing to leave the Philippines to themselves, though they are intensely hostile to the establishment of an imperialistic or quasi-imperialistic government either at home or abroad. The

people are never as radical as their radical leaders; the voters never go as far as the men who speak on the stump to get the applause of the citizens who listen. In all great engines there is what is called the "governor" — two revolving balls which, rising and falling, regulate the pressure of steam and so the speed of the engine. This five per cent. of voters is the automatic governor in our elections which prevents us from running into one extreme or another in our public life.

Our churches are another great factor in the safeguarding of democratic institutions. Whether they possess the power or the influence which they once possessed is a question not necessary here to discuss, but I believe they possess a greater power in democratic America than they do in any country where they are patronized and supported by the state. The power of the minister who speaks Sunday after Sunday to congregations gathered there, and who can speak on the great moral themes that concern the nation without being either Democratic or Republican, Populist or Prohibitionist, can, if he will, so speak as to send men back to the polls with a higher conscience, a greater regard for purity, a greater purpose to serve their country well. The influence of all the clergy of the country in this direction is one not easy to overestimate. Nor does the Christian religion express itself only through churches and ministers. If indeed the church is losing its power, it may be only that the Christian religion

may gain in its power. If the alabaster box is being broken only that the odor of the ointment may break out and fill the whole house, we can look on the result without regret. Certain it is that the moral and religious influences which a hundred years ago went almost exclusively from ministers and through churches are now diffused through newspapers, magazines, periodicals, and personal gatherings to an extent never before known.

All these influences are tending to make out of heterogeneous materials a homogeneous people, filled with a passionate patriotism. There is no people that love their country more than the American people, and in America no people that love their country more than the foreign immigrants who have come here seeking for the broader opportunity and the higher life. These men, who have broken away from old associations and old traditions, who have sacrificed sentiment and endured poverty and privation that they might come to an America that would treat them like men, give them the education of men, give them the opportunities of men in industry, give them the liberty of men in the church, and give them a share with other men in the control and direction of the destinies of their nation—these German immigrants, Irish immigrants, Italian immigrants, Hungarian immigrants, love America. Nor have we thus far found it difficult—nor shall we in the future—to bring them into harmony with that

great brotherhood which is the essential spirit of American institutions.

Democracy is not merely a political theory, it is not merely a social opinion; it is also a profound religious faith. May I phrase it as it exists in my own experience? I believe in man because I believe in God; I believe in God because I believe in man. I believe in humanity because I see God in all men; I believe in God because in all humanity I see something of his illumination, some reflection of his image, some sign of his sonship, some promise of his revelation. This one fundamental faith in the Fatherhood of God and in the universal brotherhood of man, which is the essence of democracy, is more important as the basis of democracy than past history, more important than political or industrial or educational or religious institutions, more important than the influence of the individual, more important than home or church or state or popular elections.

What this faith involves and what it anticipates as the ultimate goal of democracy will be the subject of the next and closing lecture in this series.

LECTURE XII

THE GOAL OF DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRACY, as it has been defined in these lectures is Social Christianity, that is, it is the product which results or will eventually result from applying to society the precepts and principles inculcated by Jesus Christ. Therefore in the teachings of Jesus Christ are we to look for the goal of democracy.

Jesus Christ began his ministry by declaring that the Kingdom of God, initiated by Moses and foretold in its consummation by the prophets, was at hand. He gathered a few disciples about him to help him while he lived, and to carry on his work of revival and reconstruction after his death. He made clear to them what this work was, by his constant use of the phrase "kingdom of God," or "kingdom of heaven," and by the petition which he taught to his followers, "Thy Kingdom come, thy will be done in *earth* as it is in heaven." He came not primarily to prepare men for a kingdom in heaven, but to inspire them with the spirit of heaven on the earth. To borrow a figure from the one disciple, who of those who companioned Christ on earth understood him best, the Kingdom

of God is like a city which descends out of heaven, but to abide on the earth as the dwelling-place alike for God and for men, that God may be with men. That the object of Christ's coming was not to enable a few men to escape from a lost world, as Bunyan's Christian escaped from the City of Destruction, but the creation of a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness, is evident from even a casual study of Christ's teachings.

There are five great discourses of Jesus Christ, which correlated with one another make clear the generic purpose of his ministry. The first of these discourses is his sermon at Nazareth, the first public sermon of which we have any record. He stood up in the synagogue, it is said, and read from the prophet Isaiah the prophecy: "The spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach glad tidings to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovery of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord." "This day," he said, "is this scripture fulfilled in your ears." This is something to be fulfilled on the earth. It is on the earth that the poor are to hear glad tidings, and the broken-hearted are to be healed, and the captives are to be delivered, and the blind are to be given their sight, and the bruised are to be set at liberty. This is an earthly deliverance in that it is to be accomplished on the earth; a divine deliverance in

that it is to be accomplished by the spirit of Jehovah in Jesus Christ and his followers.

Jesus Christ's second great sermon begins where the first ends. The first prophesies the diffusion of happiness, the second explains the secret of happiness: "Blessed are the poor in spirit; the meek; they which hunger and thirst after righteousness; the merciful; the pure in heart; the peace-makers. Happiness — this is Christ's second fundamental principle — depends upon what we are, not upon where we are; upon character, not upon possessions. This is the theme of Christ's second great sermon, and this principle is clearly as applicable to the terrestrial as to the celestial sphere. Meekness, mercifulness, purity, peaceableness are divine virtues in that their spring and source are divine; celestial virtues, in that we must believe that the happiness of heaven depends upon their existence and manifestation there; but they are earthly virtues in that they are to be exercised on the earth. They are the bonds which bind together scattered humanity in a divine social order; they are the life blood which animates it and makes it a living organism.

Jesus Christ's third great sermon is contained in the parables by the seashore. In this sermon, or this series of sermons, Christ makes it clear to his disciples that the Kingdom of God which he has come to establish on the earth cannot be made instantaneously by a miracle; indeed it cannot be made at all; it must grow, and growth takes time.

It is like a seed growing secretly, no one knows how; it is like a seed sown in all soils, friendly and unfriendly, and its fruitfulness depends upon the soil; it is like a seed sown in a field where an enemy has sown tares, and grows up side by side with that which is not a part of the Kingdom of God; it is like leaven hidden in three measures of meal, which by agitation and ferment it will in time pervade and radically change. These parables all illustrate an earthly growth, under earthly conditions, despite earthly opposition, and producing earthly results. The seed is divine; the growth process is divine; but the result is earthly, that is, it is a result wrought out upon the earth.

Christ's fourth great sermon is that on the Bread of Life, preached in the synagogue at Capernaum. This sermon is all summed up in the words: "I am the living bread that came down from heaven. . . . As the living Father hath sent me and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me." Here is the same truth: a kingdom of heaven on the earth; a will of God done on the earth. The bread comes from heaven, but it comes down to the earth, and is eaten on the earth, and they that eat live by it on the earth. Christ who lives by the Father lives on the earth; the disciples who live by Christ live on the earth; the kingdom nurtured by and dependent on the divine life is a kingdom on the earth.

In his fifth great sermon Christ makes clear

the nature of this kingdom which he came to establish, this new social order which he came to organize. "Be not ye called Rabbi," he says to his followers, "for one is your Master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren. And call no man your father upon the earth, for one is your Father which is in heaven. Neither be ye called Master: for one is your Master, even Christ. But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant." The kingdom of God which Christ has come to establish on the earth is a human brotherhood, founded on and inspired by faith in one Father, over all and in all, and in one Christ, Master of all and Saviour of all.

This brotherhood which Jesus Christ came to establish on the earth is not theological or ecclesiastical; that is, it is not a brotherhood founded on a common opinion in the realm of religious thought. There is such a brotherhood. Men of like intellectual tastes and opinions naturally affiliate with each other: the artist with his brother artist, the lawyer with his brother lawyer, the doctor with his brother practitioner. And the deeper the convictions and the more they enter into the spiritual nature, the closer will be the fellowship. But this is not the brotherhood which Jesus Christ has come to establish. It is not based on, it does not spring from, a common creed. A Roman centurion came to Jesus praying for the healing of his daughter; and the Jewish elders commended him as worthy because he

had built a synagogue for them. But Christ found in the centurion something better than ecclesiastical kinship: "I have not found," he said, "so great faith, no not in Israel." He once told a story of a heretical Samaritan who helped a robbed and wounded traveler, and so told it as to extort even from Jewish listeners the confession that he was more truly neighbor to the man who fell among thieves than were the orthodox priest and levite who passed him by. To Jesus Christ the bond of a common humanity was far more than the ecclesiastical or theological bond.

The brotherhood which Jesus Christ came to establish is not founded on social affinity. It is not a brotherhood of congenial spirits. This also is a real brotherhood. We like, and we have a right to like, those who share our tastes, who belong to our circle, whose life harmonizes in its intellectual activities and its social forms with ours. But this was not the brotherhood Jesus Christ emphasized. Society was in his time and country divided into social cliques and castes far more sharply than it is in ours. These lines Jesus Christ habitually disregarded. He might have preached to the lower circles and no one would have criticised him. But he treated the publicans and sinners as brethren; he made social companions of men and women who did not share the political views of the aristocracy, nor possess the social customs of the aristocracy, nor even conform to the ethical standards of the aristocracy.

This was an unpardonable offense in the eyes of the best society of his time. The brotherhood he came to establish included men of all social circles as it included men of all religious beliefs.

This brotherhood which Jesus Christ came to establish on the earth is not limited by any considerations of race. Blood is said to be thicker than water. The American meeting abroad an American recognizes in him a kinsman; and in a more catholic spirit, the American recognizes in the Anglo-Saxon in England, as the Englishman in the Anglo-Saxon in America, what Mr. Gladstone has well called "Kin across the sea." But brotherhood as interpreted by Christ includes men of all races. The race prejudices of his time were far greater than they are in ours. Christ never denied that there are race differences and race inequalities. He declared to the woman of Samaria that salvation is of the Jews, and that they knew whom they worshiped, while the Samaritans did not. He told his disciples that he was not sent except to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. He directed them to begin their missionary work among their own people, and to them he himself confined his own ministry. But he also declared in explicit terms that the men and women of other races were his brethren. The prejudice that set them apart by themselves, as uncared for by God and incapable of manhood, he condemned. In his first recorded sermon, he told the amazed and angry congregation that God cared for the Samari-

tan and the Syro-Phœnician, and proved it from their own history, and they mobbed him for his audacity.

The brotherhood which Jesus Christ came to establish was founded neither on consanguinity, nor race, nor congeniality in character, nor agreement in opinion: it was founded on the one simple and fundamental fact that God is the God and Father of the whole human race, the Father of whom, as Paul says, every fatherhood in heaven and in earth is named. Because all men can call God Father, because to all men Christ is a Deliverer, whether they are Caucasian, Indian, Chinaman, or African, whether wise or foolish, cultivated or uncultivated, good or bad, therefore all men are brethren; they are brethren because one is their Father which is in heaven. To deny the Fatherhood of God, as the socialist has sometimes done, is to deny the only basis on which the brotherhood of men can rest, and to disintegrate society into antagonistic races, antagonistic nations, antagonistic classes in the same nation. To deny the brotherhood of man, as ecclesiasticism has sometimes done, is to deny the Fatherhood of God, and to relegate humanity to a class, a national, a tribal or a race religion, or to none at all.

The primitive church began in the faith that the risen Christ would return in that generation and establish by a miraculous display of kingly power this new theocracy. The Jewish Christians could not at once abandon their Jewish belief that

the theocracy was to be a world kingdom in its form and spirit as well as in its dwelling-place. Gradually, however, this hope gave place to another, that the Empire of Rome might be transformed into such a theocracy. The Apostle John saw in a vision the time when the kingdoms of this world would become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ. The bitter persecutions of the Christians by pagan Rome destroyed this hope. Then another took its place. The church was itself regarded as the kingdom of God; the Pope was his vicar; loyalty to him was loyalty to the Great King whom he represented; the Papal decrees were regarded as divine decrees, much as the Ten Commandments brought down from the mountain by Moses were regarded as the laws of Jehovah; and the faithful, united in one creed and in one ecclesiastical organization, constituted the kingdom of God. Corruption entered the church; castes grew up in it; pagan pomp invaded it. Then devout souls separated themselves from the world and from the church, though in loyalty to the church, and constituted themselves an *imperium in imperio*, a brotherhood in a brotherhood, a theocracy in the theocracy. Such were the Franciscan friars, the Brothers of the Poor, such the monastic and conventual establishments scattered throughout Europe. These grew rich, lazy, corrupt, and lost the spirit while retaining the form of brotherhood. Then at last despair of any kingdom of God on the earth took possession of

the church. The devout still prayed, "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," but they ceased to believe in their prayer; they transferred their hopes from earth to heaven; they came to regard their life as but the preparation for a kingdom yet to come in another and a celestial sphere; they reversed the vision of St. John, and saw a city rising out of the earth and entering heaven; they ceased to teach men how to live, and thought it their function chiefly to teach men how to die; they separated religion from life, — forgot Micah's definition of religion as doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God, — forgot Paul's definition of religion as living soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, — forgot John's declaration that he that doeth righteousness is righteous, and abandoning commerce, trade, politics, and even education to the men of the world, retreated to cloisters to practice religion, not in devotion but in devotions, or confined their religious duties to sacred seasons and sacred places, and left their religion behind them when they returned to the world, or, with no hope of conforming the world to the precepts of the Master, counted it sufficient if they endeavored to conform their own lives thereto and saved themselves, and perhaps some others, out of the general wreck.

Yet all the time God, who works outside his church as well as within it, when and where and as he pleases, was inspiring society, partly by

means of the church, partly by reformers who were without the church, with aspirations for brotherhood. Gradually government was transformed, labor was emancipated, wealth was converted from idle hoards to the instruments of active industry, general comfort was enhanced, hospitals and orphanages and asylums were established and endowed, the ministry of medicine was made available for the poor as for the rich, justice was made not indeed absolutely free nor absolutely equal to all, but more nearly free and more nearly equal, public education was promoted and fostered, and by all these means the promise of Jesus Christ approximated fulfillment: the poor had glad tidings preached to them, and the acceptable year of the Lord was proclaimed.

At length a new continent was discovered, and a new world was opened for a new trial of the experiment of human brotherhood. The Puritans in New England, the Presbyterians in New York, the Quakers in Pennsylvania, the Roman Catholics in Delaware, the Episcopalians in Virginia, the Huguenots in the Carolinas, each brought from the old world a Christian faith, and each a partial conception of that kingdom of God which is so great that no church can ever adequately manifest it, and no prophet can ever adequately interpret it. But they also brought with them from the old world corruptions of the Christian faith, ethical and social as well as doctrinal. The feudalism of England and the reactionary and

revolutionary democracy of France mingled with the fraternalism born of an imperfectly apprehended Christian teaching in the birth of a brotherhood which is only partially Christian, and which it is the duty of the church to perfect and establish. Nor is it the least part of this duty to prevent the brotherhood of man from degenerating into a mere cant of politicians and professional reformers, to distinguish the brotherhood which Jesus Christ inculcated from the specious imitations which are labeled with its name, and to apply its essential principles to the solution of our social and national problems.

This rapid sketch of the social teachings of Jesus Christ, and their gradual and as yet imperfect recognition by Christendom, indicates the goal of democracy. It is the reconstruction of society, so that it shall embody these five principles: —

- I. The diffusion of happiness.
- II. Through the development of character.
- III. By a process of gradual growth.
- IV. The secret thereof being the indwelling of God in humanity.
- V. The end thereof being a brotherhood of man centred in God as the Universal Father.

Let us consider these principles as they appear, though imperfectly developed, in the American Democracy of to-day.

- I. The aim of democracy is the extension and diffusion of happiness; it purposes to make happi-

ness universal. For this reason it denies the right of men to separate themselves into classes and cliques, to concentrate happiness in the lives of the few and to leave wretchedness and misery in the lives of the many. In this respect democracy accepts the utilitarian theory of life. It does not accept it in so far as that theory determines all questions by their relation to happiness; it does accept it in so far as that theory declares the true end, the divine end, of life to be the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

There are four great material enemies to human happiness: war, poverty, pestilence, and famine. Democracy sets itself resolutely to combat all four.

Democracy is unalterably opposed to war; the military spirit and the democratic spirit are essentially antagonistic to each other. Wars may be sometimes necessary — I believe that they are sometimes necessary — but if so they are a necessary evil. The spirit that regards war as an advantage, that desires war for its own sake, that exalts and glorifies militarism, is in direct contradiction to the spirit of democracy. For war can only be carried on successfully under an autocracy. A nation which is armed and equipped for war is of necessity under a commanding general, and a commanding general must be an autocrat. War cannot be carried on by a committee; the experiment has been tried more than once, and always with failure. An army cannot by universal suffrage determine how a campaign against an enemy

shall be conducted. An army is necessarily an autocratic organization, and an armed nation — a nation which is an armed camp — is necessarily autocratic. Thus democracy is inherently, vitally, essentially opposed to the spirit of war; if it accepts war it accepts it only as a dire and unavoidable necessity, to be escaped from as soon as may be with honor. It is for this reason that democracy has found its way to contrivances which lessen the danger of war. It is for this reason that the most democratic country, America, contrived that federation of states and invented that Supreme Court of the United States which has served as an arbitrator between different communities, and has substituted reason for force as the means of settling interstate controversies. It is for this reason that in Europe the uprising of democracy has preceded the development if not the creation of international law, and preceded the organization of courts of arbitration and that final consummation of courts of arbitration — the creation of the international court at The Hague. Democracy is not only opposed to war, but democracy has invented or discovered the methods by which controversies between communities can be adjusted more rationally, more peacefully, and more in accordance with human happiness than by military force.

The second great enemy of human happiness is poverty. Democracy does not believe that poverty is a necessity. The fundamental tenet of de-

mocracy is that there is wealth enough in the world to make all men happy. This was certainly the tenet of Jesus Christ: "In my Father's house," he said, through one of the characters whom he portrayed, "is bread enough, and to spare." The world is the Father's house, and there is bread enough in the Father's house for all the Father's children. If any go hungry, it is either their own fault or else it is the fault of a vicious social organization. "Come," said Christ, in another parable, "for all things are now ready: go out into the streets and lanes of the city and bring in hither the poor and the maimed and the halt and the blind." And the servant did so and returned with the statement, "Still there is room." This lesson Jesus Christ repeats in more than one parable. We have given to these parables a spiritual interpretation, and doubtless they deserve a spiritual interpretation, but they deserve the other interpretation also. On their face they carry with them this great economic truth, that there is in the world, provided by the Father, enough for all his children, so that none need go in want.

If war can be avoided and pauperism can be avoided, the other two great evils would disappear themselves, for pestilence and famine are the children of war and pauperism. Pestilence has followed close upon the heels of war, and when war has not produced it pauperism has; it has grown inevitably out of insanitary conditions, due, not only to ignorance, but also to poverty and the kind

of vice which is connected with and fostered by poverty. Given universal education and universal competence, and pestilence would cease from the earth; nor would famine find a place if wealth were so equitably distributed that all men had sufficient for their own sustenance. Thus democracy seeks the happiness of all men, not only in its dreams, but in its definite plans. Its progress thus far has been a progress toward the cessation of war and the substitution of arbitration, and toward the division of wealth and the end of pauperism. Christ's parables are full of joyousness; dancing, singing, festivity, happiness ripple over the surface of his instructions; and they are phases of happiness not for the few, but for the all. Democracy has already made some approximation to this broad diffusion of happiness. We have not in America as many splendid palaces as in the old world, but we have more comfortable homes; we have not in America the lordly parks, but, save in our great cities and a few of our factory towns, we have a little plot of ground around the home of each individual tenant.

II. This universal happiness democracy seeks to accomplish by the development of character, a principle which democracy borrows unconsciously from Jesus Christ. It simply needs to understand Christ's principles more clearly and apply them more unflinchingly.

Jesus Christ gives no support by his teaching to either communism or socialism. He does not

teach with Proudhon that property is theft; nor with Tolstoi that accumulation of property is sinful; nor with St. Francis of Assisi that poverty is a virtue. On the contrary, he affirms that inequalities in wealth are a part of the divine order. In the parable of the ten talents the Lord gives to his servants in different measure, to one five talents, to another two talents, to another one, "*to every man according to his several ability.*" The notion that all men are to have equal possessions and the notion that all men possess equal abilities are alike foreign to Christ's teaching. Moreover, each man is to use his ability to increase his wealth. The man who trades with five talents and makes them ten, and the man who trades with two talents and makes them four, are commended; the man who wraps his one talent in a napkin and adds nothing to it is condemned. If he had not the ability to increase his store, he might at least have loaned it to some one who possessed the capacity which he lacked. It is not wealth which Christ condemns, nor the accumulation of wealth, but the hoarding of wealth. The man who invests his money in fine dresses to become food for the moths, or buries it in the earth to become a prey to robbers, Christ castigates. The farmer, who when his harvests yield abundantly, can think of nothing better to do with his grain than to stock it in barns for his own enjoyment, he calls a fool. The rich man who spends it in clothing himself in purple and fine linen and

in faring sumptuously every day, while want lies unrelieved at his door, he declares worthy to be an outcast in the world to come. In all this he condemns not wealth, but the hoarding, the ostentation, the inhumanity, which are the vices to which wealth tempts. For these vices Christ's remedy is not the self-imposed poverty practiced by Francis of Assisi, nor the common ownership of wealth proposed by Fourier and Robert Owen, nor the incongruous and unreal admixture of peasant and princely condition assumed by Tolstoi: Christ's remedy is the practical application of the doctrine that wealth is a trust, that every man is a trustee, that all that he has and all that he is are to be used for the welfare of his fellow men; that it is not the ability to make money, but the ability to use it for the common welfare that alone makes any man worthy of the respect of his fellow citizens.


As little does Christ give support to state socialism. State socialism maintains that the state should own all the tools and implements of industry and should direct and control all its operations. Each individual is to do the work which the state allots, and to accept the recompense which the state awards. That the state may be free, each individual in the state is to be deprived of industrial freedom. That we may be rid of the dominance of the capitalist, we are to substitute therefor the dominance of the politician. This was not Christ's method. He had very little to say about the social organism. Government was de-

spotic, but he did not propose a republic; labor was servile, but he said nothing about slavery. He sought to bring men into filial relations with God and into fraternal relations with their fellow men, to inculcate the principles of brotherhood and inspire in them the spirit of brotherhood; then he left men, guided by these principles and inspired by this spirit, to make their own organizations.

Nor does Christ's teaching give any support to that type of democracy of which Rousseau is the most distinguished prophet, which declares that all men are equal in natural ability and therefore ought to be equal in social conditions. Jesus Christ never taught, by even remote implication, the natural equality of men; on the contrary, he recognized explicitly that some men are greater than others; but he furnished a new standard of greatness in the saying, "He that is greatest among you shall be your servant." In the social order of imperial Rome the greatest were the served, the inferior were the servants; in the democracy of France there was neither greatness nor littleness, neither superior nor inferior, neither master nor servant, all were equals; in the brotherhood which Jesus Christ has come to establish, the rich are the servants of the poor, the wise are the servants of the ignorant, the strong are the servants of the weak, the superior are the servants of the inferior. He that renders the greatest service is the greatest man. In the same hour in which Jesus Christ

washed his disciples' feet, — a service usually rendered by the menials for their lords, — he declared himself the Lord and Master of those whose feet he had washed.

In these three respects democracy has borrowed its principles from Jesus Christ. It has sometimes been inclined to try the experiments commended to it by Fourier, Karl Marx, and Rousseau; but experience has confirmed the teachings of its unacknowledged Master, and it has returned to the democracy of Jesus Christ. Communism, socialism, democracy all seek the same end — a beneficent reconstruction of the social order; but true democracy is neither communistic nor socialistic, but Christian. Socialism, that is state socialism, — and in essential principles communism and socialism are of kin, — seeks to change the social order without changing the individuals, democracy seeks to change the individuals that they may change the social order; socialism seeks the welfare of the individual by making him subservient to society, democracy seeks the welfare of society by making it subservient to the individual; socialism would make society free by destroying the freedom of the individual, democracy calls on society to protect the freedom of the individual that society may be free; socialism would make the state the owner of all wealth, democracy would make the state the protector of individual wealth; socialism would have the state carry on all the industries and would make every individual the



servant of the state, democracy would make the state a protector of individual industries and the state the servant of the individual; socialism puts the organization first, the individual second, democracy puts the individual first, the organization second; socialism expects to develop the individual, but chiefly through a change in the organization, democracy expects to develop society, but chiefly through the development of the individual. Thus these two, working to the same ends, work by diametrically opposed methods. The object of democracy is, first, to protect the rights of the individual, next, to develop the character of the individual, and third, to teach the individuals how to coöperate together to a common end.

It is because democracy lays this stress on individual character that it lays stress on the institutions which develop individual character. It is for this reason that so soon as a state becomes democratic it establishes a school system for the education of the individual. France becomes democratic, it establishes a state school system; England becomes democratic, it organizes the board school system; the Northern states become democratic, they organize a public school system; the Southern states become democratic, they organize a public school system; we wish to establish self-governing communities in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, and contemporaneously with the organization of civil government we organize a free school system. Democracy instinctively re-

cognizes the fact that we cannot have a self-governing state without educating the individuals and substantially all the individuals in the community.

For the same reason democracy develops individualism in religion. With imperialism goes naturally one church, one creed, one ritual, one ecclesiastical order; with democracy there goes naturally a variety of churches, of creeds, of rituals, of ecclesiastical organizations, because democracy insists on the development of the individual, and therefore on the right of the individual to frame his own creed, to worship according to his own ritual, to organize his own church. The innumerable variety of sects into which the church in America is divided is no accident; it is the inevitable result of the individualism which it is the object, deliberate or unconscious, of democracy to promote. Democracy believes that it is better to have great men and little churches than a great church and little men.

For this reason democracy tests everything by its relation to character — not always consciously, not always wisely, but intuitively and instinctively. It is thus to-day testing the churches in America. The workingmen are asking, Will the church help us? Will it make us better men? Will it make us happier men? Will it enlarge and enrich our life? I do not think they find altogether the right answer to their question, but they are justified in asking it. The church can add to the glory of God only by adding to the welfare and happiness

of his children; and if it fails to add to the happiness and welfare of his children, or if it fails to add to the welfare and happiness of those of his children who most need to have their happiness and welfare promoted, then, in so far, the church is a failure. Whether rightly or wrongly, this is the test which democracy applies to preacher, to priest, to church, to religious institutions of every kind. So long as we have a democratic America, so long it is certain we must have churches that will serve the common people, or the churches will cease to be supported by the common people. Democracy measures its institutions by their relation to human need.

In the same way it measures industry. It tests every industrial organization by the question: Is it making good men and good women? It is democracy which has insisted that the law shall interfere with industrial enterprises which are not making good men and good women. It is democracy which has insisted that child labor shall cease, that woman labor shall be limited, and that hours of labor for all men shall be defined. It is democracy which protests against any system of labor which requires a man to work twelve hours out of the twenty-four, and seven days out of the week. It is democracy which insists on shorter hours of labor and larger wages; not merely for the sake of the larger wages, not merely for the sake of the shorter hours, but for the sake of such leisure as will make development of the working-

men's life possible. This is the meaning of the blind, groping, ignorant, often impracticable, and sometimes revolutionary demands of labor organizations. This is the spur that drives them on, this the moral force that compels them. It is true that wages are better than wages ever were before, and that hours of labor are less than they ever were before. But it is also true that manhood is larger than it ever was before; that it needs more relief from toil and more opportunity for the development of the higher life than it ever did before. Democracy measures industry by its effects on character. It counts that a poor industrial system which grinds up men and women in order to make cheap goods.

That American democracy is not the same as the democracy of Rousseau, that it adopts as its principles not the falsehood that all men are equal or ought to be equal, but the truth that the greater the man the greater his obligation of service, we shall see in considering Christ's fifth principle that the kingdom of God is a brotherhood of men.

III. The third principle which Jesus Christ inculcated is that the kingdom of God comes by a peaceable process of growth; in other words, that the hope of society is not in revolution but in evolution.

This principle is alike seen in the Old Testament and in the New Testament. Both in Judaism and in Christianity social reforms have been only gradually wrought, so gradually as to excite the

impatience of some moral reformers and to provoke the scoffing skepticism of others. In the twelfth century before Christ slavery and polygamy were almost universal, and sacrificial ceremonialism was the only method of worshiping the gods. The Mosaic law abolished neither. But slavery was hedged about with such restrictions that by the time of Christ slavery had disappeared from Judaism; polygamy was interpenetrated by such moral influences that in Christ's time the harem was no longer known among the Hebrews, who are now distinguished by their marital fidelity; and the sacrificial system was at once so modified by ecclesiastical law and so interpreted by prophetic teaching that with the destruction of Jerusalem it disappeared forever from the Jewish religion, without in the least affecting the fundamental principles or the essential spirit of Judaism. The same doctrine that moral reforms to be effectual must be the result of a moral growth was, as we have seen, explicitly affirmed by Jesus Christ. His teaching, accordingly, though radical was never revolutionary; and so gradual has been the overthrow of slavery, the amelioration of war, the transformation of government, the emancipation of industry, the establishment of systems of popular education, the elevation of woman, and the development of the home, that, although these reforms have been absolutely confined to Christendom, some thinkers have believed them to be wholly due to other than Christian influences, and

some have even claimed that they have been accomplished in spite of Christianity.

This principle that evolution, not revolution, is the true method of enduring reform, and this spirit of patient waiting coupled with high endeavor, characterize that type of democracy the genealogy of which can be traced historically to the Hebraic commonwealth. The so-called revolutions in England have with one exception been developments of a larger life out of precedent conditions; and that one exception, furnished by the Puritan Commonwealth, did not survive Oliver Cromwell, and was followed by a disastrous moral and political reaction. In America the colonies reluctantly accepted revolution only when it was forced upon them as their only escape from the reëstablishment of a feudal system; our fathers, with equal reluctance, acquiesced in the immediate abolition of American slavery only when it became necessary as a means of preserving the nation; and in our own times the anarchist and the socialist, who propose to disregard the experiences and to discard the work of the past, get but an inattentive listening from but scant audiences. The democracy of America is essentially a conservative democracy. This characteristic is made the more striking by the contrast which it presents to the French democracy. In France the "men of the Book," the Puritans of France, disappeared in the massacre and the exile of the Huguenots; in their disappearance Hebraic Christianity disappeared;

Roman imperialism took an undisputed possession of the church as of the nation; the revolution of 1789 was equally a revolt against church and state; and its leaders, many of them men both of intellectual ability and noble spirit, had, or seemed to themselves to have, no alternative but to break absolutely with a past which was wholly reactionary, and begin anew. The comparative results of the French and the American revolutions remain to attest the wisdom of the third principle enunciated by Jesus Christ, that the development of society into a kingdom of justice and liberty must be by a process of gradual growth, not by one of instantaneous new creation.

IV. Democracy does not yet clearly perceive the fourth principle which Jesus Christ inculcated, namely, that the secret of all life is God dwelling in man and inspiring him to an ever higher life. And yet democracy already begins to feel after this truth, if haply it may find it; and I cannot but think that if it fails to see it clearly, it is partly because religious teachers have failed to see it clearly, or to present it so that others should see it clearly.

Democracy believes in law; it believes in government for the protection of person, of property, of the family, of reputation. Democracy has organized a strong government; the old fears that the United States would be but a rope of sand are no longer entertained by any students of American history. Democracy is as far removed from anar-

chism as it is from socialism. But law must be either imposed and enforced by authority from without, or imposed and enforced by authority from within. If the law comes from without, and is enforced by a power from without, the individual is, in so far, in subjection to some one other than himself; if the law comes from within, and is enforced by his reason and his conscience, the law thus within the man is a self-enforcing law; when a man lives under a self-enforcing law he lives in liberty. Law according to the Christian conception, law according to the Old Testament conception, law as more and more democracy is coming to see it, is the law of man's own nature. It is not an edict issued by a king, nor a statute framed by God; it is the law of man's own organism. The moral law is a part of his organism and a product of it. Those laws of the social order which bind men together in a great social organism are not made by man; they are made by the Creator of man; they are divine; but they are not external to man; they are not brought down to him at Mount Sinai, nor in the Sermon on the Mount. Mount Sinai and the Sermon on the Mount do but interpret them. This is the fundamental postulate of liberty: God appeals to the divine in man and finds in man himself the power to enforce all righteous laws. Thus the foundation of liberty is the recognition — intelligently or unintelligently — of a divinely organized law; not getting its authority from any human will, but from a divine will, and

from that will as it is manifested in the structure of the human soul, and as it finds its expression in the voice of the human reason and the human conscience. That God is in man, that man is of kin to God, that law derives its authority from the divine Lawgiver and not from the human czar, or from congress, or from a majority — this is the fundamental postulate of free institutions, this is the basic fact of democracy.

V. Christ not only declared that he had come to give human happiness to the world, and to give it by the development of individual character, to do this by a gradual process of growth, the secret of which would be a growing consciousness of the divine within them, but he taught them that when thus they were developed and came to the consciousness of this divine within them, they would be brought together into a great social organism. And he gave us a type and illustration which we should have perpetually before us, which should give to us our conception of the type of this organism and of the spirit which should animate it: "One is your Father which is in heaven, and all ye are brethren." The family is the type of the true social organism. The goal of democracy, as of Christianity, is a family or brotherhood of man.

The family is the first and oldest of organizations and is the parent of all other organizations. Out of the patriarchal family grew the patriarchal church; out of the patriarchal church the patriarchal government. Governments are but collec-

tions of families; the church is but a combination of households. As the family is the first, and as the family is the parent, so the family is the type. "Our Father" is more than an acknowledgment of our relation to God, it is an acknowledgment of our relation to one another; and this relation which we bear to one another is the relation of brothers in a family, as the relation which we bear to God is the relation of children to a father.

The first fact to be noticed is that in the family the ground of fellowship is in the parents. These children are brethren, not because they think alike, not because they have similar temperaments, not because they are naturally congenial to one another, but because they are children of the same father and mother. Loyalty to the father and mother makes the family one. So loyalty to God makes the human race one; this is the first and fundamental fact. A brotherhood of man — why a brotherhood of man? I can understand why I am brother to a man who is congenial to me, who thinks as I think and likes what I like; or why I am brother to the man who belongs to the same state or the same nation and has the same political interests that I have; or even why I am brother to the man who is neighbor to me and with whom I come in perpetual contact. But why am I brother to all men? Why am I brother to the man against whom I brush in the street-car, whom I shall never see again? Why am I brother to the man on the other side of the globe? What basis

is there for saying that I am brother to all men? Because deeper than consanguinity, deeper than race relationship, deeper than a common language, is this sublime fact: that we, all of us, rich and poor, black and white, American and Filipino, are children of God, made in his image, or at least being made in his image. This it is, and only this, that makes us brothers. It is as infidel to deny the brotherhood of man as it is to deny the existence of God, and it is as inconsistent with any large human progress to deny the Fatherhood of God as it is to deny the brotherhood of man. Atheism never can be made to consort with democracy.

The second fact to be noticed is that the laws which govern the family in their inter-relationship to one another are the laws which are to be projected into society and to govern men in their relations with one another. Mark the contrast between the laws which we recognize as laws of the family and those which we generally have assumed to be the laws of the social organism. For example: "Hire labor in the cheapest market and sell it in the highest market;" this is the silver-plated rule of industry; this is the basis on which it is supposed a harmonious social organism can be erected. Apply this rule to the family: Seek the wife who will render to you the greatest service and ask you for the least money; seek the husband who will pay the largest pin-money and ask of you the least service! What kind of a family

will that give? Take another aphorism of science misapplied to the social order — “struggle for existence, survival of the fittest.” Is this the rule of the family? The babe is laid in the mother’s arms, the unfittest infant on the face of the globe to survive, for there is no other infant that has not more capacity to take care of himself than the human infant. At once we all begin to study how this unfittest can survive. The boy must take off his noisy shoes when he enters the house, that he may not disturb this unfittest; the husband must be careful not to talk too loud in the adjoining room lest he awake the unfittest; he must get up in the middle of the night and walk with the unfittest, that the unfittest may be comforted and go to sleep. There is no service that we must not render for the little king, who is king because he is dependent; only as we love him, and care for him, and give ourselves in unrequited service to him, will he survive. If we were to take these two principles of the home and carry them out into our industries, if the problem of the capitalist was, how large wages he could give and still keep his business going, and the problem of the laborer, how much work he could give and still maintain the time necessary for his own highest manhood; if the problem in our life was to “bear one another’s burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ,” which is also the law of democracy; if we really believed that he who would be greatest among us should be the servant of all, can any one doubt

that the social problem which perplexes us would be solved?

Life is divinely organized for mutual service. The farmer gathers the raw material from the earth; the manufacturer converts it into objects which are useful to human life—the grain into flour, the wool into clothing; the railroad man takes this material, which is of no use where it is, and carries it across the continent to those regions where it is needed, from the overfed West to the underfed cities of the Atlantic border; the middleman takes what is transported and carries it to our individual houses; the banker regulates the money through which all this mysterious and intricate system of interchange is carried on; the lawyer determines for us what are the principles of justice by which we are to be governed in our dealings one with another in this intricate system; the doctor cures us when we are sick, or, if we are wise and he is also wise, keeps us from getting sick; the teacher gathers from all the experience of the past that which shall launch us into life with something of the wisdom acquired by our forefathers; and the preacher ministers the life and love of God to men to inspire them in all their labor. Life is organized for service, and the goal of democracy is the realization of that ideal in which every man shall look not only upon his own things, but also on the things of his brother; in which every man shall endeavor to help the weaker man through the hard places of life; in which

every man shall recognize that his place in life, wherever it may be, is a place for the service of others, not for self-service. In this truth, that life is a place for service, and he who renders the greatest service is the greatest man, not in the groundless notion that all men are equal in their abilities or endowments or ought to be equal in their office or function, is the foundation of democracy to be found.

Such seems to me to be the goal toward which that democracy whose source is to be traced to the Hebraic commonwealth has been steadily tending: universal happiness, founded on the development of character, wrought by a gradual process, inspired by the indwelling of God, and leading to the unification of the human race in one brotherhood, bound together by love, and manifesting itself in mutual service.

In bringing this series of lectures to a close, I sum up their results in a paragraph: The conflict of the centuries is one between the doctrine of pagan imperialism, that life and the world are made for the few, whom the many are to serve, and that of the Hebraic democracy, that life and the world are made for the many, and the great are to be their servants. This democratic or Hebraic or Christian doctrine involves: in politics, All just government is for the benefit of the governed; in political economy, The common wealth is for the benefit of the common people; in education, A fair opportunity for the development

of every individual; in religion, The right of every soul to learn for itself what it can of the Infinite, and to tell what it thinks it has learned. Of the Hebraic democracy the United States affords the best modern example; in the faithful application of these simple principles it will find the solution of its problems, both domestic and foreign. Its perils are great, but the grounds for hopefulness as to the final issue are greater. That issue, if it be successfully achieved, involves the material welfare of all the people, based on their intellectual and spiritual development; the freedom of the community, based on the recognition of a divine law enforced by reason and conscience; and a brotherhood of humanity, based on loyalty to one Father and manifested in glad service rendered by his sons as freemen to one another.

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
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